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
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NUMBER I

CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE AND DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

I. When we speak of "Christian Experience" certain problems at once suggest themselves—problems of importance for Dogmatic Theology. What is experience? Can we speak of "experience" in regard to the objects of religious faith and knowledge? What do we mean by "Christian experience"? How is its normal character to be determined? What is its value for Christian Apologetics? What is its importance in Dogmatic Theology and in regard to the knowledge of Christian truth? In the limits of this article we cannot hope to touch upon all of these problems. We wish, however, to indicate the nature of Christian experience, and from the point of view thus gained to point out its significance for religious knowledge and Dogmatic Theology.

Since the Erlangen theology reached its culmination in Frank, there have appeared a number of monographs on "religious experience" and "Christian experience" or "experience of salvation" (*Heilserfahrung*), as the Germans call it. In none of these monographs, however, is there any full or adequate treatment accorded to the place of Christian experience in Dogmatic Theology. In 1894 E. Haack¹ published an Address on the *Nature and Significance of*

¹ E. Haack, *Ueber Wesen und Bedeutung der christlichen Erfahrung*, 1894.

Christian Experience, in which, after setting forth the nature of Christian experience, he attempted to point out very briefly its significance for Christian faith, its relation to Scripture, and its place in religious knowledge. In 1898 E. Petran² wrote a book on the *Idea and Nature of Moral-religious Experience*, which is devoted almost exclusively to setting forth the nature of religious experience, especially in its relation to other forms of experience; this book contains practically nothing, however, concerning the use and significance of the idea in theology. Petran's book was the occasion of a short article by Schian³ on the *Idea of Experience in Dogmatics*, which touches on the nature of Christian experience; the determination of its normal or truly Christian character; its value as a ground of belief; and its significance for Dogmatics. All of these questions, however, are simply touched upon in the briefest possible manner. In the following year, 1899, and in the same journal, H. Holtzmann⁴ published two articles on the subject. He raises the question whether there is such a thing as religious experience, and, having answered this question affirmatively, proceeds to determine the "content" of religious experience in general. He remarks, however, at the outset that he does not intend to touch upon the questions of "how far Experience can be used as a source in Dogmatics, or whether and how it can be used to ground doctrinal propositions". The same thing is true of the monograph on *The Nature of Religious Experience* by G. Heine,⁵ which was published in 1900, and which confines itself to the subject indicated in the title.

² E. Petran, *Beiträge zur Verständigung über Begriff und Wesen der sittlich-religiösen Erfahrung*, 1898.

³ Schian, "Der Begriff Erfahrung in der Dogmatik"; *Protestantische Monatshefte*, 1898, pp. 378-388.

⁴ H. Holtzmann, "Ueber Begriff und Inhalt der religiösen Erfahrung", *Protestantische Monatshefte*, 1899, pp. 217-225, 270-285.

⁵ G. Heine, *Das Wesen der religiösen Erfahrung*, 1900. The recent book by H. Bois, *La Valeur de l'Expérience Religieuse*, 1908, discusses some of the problems connected with religious experience and religious epistemology, but gives no discussion of religious experience in relation to Dogmatic Theology.

There are, however, two recent monographs on Christian Experience, which do contribute to the subject of the relation of Christian Experience and Dogmatic Theology, though they are valuable chiefly from a historical point of view. In 1902 H. Sogemeier⁶ wrote a monograph on *The Conception of Christian Experience*, in which his purpose was to investigate its nature with especial reference to its application in Dogmatic Theology. By far the greater part of this essay, however, is devoted to a discussion of the nature of Christian experience. Only the last fifteen pages enter upon its application in theology, and this brief closing section is devoted chiefly to a defense of Schleiermacher's method over against that of Frank; though the author does indicate in what way Schleiermacher is to be corrected, and lays down two rules of method, or rather indicates how two main objections to his method are to be met. The recent book by K. Wolf,⁷ published in 1906, entitled *The Origin and Application of the Idea of Religious Experience in the Theology of the Nineteenth Century*, is helpful as a guide to the study of the historical development of the subject, taking up, as it does, the views of Schleiermacher, Hofmann, Plitt, Frank, and Dorner. Only four pages, however, are devoted to the author's discussion of the relation of Christian experience to religious knowledge. In these few pages Wolf simply repeats the criticisms which were made by H. Cremer and Kähler⁸ in reference to the attempt to make the Christian consciousness the source of theological knowledge, adding a few brief suggestions of his own.

In America, L. F. Stearns,⁹ late Professor in Bangor

⁶ H. Sogemeier, "Der Begriff der christlichen Erfahrung hinsichtlich seiner Verwendbarkeit in der Dogmatik untersucht", pub. in *Beiträge zur Förderung christl. Theologie*, VI, 1902, pp. 113-186.

⁷ K. Wolf, *Ursprung und Verwendung des religiösen Erfahrungsbegriffes in der Theologie des 19ten Jahrhunderts*, 1906.

⁸ Cf. H. Cremer in Zöcklers Handbuch III⁸, pp. 55ff.; Kähler, *Wissenschaft der christl. Lehre*,² p. 61.

⁹ L. F. Stearns, *The Evidence of Christian Experience*, 1890.

Theological Seminary, published a book in 1890 on the *Evidence of Christian Experience*. This is really a treatise in Apologetics, using the argument from Experience. Its attempts to find Christian doctrine implicated in Christian experience are only incidental. But in the Stone Lectures in Princeton Theological Seminary in 1900 Prof. F. H. Foster¹⁰ has sought to trace the contribution of Christian experience to the system of evangelical doctrine, following quite closely the view of Frank; and defending that theologian against the criticism of Kaftan.

From this brief enumeration of the recent literature on the subject, it can readily be seen that it is the question of the nature of religious, and especially of Christian experience, which has occupied the chief place in the discussions of the subject; and that the use of Christian experience as a source of Christian doctrine has been less prominent since the time of Frank's death, that is, during the last fifteen years. Sogemeier no doubt, as we have seen, has advocated the use of Christian experience in Dogmatics, and Schian, as we have also seen, would give it a large place as a norm of Christian truth. Foster has attempted to deduce a number of Christian doctrines from Christian experience. Nevertheless, the advocacy of an "experiential theology" in this sense has declined during the last twenty years. This is no doubt due in large part to the influence of Ritschl and the theologians who may in a general way be regarded as belonging to his school. Their emphasis on revelation through the historical Christ led them to criticise Frank's standpoint and method,¹¹ whereas Frank¹² saw in Ritschlianism a renewal of rationalism. Most of the literature upon

¹⁰ F. H. Foster, *Christian Life and Theology, or the Contribution of Christian Experience to the System of Evangelical Doctrine*.

¹¹ Herrmann, *Theol. Literaturzeitung*, No. 22, 1881, pp. 524ff. Kaftan, "Glaube u. Dogmatik", *Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, 1891, pp. 509ff. *Dogmatik* ³ and ⁴, 1901, p. 31. Also "Zur Dogmatik", *Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, 1903, pp. 505ff. Cf. also Gottschick, *Die Kirchlichkeit der sogenannten kirchliche Theol.*, 1890.

¹² Frank, *Die kirchliche Bedeutung der Ritschlsche Theol.*, 1888.

the subject has been largely in criticism or defense of Frank. H. Cremer criticised Frank's method in Zöckler's *Handbuch der theologischen Wissenschaften*. Kähler also discussed and criticised this theological method. Also several members of the Ritschlian school have written very fully in criticism of Frank's position.¹³ On the other hand, in the year 1900, in the *Beiträge* of Schlatter and Cremer, Daxer¹⁴ published a long article in defense of Frank against his critics.

The questions of the place of Christian experience as a ground of faith, and of the experiential argument for the truth of Christianity, have called out an extensive literature, and have been discussed by the Ritschlian school, as well as by Kähler and Köstlin. We shall not attempt to give any account of this discussion. A very good idea of its course can readily be obtained from the writings of Köstlin, Kähler, Reischle, and Wendt.¹⁵

II. When, now, we ask what is the nature of "Expe-

¹³ Cf., for example, Kaftan in his Art. "Glaube und Dogmatik", *Zeitsch. für Theol. u. Kirche*, 1891; *Dogmatik*^{3 and 4}, 1901, pp. 31ff.; also "Zur Dogmatik", *Zeitschr.*, 1903; also Herrmann, *Beweis des Glaubens*, 1889, pp. 173-184; Reischle, *Zeitschr. für Theol. u. Kirche*, VII, 216ff.; Gottschick, *Die Kirchlichkeit der sogenannten kirchlichen Theol.*, 1890, pp. 57ff.; Kattenbusch, *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl*³, 1903, pp. 73ff. Lobstein, *Einleitung in die evang. Dogmatik*, 1897, pp. 82ff.

¹⁴ Daxer: "Der Subjectivismus in Franks System der christlichen Gewissheit", *Beiträge zur Förderung der christlichen Theologie*, Jahrg IV, Heft 5. Daxer seeks to show that most of the criticisms on Frank rested on misunderstandings. He says that Frank's critics fail to distinguish between "Christian certitude" (*i. e.*, certitude of the truth of Christianity) and assurance of faith or certitude as regards one's own salvation (*Heilsgewissheit*); and that they also fail to distinguish the scientific question as to the ground of Christian certitude from the practical question how to bring an unbeliever to faith. It is true that Frank makes these distinctions clearly; but not all of his critics have failed to realize this, nor can their chief objections be so easily removed.

¹⁵ Köstlin, *Die Begründung unserer sittlich-religiösen Ueberzeugung*, 1893. Kähler, *Der sogenannte historische Jesus und der geschichtliche biblische Christus*², 1896. Reischle, "Der Streit über die Begründung des Glaubens", *Zeitschr. für Theol. u. Kirche*, VII, pp. 171-264; Wendt, *Der Erfahrungsbeweis für die Wahrheit des Christentums*, 1897; also *System der christl. Lehre.*, Teil I, 1906, pp. 58-72.

rience" in general and of "Christian Experience" in particular, we find a very considerable divergence of opinion so far as the "content" of Christian experience is concerned. This, however, does not concern us at present. We need to ask what is meant, from the formal standpoint, by the word "experience". The term is easier to describe than to define. All we shall attempt is a description of it. When we approach the term "experience" from the purely formal standpoint, we find quite general agreement as to its meaning. In general we may say that "experience" denotes a state or states of consciousness brought about by a contact, as immediate as possible, with an object, and through the appropriate channel on the part of the subject. Each of these ideas is determinative of the meaning of "experience", and each expresses practically the same thing from a slightly different point of view. Thus the term "experience" is used only where the contact with the object experienced is as immediate as possible. For example, with regard to the objects of sense perception the immediacy required excludes mediation through the mental or spiritual life of other men. We are told by someone that fire burns, but we do not call that an experiential knowledge of the fact. When, however, we put our finger in the flame, then we say that we know by experience that fire burns. When we turn from the objects of sense perception to the sphere of inner consciousness, we say that all the contents of our consciousness are the objects of an "immediate awareness" which makes it proper to say that they are objects of which we have experience or experiential knowledge. When, however, we have regard to the objective reference of these states of consciousness, then only those are experiential which give us an immediate knowledge of the object. Thus, we know by experience what reflective thought is in as far as such thought is included in the content of our consciousness, but as regards its objective reference we do not say that we have an experiential knowledge of the objective relations which are the objects of such reflective thought, and we distinguish

knowledge so gained from the experiential knowledge which we have of the reflective thought itself, as well as of the objects of sense perception.

The same thing holds true when we turn from the objects of sense perception and self-consciousness to the mental life of other men. Here, of course, such immediate contact with the object as has just been described, is by the nature of the case impossible. Nevertheless, we speak very properly of having an experiential knowledge of other men when their inner life is known to us through the medium of their outward acts or words and our sense perception and thought. In this way when we hear of the kindness of a certain man, we do not say that we have experienced his kindness, but only when we ourselves have seen his kind acts, do we say that we have an experiential knowledge of his kindness.

The other idea which we mentioned is also of importance in describing what is meant by the term experience, namely, that the contact with the object must be by the appropriate channel in the subject of the experience. With this idea in mind, we may distinguish between experience in a looser and in a stricter sense. Thus, for example, we may hear from others that fire burns. In this case we cannot speak of experience at all. We may see fire burning an object, in which case it is in a certain sense correct to say that we know by experience that fire burns. But we do not speak of experience in the strictest sense until we have ourselves been burnt by fire. The sense of sight is not the appropriate medium in this case, but the sense of touch. In like manner we may be told what is the love of a mother for her child, in which case, again, we do not speak of knowing it by experience. We may, however, see a mother's love exhibited in acts of self-sacrifice for her child, in which case we can in a looser sense speak of knowing by experience what is a mother's love. But we only speak of knowing a mother's love by experience in the stricter sense of the term when in our own lives and hearts we feel and know directly the love of our own mother.

This same distinction holds true of moral and spiritual experiences. Thus a man may have no experience in any sense of the term of the sinfulness of sin. This may be a truth of which he has simply been told. Or again he may have seen sin working destruction in the lives of others, and so in the looser sense may be said to know by experience the sinfulness of sin. But in the stricter sense an experiential knowledge cannot here be spoken of, because in this case the appropriate channel is one's own conscience or inner life or what the Scriptures call the heart. Hence, though the contact with the effects of sin in the above case be immediate, that is, not mere hearsay, the channel or means of appropriation is not the proper one. Consequently it is only when guilty conscience stands convicted and the sinner feels his guilt and pollution in the heart, that an experiential knowledge of sin can be spoken of.

Thus, in general, "experience" is a state of consciousness brought about by a contact with an object as immediate as possible, and received by the subject through the appropriate channel. It involves, therefore, an objective cause which produces it, and a capacity on the part of the subject for receiving the impressions from the object. The latter is just as essential as the former. We could have no experience of music if we were deaf, and no experiential appreciation of a symphony of Beethoven if, though not deaf, we had no musical sense.

When we come, now, to consider briefly the idea of religious experience, we can see that it does not differ formally from experience in general. It should be noted, to begin with, that the distinction between "inner" and "outer" experience is not adequate to differentiate religious experience from other forms of experience. This distinction, if an accurate one, would be insufficient for this purpose, since many so-called "inner experiences" cannot be called religious. But, in addition to this, the distinction itself involves a certain amount of confusion. All experience is from its very nature "inner experience", that is, it involves an "immediate aware-

ness" of its objects. The distinction between "inner" and "outer", therefore, is only a distinction between the objects of experience. And it is only from this standpoint, namely, that of the producing cause, that religious experience can be distinguished from other forms of experience. Religious experience, then, is a state of consciousness which is produced by a transcendent cause, that is, by God, and which gives an experiential knowledge of God. God may act upon the soul mediately or immediately. We can set no limits to His power. But, more or less remotely, ultimately religious experience is produced by God and terminates on God.¹⁶ Its presuppositions, therefore, are the existence of God, His knowableness, and the capability of man to know God, or the religious nature of man. And since God can be known only as He chooses to make Himself known, we may say that the presuppositions of general or natural religious experience are the existence of God, general revelation, and the image of God in man or man's religious nature, which alone makes

¹⁶ Whatever be the differences among theologians as to the content or essential nature of religious and Christian experience (*vid.* Köstlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-100; Petran, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-123, on the views of such theologians as Dorner, Frank, Lipsius, Reischle, Herrmann, Kähler, etc.), there is substantial agreement as to the idea of religious and Christian experience from the purely formal point of view. *Cf.*, for example, the definition of Petran, *op. cit.*, p. 124,—religious experience includes "alle die innere Vorgänge, welche im Geistesleben eines Menschen sich beobachten lassen, der unter den Einfluss des durch äussere Mittel auf unser Inneres wirkenden Gottes gekommen ist." *Cf.* Heine, *op. cit.*, pp. 25, 26—Experience in general is defined as "jede von aussen an uns herantretende sinnliche oder geistige Einwirkung, welche mit unserem eigenen seelischen Leben so verwächst, dass sie einen wesentlichen Bestandteil desselben ausmacht, und von deren Macht wir ein mehr oder minder klares Bewusstsein haben". These experiences are Christian experiences (pp. 75, 76) "wenn die Einwirkung als unmittelbar oder mittelbar von Christo ausgehend, mehr oder minder klar erkannt oder auch nur geahnt wird". *Cf.* also Sogemeier, *op. cit.*, in the *Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theol.*, 1902, p. 141. "Christliche Erfahrung ist das beim Anschauen der durch das Wort der ersten Zeugen übermittelten historischen Erscheinung Jesu Christi in den Gläubigen gewirkte Erlebnis Gottes, welches seinen vollen erfahrungsmässigen Character gewinnt in Verbindung mit der durch die Wirksamkeit des Heiligen Geistes gegründeten und erhaltenen christlichen Gemeinde."

him capable of receiving a revelation. So far, therefore, is it from true that religious experience is the sole argument in Apologetics, that on the contrary a very considerable body of philosophical apologetics is presupposed by general religious experience.

The idea of Christian experience is, from the purely formal standpoint, similar to that of general religious experience. If, namely, the object experienced and from which the determining influence goes forth is Christ, then the resulting state or states of consciousness are called Christian experience. When, therefore, we speak of Christian experience, we do not mean simply that the truth contained in some general religious experience is Christian in the sense of being like the teaching of Christ. This seems to be what Heine means by Christian experience in a "mediate" sense. Such an experience should not properly be called Christian at all. Christian experience is an experience of Christ or of God in Christ and through Christ. And it is an experience which is caused by Christ as the revealer of God. That is, Christian experience depends objectively on the special revelation which has become the necessary mode of revelation for sinful man, and this experience depends subjectively on the effect of Christ's Spirit upon the religious nature of man, fitting it to apprehend this revelation.

These matters will be taken up more fully presently, and need not detain us now. We simply mention them in order to set forth from the formal point of view the nature of Christian experience. It is, in a word, an experience the nature of which is determined by the nature of Christianity.

III. In asking what is the importance of Christian experience for the knowledge of Christian truth, it is necessary to go back again to the more general question of the relation of experience to knowledge. To answer this question adequately, it would be necessary to pass in review all the modern theories in epistemology and to state and defend a philosophical theory of knowledge. Such a task

cannot, of course, be attempted here. Certain general positions, however, must be laid down, in order that an adequate view of the relation of Christian experience to Christian knowledge may be attained.

That "experience" is important for knowledge goes without saying. Indeed, in a certain sense it is true that knowledge grows out of experience. But when it is said that knowledge grows out of experience, or that experience furnishes the raw material for thought, it is not at all meant that knowledge grows out of bare feeling, or that consciousness with its thought differentiations and content could grow out of a bare undifferentiated state of feeling. In a word, feelings do not produce ideas. What has just been said holds true in the sphere of the knowledge of the external world. When we say in this sphere that experience furnishes the material for knowledge, we do not mean that the first thing in our consciousness is a lot of bare feelings, nor even undifferentiated and unrelated sensations which the activity of thought in perception constitutes as related objects. It is true, of course, that a psychological analysis of the process of perception shows that its primary elements are sensations. But these do not exist for consciousness unrelated, and the percept or the object as perceived is the first thing given in the knowledge of the external world. Hence when it is said that experience conditions knowledge in this sphere, all that is meant is that perceptual experience furnishes the material for reflective and scientific thought, or as Kant would put it, for the categories of the understanding.

In precisely the same way, when it is said that experience is important in the general knowledge of God, what is meant is that experience has its place as a condition of knowledge in this sphere in the sense intended by an empirical religious philosophy, as over against Rationalism (in the philosophical sense of the term) and Mysticism. Rationalism in both its forms sought to discredit experience as a source of religious knowledge. The object of Kant's

attack was what is called "Dogmatic Rationalism"; and the classic example of this abstract use of reason to the neglect of experience, as Sogemeier has pointed out,¹⁷ was the so-called ontological proof or argument for the existence of God. By pure reason, that is, by means of the idea or conception of God, it was sought to prove God's existence. It was, in part, to attack this use of the reason that Kant wrote his *Critique of Pure Reason*, in which he sought to show the necessary place which experience occupies in knowledge as furnishing its content, thus setting aside "Dogmatic Rationalism".

But Kant arbitrarily took over Hume's conception of experience, and without warrant limited the term or notion to its sensational form or aspect. In consequence of this he held that all ideas transcending the sphere of sense perception and scientific cognition, that is, all religious ideas, were without "content", and hence that no "theoretic" knowledge in the religious sphere was possible. In other words, he too discredited experience in religious knowledge, and sought to vindicate the objects of religious knowledge as moral postulates. His religious philosophy may be called ethical Rationalism to distinguish it from dogmatic Rationalism.

On the other hand, Mysticism, neglecting all ordinary experience as a source of religious knowledge, sought to show that all religious ideas spring from the direct contact of God with the soul, influencing its feelings, out of which religious knowledge was supposed to spring.

Now, over against Rationalism in both its forms, and this type of Mysticism, an empirical religious philosophy may be said to be one which vindicates a place for ordinary experience as a source of religious knowledge, or which seeks to show that we can know God as He has revealed Himself, and that this knowledge is in harmony with the rest

¹⁷ Cf. on this whole subject, Sogemeier, *op. cit.*, in *Beiträge zur Förderung christl. Theologie*, 1902, pp. 115ff.

of our knowledge. This is all that we mean by saying that experience is important for religious knowledge.

On the other hand, it is not meant that religious ideas spring from and are but the symbols of the life of religious feeling and sentiment. We are not now concerned to point out how inadequate is this view of Sabatier's in regard to Christianity. When we have made the doctrinal content of Christianity to be simply the product of the religious life, we have done away with Christianity, because we have explained away as mere symbol all that distinguishes Christianity from natural religion. But we are now speaking of religious knowledge in general; and the theory of religious knowledge just mentioned is inadequate in natural religion just because general religious feeling or sentiment presupposes an intellectual content given by general revelation. For in order that a mere feeling of dependence upon a higher power or feeling of elevation above the compulsion of natural motives may have any really religious significance, we must refer our religious sentiments to God as their object and cause. In other words, before we can speak of really religious experience, we must make the presupposition that certain qualities and attributes which are involved in our conception of God are thus experienced by us, that is, a conception of God lies at the basis of religious experience.¹⁸ Hence when it is said that experience conditions religious knowledge, it is not meant that religious ideas are the product of feeling, but only that an empirical philosophy of religion, in the above indicated sense, is valid as against philosophical Rationalism.

Passing from religious experience in general to specifically Christian experience, it will be seen that its importance as well as its limitations in relation to the knowledge of Christian truth, are determined by a certain dualism, if I may so speak, or at least a certain distinction between Christian knowledge and natural knowledge. This distinction is not the Kantian distinction between the theoretic and the

¹⁸ Cf. H. Holtzmann, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

practical reason, nor the Ritschlian distinction between theoretic and religious knowledge. These distinctions introduce a species of dualism into human nature and experience which tends to rob religious knowledge of theoretic validity and so to culminate in religious agnosticism. Those who distinguish thus between religious and theoretic knowledge do not mean that the essence of Christianity consists in mere internal feeling or ethical ideas. On the contrary, they insist that Christianity implies a Christian view of the world; and that the question is as to the nature of the grounds of this world-view. There is, however, a twofold danger in this distinction. In the first place, in seeking to base religious knowledge on purely internal grounds or immanent states of feeling, there is danger that the essence of Christianity be reduced to a merely natural ethical content. And this has actually taken place. In the second place, notwithstanding the fact that theologians like Kaftan and Wendt have sought to modify the position of Ritschl in this matter, the logic of a position which introduces this sharp dualism into human knowledge is, as was said, to rob religious knowledge of theoretic validity, and so to culminate in religious agnosticism.

Moreover, this distinction is not in accordance with the facts of the case. For example, Kaftan¹⁹ distinguishes theoretic and religious knowledge in the following way: He says that, though ordinary or theoretic knowledge has of course an inwardly experienced certitude, nevertheless that which causes this is the external "compulsion of facts"; while, on the other hand, although religious knowledge arises in connection with external facts, the cause and ground of its certitude is internal. Moreover, he says that theoretic knowledge addresses itself simply to the intellect, while religious knowledge springs from faith. There is much that is true in this statement, as we shall see presently. No one doubts that Christian faith has a content of knowl-

¹⁹ Kaftan, Art. "Glaube und Dogmatik", *Zeitschr. für Theologie und Kirche*, I, pp. 479ff.

edge and that true Christian faith, that is, saving faith, depends on an attitude of the heart toward its object. The Ritschlians would be right in pointing to Luther and Calvin as their forerunners if this were what they meant. But they do not mean simply this. Kaftan wishes to infer from his distinctions that there is an essential dualism or distinction in the human consciousness as such between its theoretic and religious knowledge such as will result in a separation of their spheres and objects and the nature of their validity and the categories with which they operate. But this is not the truth of the matter. There is in each case, that is, both in religious and theoretic knowledge, an "objective compulsion", to use Kaftan's phrase. The formal categories, moreover, do not differ. For example, the causal law, though not to be construed in regard to the knowledge of God, in the form it takes in mechanical science, is nevertheless valid in the religious sphere, though in a changed form. And though the subjective organ of apprehension differs in each case, each kind of knowledge presupposes its own organ, and religious knowledge must validate itself to the intellect, unless such a dualism is to be introduced into human knowledge and experience as will result in religious scepticism.

The distinction in our knowledge to which reference has been made, and which is so essential for understanding both the importance and the limitations of Christian experience in relation to the knowledge of Christian truth, then, is not one pertaining to the categories of knowledge, nor to the sphere or objects of cognition, nor to the nature of its validity and its grounds. It is a distinction in the source of knowledge, the norm of truth, and the conditions of its apprehension on the part of the subject of knowledge. It is the distinction expressed by what we call Christian supernaturalism, or by the opposition of sin and grace, the natural consciousness and the regenerate consciousness. That sin has darkened the mind and distorted the natural religious nature of man, that it has marred the image of God in man, that it has obscured the marks of God's hand in nature, all

these are facts of experience no less than truths of Scripture. This has brought about what Kuyper has called an "inversion" of the method of revelation,²⁰ which now proceeds from what Kuyper has called a special *principium*, and becomes external in a series of supernatural facts at once renovating and revelatory. And this makes necessary also that the knowledge of the meaning of these facts shall come in the same way, that is, external to the individual Christian. Instead of proceeding from the individual and growing to a common knowledge, the opposite of this takes place, and the interpretation of the facts has a central starting point and is to be accepted and appropriated by the individual. This line of thought which Kuyper has richly developed is only another way of saying that the facts which enter into the essence of Christianity are not "bare facts", but come to us interpreted, and that this interpretation or the facts thus interpreted are just Christianity as a historical religion.

We have seen that the content of general or natural religious experience was determined by general revelation; we now see that the content of Christian experience and its character are determined by special revelation. And since this special revelation which thus conditions the nature and content of Christian experience is supernatural, historical and soteriological, it cannot be apprehended by the general or natural religious consciousness, but only by a religious consciousness which has been illuminated supernaturally, and thus prepared for this revelation. Hence, Christian experience is conditioned by and presupposes a faith in the Christian revelation, and this Christian experience and faith are themselves the product of a supernatural cause as well as is the revelation which is supernatural only from the standpoint of its source and method, but which has no supernatural power to produce Christian experience.

As a result, therefore, of the effect of sin upon our religious knowledge, we require that not only our knowledge

²⁰ A. Kuyper, *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*, E. T., p. 280.

of Christian truth, but that our entire religious knowledge should proceed from a special revelation. The change from the natural knowledge of God, or from the doctrinal content of natural religion to Christianity, as the product of this special revelation, cannot be explained as a natural evolution. In other words, Christian truth is not the product of the natural religious nature of man, and every attempt to explain Christianity as the culminating point of a natural development of religious thought, must end in reducing the doctrinal content of Christianity to that of natural religion. This can be seen from the recent book of Bousset, *Das Wesen der Religion*. In this book the author seeks to explain Christianity as a natural product of the evolution of natural religious thought. The result is that we cannot accept the Christianity of Jesus as the final form of Christianity, but must translate the ideas of Jesus into the forms of our modern notions about God. Thus Christianity is reduced to natural religion construed under the categories of the naturalism of "modernism." The same thing is illustrated from a more mystical standpoint, which regards religious ideas as the symbols of Christian life and experience, in the works of the late Prof. Sabatier, who has reduced Christianity practically to altruism, which latter ethical position he could scarcely maintain from the point of view of his sensationalistic theory of knowledge.

If the facts of sin and redemption be left out of account, then, as Kuyper says, we are not at variance with God, our minds have not been darkened, and from this point of view it is also inconceivable that a restorative power should have been at work, or that there should be a special revelation which does not coincide with the normal process of the development of religious thought. And still further, from this standpoint the knowledge of God in this century should be better than that of the first century, and far higher than that of Abraham or Moses.²¹ On the other hand, from the standpoint of Christian supernaturalism above set forth,

²¹ Kuyper, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

Christian experience is conditioned by a revelation which is external and supernatural in character, and which thus becomes the source and norm of Christian truth.

We saw that a second consequence of the fact of sin and regeneration was that for the apprehension of this revelation, spiritual illumination was necessary. And here likewise there is a contrast between natural religious knowledge and Christian or supernatural religious knowledge. For since the change from the natural consciousness to the Christian consciousness is by regeneration, it is not possible to explain by any natural means the transition from one form of consciousness to the other, nor is it possible, to use a phrase of Frank,²² to "elevate" the natural consciousness to the Christian consciousness by purely intellectual means—or any means for that matter—inasmuch as the understanding of the objects of the Christian faith is conditioned by an experiential contact with them by faith. Hence there may be a purely natural knowledge of the objects of Christian faith, but what is requisite is rather a Christian knowledge of these objects, that is a knowledge by the regenerate or Christian consciousness.

On the other hand, in order to a correct understanding of the function of Christian experience in Dogmatics and especially in Apologetics, it is necessary to note that this distinction or dualism between the natural religious consciousness and the Christian consciousness is not so absolute as it is conceived to be by Kuyper. In the first place, sin has not destroyed man's rational nature or cognitive faculties. These continue to function as before. This much of course Kuyper affirms. But in the second place, man's religious nature has not been totally obliterated, and a natural knowledge of God has been, as Kuyper also affirms, preserved by common grace. The new revelation of God is not simply added in a mechanical way to the general revelation, but is corrective of, as well as supplementary to, the natural knowledge of God, and hence presupposes it and rests upon it. Moreover,

²² Cf. Frank, *System der christlichen Gewissheit*, § 5.

thirdly, it should never be forgotten that in the regenerate man the effects of sin are not removed entirely and all at once. Hence, while it is true that the Christian consciousness cannot be regarded as an evolution by natural causes from the natural consciousness, it is nevertheless true that the Christian man has not an entirely renewed and clarified consciousness, nor has he two consciousnesses side by side as it were. His consciousness is a unit, in principle renewed, yet being relieved of the effects of sin in a process—albeit a supernatural one.

The distinction and opposition, therefore, between the natural and the Christian consciousness, and between natural and Christian knowledge, is only a relative one after all.

IV. This relative dualism between natural and Christian experience, as thus conceived, determines the importance and limitations of Christian experience in relation to Apologetics and Dogmatics, that is, to the questions as to the grounds and content of the Christian faith.

In regard to Apologetics we shall stop only for a summary statement, as our main purpose is to consider the place of Christian experience in Dogmatics. In regard to Apologetics, then, the question is not as to "assurance of faith", or of one's status as a Christian (*Heilsgewissheit*), but as to the grounds of faith. Faith, as Dr. Warfield has said,²³ is conviction of truth grounded on evidence. Psychologically it may be a personal experiential trust, nevertheless it is not without its grounds or evidence. The question is as to the nature of the evidence. Two questions arise. First, is the evidence exclusively internal or experiential? Secondly, is the preparation of the heart by the Spirit, which is necessary for the genesis of faith, only a preparation of the heart to receive evidence, or does it constitute an additional ground of belief?

In reply to this latter question, which must be answered first, we affirm that the preparation of the heart by the

²³ For a discussion of this whole subject in relation to Apologetics *vid.* Warfield, Introduction to Vol. I of Beatty's *Apologetics*.

Spirit does constitute an additional ground of belief. Hence it is true, as the "experiential Apologetics" affirms, that the Christian does have a ground of belief which the non-Christian does not have. The validity of this ground, however, is not thereby affected since the Christian's experience is a well attested fact.

In regard to the former question, it should be said that the Christian faith, objectively speaking, rests upon external grounds and evidence because of the historical content of that faith, and that consequently the Christian's faith, subjectively, requires also external grounds in addition to its experiential grounds, that is, this simply means that *assensus* is the logical prius of *fiducia*. It follows also that the non-Christian, although he cannot be made a Christian by argument, but only by the power of the Spirit, yet must be convinced of the possibility of the truth of Christianity, and that the Spirit may use such evidence in his conversion.

In short, the grounds of belief in Christianity are universally valid grounds and should be set forth as such.

We pass on at once to consider the place of Christian experience in Dogmatic Theology. What has been said concerning the nature of Christian experience and its place in religious knowledge, affords us the point of view from which the subject under discussion must be approached. Since the apprehension and understanding of the objects of Christian faith is conditioned by an experiential contact with them through faith, it follows in the first place, that Christian experience is necessary as an "organ" of knowledge in Dogmatic Theology, that is to say—Christian Theology presupposes a Christian subject of knowledge. In other words, the theologian should be a Christian, and approach the subject of his science from the Christian standpoint and from a truly Christian experience. That a *theologia irregenitorum*, as the Pietists termed it, is impossible, we do not affirm. But if all that has been said concerning Christian experience be true; if sin has darkened the mind, and if spiritual things must be spiritually discerned, as Paul

says, then it will follow that a theology of unregenerate men must always be very inadequate. A man with no artistic sense could scarcely write an adequate treatise on art, and just as little can a man whose religious sense is blinded write a satisfactory treatise on religious faith.

But on the other hand, it is equally important to notice, in the second place, that since Christian experience presupposes a faith the content of which is given by a revelation which is historical, soteriological, and supernatural in character, and since, moreover, on the side of the subject, regeneration does not remove all at once the darkening effects of sin, it must follow that Christian experience can be neither the source nor yet the norm or "principle" of knowledge in Dogmatic Theology. It is not merely that such experience is always the experience of an individual and so individually conditioned; it is not merely that it is difficult to observe and record; nor that it is not a finished product, but one always progressing. These are serious objections, no doubt, to making Christian experience either the source or norm of theological knowledge and truth. But the fundamental and insuperable objections are the ones we have just stated, and which have grown out of our whole previous discussion. Regeneration does not remove all the effects of sin upon the mind instantaneously. If then we seek to use the Christian consciousness or Christian experience as either the source or the norm of Christian faith, we are quite sure to substitute the God our imperfectly renewed natures would like to have, for the God who has revealed Himself through Jesus Christ His Son. Nor will it help matters in this regard to point away from our individual experience to general Christian experience as recorded in hymns, liturgies, and in the history of the Church, as all theologians of this type do. You cannot get rid of the defects and limitations which attach to the Christian experience of the individual simply by multiplying these individual experiences, each of which is thus defective. If, again, recourse is had to the Scriptures, it should be remembered that if the idea of supernat-

ural revelation be either neglected or denied, and the Scriptures be regarded solely from the point of view of a record of primitive Christian experience, we have not obviated the difficulty which we are considering. The Scriptures were written by men only partially sanctified, and in addition to this, from the purely experiential point of view, that is, the viewpoint of immediacy, each one's own experience has the advantage. Whereas, on the other hand, if the idea of supernatural revelation be taken into account, it then becomes impossible to regard Christian experience in any form as either the source or norm of theological knowledge. For we have seen that Christian experience depends on a faith the doctrinal content of which is determined by just this supernatural revelation.

Accordingly, not only is Christian experience dependent upon both transcendent and historical factors, but also as a consequence, faith may mediate to the Christian consciousness truths which altogether transcend our actual Christian experience and which are the objects of faith and hope. Thus the Christian's actual experience of salvation always lags behind the entire blessing of salvation which is really his possession. The entire sphere of Christian truth which comes under Eschatology is an illustration of this fact. And even where the truth lies in a different category, in a case for example where it is a transcendent truth like the doctrine of the Trinity, although it may be most intimately associated with and implicated by Christian experience, it by no means follows that it can be made explicit and drawn out in full statement from that experience. While, therefore, it may be said that Christian experience implicates a definite system of doctrine, it by no means follows that this system can be drawn out and stated from the experience which implicates it. And the history of such attempts shows that in using Christian experience as a source of theological doctrine, one of two things is almost sure to happen—either the entire content of Christian truth as it lies in Scripture is really read into the experience in

order to be thence again drawn out, or else the doctrinal content of Christianity is so stated as to exclude all that transcends experience, that is, all transcendent, supernatural, cosmological and eschatological truths, and Christianity is reduced to a merely ethical or spiritual content.

We are now in a position to review the attempts which have been made to use Christian experience or the Christian consciousness either as the source of Christian doctrine or the norm of Christian truth. We have attained a standpoint from which to criticise these attempts; and it will consequently be possible to go beyond merely indicating their want of consistency, and to point out the fundamental impossibility of all such attempts. It will naturally be impossible within the limits of this article, to discuss such attempts in reference to specific doctrines or to go into details. We shall be concerned only with their general method of procedure.

In the first place, we may dismiss with a few words the mode of procedure which simply transfers the method of natural empirical science into the sphere of theology. It is in order to avoid questions as to the objective reference of states of religious experience and the objective validity of religious ideas, that the method of natural science is thus taken over into theology. Just as physical science investigates physical phenomena and the empirical laws which they follow, so in like manner theology is made to investigate spiritual phenomena, and thus it become really nothing more than a "phenomenology of the religious consciousness." In this way theology loses its right to exist as a distinct science, and becomes a branch of empirical psychology. It can not only do without God; in accordance with its principles it can do without the human soul. Religious experience is merely described and related to the rest of the contents of consciousness. This method will not be able even to make the affirmations to which Sogemeier limits it.²⁴ He says that all that such a method can

²⁴ Cf. Sogemeier, *op. cit.*, pp. 114ff.

do is to affirm that religious experience is an illusory form of human experience, or to validate for it an "abiding place" in the life of the human spirit by showing that without this experience the life of the human soul does not attain its complete development. But such an affirmation as this involves questions of ideals, of values, and of the objective validity of religious knowledge, which this method cannot answer at all. Such a method of procedure not only will do away with the right of theology to exist as a separate science; it proceeds upon an entirely gratuitous assumption, namely, that knowledge is invalid beyond the phenomenal sphere, and that the limits of knowledge which, by its nature, empirical science very properly sets for itself, are the limits of all human knowledge. This method in theology need not detain us longer. The chief "experiential theologians" have not adopted it. Schleiermacher cannot be classed here. He laid emphasis on the objective reference in religious experience, and also on its positive historically conditioned character. The feeling of absolute dependence finds its meaning not in the immediate contact of the soul with the Infinite, but is referred to the redemption through Christ.²⁵ The same thing, of course, is true of Hofmann and Frank.

The different ways in which Christian experience has been used as a source of Christian doctrine, can best be distinguished by looking at the concrete attempts to set forth Christian truth in this way. The theologians who have sought to make Christian experience the source as well as the norm of Christian doctrine differ widely in their theological positions and in their statement of Christian doctrine. They differ, also, in the method by which they seek to draw forth doctrine from experience; but it is important to notice that their difference in the manner in which Christian experience is used, will not explain their great difference in theology. This fact will supply confirmation to a

²⁵ Cf. Schleiermacher, *Der Christl. Glaube*, § 11, *Werke Abtheil I, Bd. III*, pp. 67ff.

remark which has already been made, namely, that the doctrinal system of Christianity cannot really be derived from Christian experience, and that consequently the doctrinal position of these theologians is really derived from some other source which determines for them the so-called doctrinal content of Christian experience, this determining factor being either the Christian revelation, as in the case of the Erlangen theology, or a philosophical conception of religion and redemption, as in the case of Schleiermacher and the "mediating theology."

Schleiermacher was the first to introduce this subjective idea of the nature and method of Dogmatic Theology. The name which he gave this science—*Glaubenslehre*—or the "science of faith," is an indication of the view which he took of its nature and consequently of its method. He held that religion is essentially feeling, and that it is independent of "theory." Over against the evangelical theology, Schleiermacher maintained that there can be no "external authority" or "blind authority" as he would call it. In this respect he agreed with the rationalist. He opposed Rationalism, on the other hand, as regards its too intellectualistic conception of religion, and as regards its neglect of the historical aspect of Christianity, which aspect had been reduced by Rationalism to a merely symbolical expression of rational truth. Schleiermacher sought to distinguish Christian experience and the Christian consciousness from religious experience in general by referring it to redemption in Christ as its cause.²⁶ He rejected, nevertheless, all idea of an external authority for religious knowledge. He held that, since according to the evangelical idea, faith was not a mere assent to doctrines, it could not have a doctrinal content

²⁶ Cf. *Glaubenslehre*, §§ 11-14, for Schleiermacher's discussion of the place of historical Christianity and its relation to the religious consciousness. On Schleiermacher compare Kattenbusch, *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl*, and the admirable article by O. Kirn, *Herzog P. R. E.* * XVII pp. 587-617. In the latter article will be found references to the large literature on Schleiermacher. Also cf. Wolf, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-55.

determined by a revelation to which it must yield assent. Revelation, moreover, he regarded not as a supernatural communication of truth, but as an inward enlightenment. Accordingly he conceived of Dogmatic Theology as *Glaubenslehre* or the science of faith. Moreover, the nature of Christian doctrine he held to be determined by the nature of Christianity. In the Christian religion the idea of redemption is central, and this redemption is found only in communion with Christ.²⁷ This can be realized only in faith and experience. Consequently Christian doctrines simply give formulated expression to this Christian life or experience. They describe not so much the object of faith, as the Christian consciousness which is supposed to contain or imply a view of God, the world, and man, which can be scientifically expressed. In accordance with this Schleiermacher defines Christian doctrines as "Conceptions of states of the Christian religious consciousness set forth in formal statement."²⁸ In order to understand his idea, we must keep clearly in mind two things: First, we must remember that, according to Schleiermacher, the function of the theologian is purely formal. He should seek simply to give scientific expression to the Christian consciousness, and is not to seek, by a method of causal or real inference from the Christian consciousness, to determine the nature of its objects conceived as its causes. This latter method is more like that of Frank. Schleiermacher was simply seeking to give a scientific and doctrinally formulated expression to the Christian consciousness. Secondly, we must bear in mind that, according to Schleiermacher, revelation is not the supernatural communication of truth to man by God, nor yet does it consist in historic events, but is given in and through the Christian consciousness. For this reason we have the above definition of Christian doctrines.

We shall not stop to indicate how Schleiermacher worked

²⁷ *Glaubenslehre*, § 11.

²⁸ *Glaubenslehre*, § 15, I, 3, p. 99. Christliche Glaubenssätze sind Auffassungen der Christlich frommen Gemüthszustände in der Rede dargestellt.

this idea and method out in his system. This is well known. We wish rather to point out its defects of principle and method, as illustrating the principles which we have set forth. There have been many different criticisms passed upon Schleiermacher. It is not our purpose to review these. From the point of view which we have taken, we notice first that Schleiermacher has really not escaped the "subjectivism" with which he has so often been charged. The states of the religious and of the Christian consciousness he regarded too exclusively as states of feeling (*Gemüths-zustände*). When the religious consciousness and the Christian consciousness are thus conceived, there is no basis for asserting objective validity for the doctrinal construction. It is probably a concession to his theory of knowledge as much as to his abstract conception of God, when, for example, the doctrine of the Divine attributes is regarded as nothing but different modes of construing the feeling of absolute dependence when we refer it to God. Secondly, not only is our doctrinal construction thus made subjective, but this doctrinal system is not contained in the Christian consciousness or in the religious consciousness conceived as Schleiermacher conceived it, namely, as a state of feeling. Schleiermacher consequently could not escape the dilemma which confronts all such attempts—either to draw the doctrinal content of Christian experience from the Christian revelation in the Scripture or from philosophy. The former was what Frank really did, and the latter seems to have been the fundamental mistake of Schleiermacher. By his reference of Christian experience to the redemption through Christ, he sought to separate Christian experience from religious philosophy, but his conception of that redemption is drawn from another source than the Christian revelation, and thus not only his whole theology but also his view of Christian experience is determined by a mystical and pantheizing conception of religion and of redemption.²⁹

²⁹ Schleiermacher always claimed not to be a pantheist, and that he was not is the view taken by Kirn, *op cit.*, Kattenbusch, *op cit.*, and O.

This illustrates afresh what was said in general criticism of all attempts to make Christian experience the source of the statement of Christian doctrine, namely, that the doctrinal system of Christianity, though implicated by Christian experience, cannot really be drawn from it, and that as a consequence the doctrinal statement is really taken from some other source, either the Christian revelation or a religious philosophy.

As a transition from the method of Schleiermacher to that of Frank, that of F. C. K. von Hofmann of Erlangen should be briefly mentioned.³⁰ In his *Schriftbeweis* Hofmann is attempting to give proof from Scripture for the "scientific statement of Christianity."³¹ Hence the nature of Christianity and of its scientific expression will determine the task of the theologian. Christianity is a personal fellowship with God through the mediation of Christ.³² It is therefore a fact of experience and life. Hence the scientific statement of Christianity is simply the unfolding of this fact of the Christian consciousness. It is the "self-expression" (*Selbstaussage*) of the Christian.³³ Accordingly the systematizing and dogmatizing function of the theologian is not the mere "description of states of the Christian religious consciousness," nor the simple "reproduction of Scripture doctrine," nor the deduction of Christian doctrines from a central principle, but is the "unfolding of the simple fact (of consciousness) which makes a Christian a Christian and which distinguishes him from one who is not a Christian."³⁴ The theologian has not to describe states of the religious consciousness, nor yet to infer from this consciousness what must be the nature of its causes, but simply to set forth the

Ritschl, Schleiermachers Stellung zum Christentum in seinen Reden über die Religion, 1888.

³⁰ von Hofmann, *Der Schriftbeweis*,² 1857, I, pp. 1-33.

³¹ Cf., *op. cit.*, p. 5, "die wissenschaftliche Aussage des Christentums sei es, für welche Beweis ihrer Schriftgemässheit gefordert werde."

³² *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

consciousness itself with its doctrinal implications. The scientific proof for this doctrinal system is threefold: first, in the immediately certain consciousness of regeneration; secondly, in the history of the Church; thirdly, in the Scriptures.³⁵ Hofmann deals with the proof from Scripture, and is more occupied with this Scripture proof than with the "scientific statement" of Christian doctrine, so that we pass at once to Frank in whom the Erlangen theology culminated, and who is the chief "experiential theologian" since Schleiermacher.

Frank's³⁶ method may be described as causal or realistic, to distinguish it from that of Schleiermacher, which may be characterized as formal. According to Schleiermacher, the dogmatician must take the Christian consciousness and seek simply to give it expression in the form of scientific concepts. According to Frank, on the other hand, while it must be granted to him against some of his critics, that he did not seek to deduce the Christian doctrinal system from Christian experience apart from the Christian revelation, the theologian must nevertheless start with Christian experience and by the application of the causal principle must show from the nature of Christian experience regarded as an effect, what must be the nature of its causes. Thus according to Schleiermacher, the Christian doctrine is really given in Christian experience, whereas according to Frank, Christian experience does not contain a knowledge of its objects, but such knowledge is to be obtained by using experience as a datum from which the theologian obtains by inference a knowledge of the objects of faith. According to Schleiermacher, the knowing activity of the theologian terminates on experience or states of consciousness; accord-

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³⁶ Frank, *System der christlichen Gewissheit*, 2 Bde. i. Aufl. 1870-3. 2 Aufl. 1881-3. *System der christlichen Wahrheit*, 2 Bde. 1 Aufl. 1878, 3 Aufl. 1894. Cf. also *Dogmatische Studien* 1892, and an article "Zur dogmatischen Prinzipienlehre", *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift* IV (1893), pp. 105-127.

ing to Frank it seeks by means of Christian experience to obtain a knowledge of the objects of Christian faith.

We shall find, however, that just as the feeling of absolute dependence would not yield the system of Christian truth, and consequently Schleiermacher determined his system by a philosophical conception of religion; so also the experience of regeneration by the soul will not yield the doctrinal system of Christianity, and consequently Frank determined his system of doctrine from the Christian revelation and the Lutheran Confessions. We do not affirm by any means that he did this unconsciously. As there is some difference of opinion as to what Frank's intention really was, it is necessary to look more closely at his line of thought.

In order to understand Frank, the following questions should be kept clearly distinct.—First, what is the ground of the Christian faith, or what are the reasons for belief in the truth of Christianity? Secondly, how does a Christian reach certitude as to the objects of his faith? Thirdly, how does a Christian attain "assurance of faith", that is of the genuineness of his own faith and Christian status? It is the second of these questions which Frank is seeking to answer in his *System of Christian Certainty*. He expressly says that it is not the third question with which he is dealing.³⁷ Seeberg thinks that Frank is seeking an answer to the first of the above questions.³⁸ But Frank states a number of times that his task is simply to set forth the origin, nature and warrant of the Christian's certitude, where by "warrant" he is obviously not referring to the grounds of belief as a whole, but simply to the specific warrant which Christian certitude carries in itself.³⁹

³⁷ *Gewissheit*, I 1.

³⁸ Cf. art. on Frank by Seeberg, Herzog *P. R. E.*⁸ VI pp. 158ff.

³⁹ *Gewissheit* I, § 1, § 7; and especially *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschr.* iv, p. 123—"der in der Gewissheit des Glaubens stehende Christ, giebt sich Rechenschaft darüber, wie er zu dieser Gewissheit gekommen sei, mit welchem Rechte er an dieser Gewissheit festhalte, und auf welche Stücke Christlicher Wahrheit sie sich beziehe."

The Christian knows that a great change has taken place within him, and continues to take place.⁴⁰ He is as certain of this as a man who has been cured of a disease is certain of the fact that he was sick and is now well.⁴¹ This great change Frank calls Regeneration and Conversion. These carry their certitude in themselves, and this certitude includes that of the causes of this Christian experience, since it cannot be explained by any causes within the Christian or in his environment. In this way by inference there arises a certitude in regard to three groups of objects. 1. "Immanent" objects—the state of sin and of regeneration. 2. "Transcendent" objects, that is, God as the cause of regeneration; and not only God but the doctrines of the Trinity and of the Divine-human Mediator are thus given. 3. "Transient" objects through which the Christian experiences the operations of God—the Word, the Sacraments, and the Church.⁴² Not only the reality of these objects, but also necessarily some knowledge of their nature is thus implied in the Christian consciousness.

Some of the criticisms which have been made upon Frank's system do not distinguish carefully enough between "Christian certitude" and "assurance of faith" (*Heilsgewissheit*). Daxer has attempted to set aside on this ground most of them, as resting upon a misunderstanding of what Frank was attempting;⁴³ but not all of them can be answered in this way. One of the sharpest criticisms of Frank is that by H. Cremer.⁴⁴ Cremer said that it was in contradiction to the nature of Christianity as a revealed religion to make Christian certitude the starting point of a mode of procedure which developed speculatively the content or object of this certitude. In this way, Cremer affirmed, the Christian historical revelation did not come to its rights, but served only to supplement and correct

⁴⁰ *Gewissheit*, i., 120.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, i., 129.

⁴² *Ibid.*, § 23.

⁴³ Cf. Daxer, *op. cit.*, *Beiträge*, u. s. w., iv., esp. p. 92ff.

⁴⁴ H. Cremer in Zöckler's *Handbuch d. theol. Wissenschaften* iii³ 60ff.

Christian experience. Frank replied to this criticism in an article published shortly before his death.⁴⁵ His reply is that Cremer has misunderstood him and reduced his position to an absurd one which he never intended. His method, Frank says, is not speculative, because since Christian truth has been "deposited" (*abgelagert*) in Christian experience by Divine influence through the Christian revelation, it is not speculation to seek to draw this out. And so far from the revelation not having an essential place, Frank affirms that since it is included in the causes of Christian experience, the truth which is inferred from that experience is just the truth contained in the Christian revelation.

But this is precisely the question, namely, granted that the Christian revelation is an instrument in conversion, whether the system of Christian doctrine can be shown in detail to be implicated in that experience. Frank has been criticised often for presupposing that which he wished to draw from Christian experience, namely, the evangelical Lutheran system of doctrine. He seems to imply that we come to the knowledge of these doctrines by our Christian consciousness. Bavinck, for example, says,⁴⁶ that he has the impression that Frank held that all these truths could be deduced from the fact or consciousness of regeneration apart from Scripture and the Confessions. There is no doubt that in some places Frank does speak as if Christian doctrine could be deduced from Christian experience. And there is one passage where this is explicitly affirmed.⁴⁷ Nevertheless Frank frequently denies that he has attempted any such deduction, and Kaftan's description of Frank's method seems to us to be more adequate, when he says that Frank does not attempt to deduce Christian doctrine from the consciousness of regeneration, but that he takes the common Christian faith as stated in the Lutheran symbols,

⁴⁵ "Zur dogmatischen Prinzipienlehre", *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschr.* iv., p. 123.

⁴⁶ Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek* I² 562.

⁴⁷ *Gewissheit*, § 23, paragraph 2, at the close.

and seeks to show how the certitude of this inner fact of regeneration extends to these objects of faith.⁴⁸ But while the Lutheran system is thus consciously presupposed by Frank, it is nevertheless true that he uses the causal principle, and holds that from the nature of Christian experience it can be shown what must be the nature of its causes. And in so doing he does separate Christian experience from revelation and attempt in an artificial way to show that Christian doctrine can be drawn from this experience.

The artificiality as well as the impossibility of this attempt can be observed, by way of example, from the manner in which he seeks to show that the doctrine of the Trinity is implied in the experience of regeneration. Regeneration as a unitary fact presupposes the unity of its transcendent cause. This gives us assurance of the unity of God. Regeneration appears in our consciousness in a manifold of states by which we are assured of the triune nature of God. The transcendent cause of Regeneration, namely, God is distinct as conditioning our consciousness of guilt, as establishing a relation of freedom from guilt, and as introducing the Christian subject into this relation.⁴⁹ That this construction of the doctrine of the Trinity is artificial in the extreme, we think cannot be denied. Certainly the doctrine of the Trinity is no mere abstract or speculative doctrine. It is intimately related to Christian experience. It underlies the entire plan of salvation as set forth in Scripture. It determines the religious experience of Christians. It is, we think, not going too far to say with Dr. Charles Hodge, that this and the other doctrines of the Bible are "presupposed in that experience".⁵⁰ But the attempt of Frank means more than this. It means that the doctrine having been in part the cause of that experience can then be drawn from it. On examination, however, it appears rather that it has been read into the experience. This seems to illus-

⁴⁸ Kaftan, Art. "Glaube und Dogmatik", *Zeitschr. für Theol. und Kirche* i., pp. 512ff.

⁴⁹ Cf. *Gewissheit*, I Abschnitt II., §§ 31-34, pp. 275-327.

⁵⁰ Charles Hodge, *Systematic Theology* i., p. 442.

trate what has been said, namely, that while Christian experience implicates a system of doctrine, it does not follow that this system can be made explicit from it; that for the reasons we have stated it is the fact that it cannot be made explicit; and that every attempt to make it explicit will be seen to draw the doctrinal statement not from the Christian consciousness but from philosophy or from the Christian revelation.

This criticism of Frank refers of course to his *System of Christian Certainty*. But the situation is not materially altered when we turn to his *System of Christian Truth*.⁵¹ When the objects of the Christian faith are thus attained and certified, it is, according to Frank, the task of the *System of Christian Truth* to set forth these objects. The task of the dogmatician is to understand and set forth these objects in their nature and relations, proceeding now in the opposite direction, with the idea of God as the "*Realprincip*" or organizing principle of the system. The "principle of knowledge" is still the "believing consciousness." But since this consciousness includes in itself the recognition of the authority of Scripture and of the Church's Symbol, Frank made use of Scripture and the Confessions in building up his system.⁵² The "believing consciousness" is bound to Scripture and the Confession. It recognizes Scripture "as the original witness of those who through the special witness of God have had an inner experience of the realities once for all revealed".⁵³ The Scripture, though apparently recognized as an authoritative revelation, is really used thus only as an original record of that Christian experience which was nearest in time to the revelation.

It has already been shown what are the limitations and difficulties of this view, and it is not necessary to repeat now what has been already said. It should be pointed out, however, that if the Scripture revelation is recognized as

⁵¹ *System der christlichen Wahrheit* i., pp. 1-91.

⁵² *Wahrheit*, p. 52.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

supernatural and as containing a communication of truth, as seems to be done by Frank, then it cannot be subordinated to the Christian consciousness so that the consciousness becomes the "principle of knowledge" "out of which the Dogmatician must draw"⁵⁴ his doctrines. For there is a sense, Frank says, in which the theologian must draw his doctrine from his own Christian experience since he can only set forth truth as it "reflects itself" in his consciousness. In this way Frank has, in his *System of Christian Truth* as well as in the *System of Christian Certainty*, failed to give to the Scripture revelation the authoritative place which its supernatural character, as recognized by Frank himself, demands.

As already remarked, the "experiential theology" may be said to have culminated in Frank. The theology of those usually considered as belonging to the "mediating theologians" may properly be called "speculative" since their statement of Christian truth is in each case moulded by a particular philosophical point of view. Dorner's position may be briefly mentioned in passing as an example, since he advocates what we may term a speculative experiential method, distinct from that of both Schleiermacher and Frank.⁵⁵ Since in the Christian religion, according to Dorner's view, the eternal has entered the sphere of historical fact, the theologian can neither follow a purely speculative method which would develop the doctrinal content of faith from pure thought or reason, nor can he follow a merely "empirical" method of simply reproducing the historically conditioned form of Christian truth as it lies in Scripture. With both Schleiermacher and Frank, Dorner starts from the Christian consciousness and the standpoint of faith. From this point of view Dorner says that there are three possible methods. Schleiermacher not merely made the fact of the Christian consciousness his starting point; he considered the states of consciousness as the sub-

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, cf. pp. 68-70.

⁵⁵ Dorner, *Christliche Glaubenslehre* i., § 13, pp. 155ff.

ject matter of Dogmatic Theology. They are the "material" for reflection, and the scientific function of the theologian is simply to give expression to these states of consciousness. In this way, Dorner says, we can reach no knowledge of the objects of the Christian faith, and Schleiermacher, he says, overlooked the fact that a knowledge of the objects of faith is already implied in faith. Frank sought to reach a knowledge of the objects of Christian faith by inference from Christian experience upon the basis of the causal principle. This method according to Dorner is impossible since a consciousness of regeneration already implies a "consciousness of God." The method which Dorner adopts recognizes that the Christian consciousness and faith itself possess a knowledge of God and of Christ, which knowledge the theologian must change or raise to a scientific knowledge. In this process of the development of the knowledge which faith possesses into "scientific" knowledge, however, the content of the Christian faith becomes moulded by the idealistic philosophy of Hegel. Frank's method is therefore most properly typical of the attempt to base dogmatic theology upon Christian experience.

When we say, however, that the attempt at an "experiential theology" culminated really in the Erlangen theology, we mean of course its use in Dogmatic Theology or as a source as well as norm of Christian doctrine. The question as to the place and value of Christian experience in relation to the grounds of the Christian faith and to Christian certitude has called forth a very large literature. Is faith grounded in one's inner personal experience of salvation or in the historic facts of Christianity? And if in historic facts, what facts and how many? We have only to ask such questions to be reminded of the writings of E. Cremer, Köstlin, Kähler, Ihmels, Herrmann, Reischle, Wendt and others. But as regards Dogmatic as distinct from Apologetic Theology, the literature goes back to the names of Schleiermacher and Frank. For example Sogemeier in the

article already referred to, published in 1902, criticises the method of Frank and advocates a return to that of Schleiermacher from the formal point of view, though he would not accept Schleiermacher's view of the content of Christian experience. His remarks on this point, however, seem another illustration of our criticism of this whole theological method, since it is only by appealing to the objective Christian revelation that Christian experience is made by Sogemeier to have a doctrinal content which is truly Christian. On the other hand, with some slight differences, Daxer in the article we have cited, Schnedermann⁵⁶, and in this country F. H. Foster in the book already mentioned, have advocated, in general, the method of Frank.

A second subjective method in Dogmatic Theology is that of the so-called Ritschlian school. This theology has sometimes been characterized as an "experiential theology", and their method described by saying that they find in the Scripture the source of Christian doctrine, and its norm in Christian experience. This, however, is not an accurate description of most of this school. They can scarcely be classed among the "experiential theologians", though their norm of truth is subjective. They seek, in nearly every case, to determine in some way the "revelation-content" of Scripture, that is, they seek to determine what in the Scripture is really a revelation. And since with most of them it is not the Christian consciousness or experience by which they separate this revelation from the rest of Scripture, they can scarcely be called "experiential theologians".

This Ritschlian school, speaking very generally, attaches itself to two points which Dorner had emphasized, namely, first, that Christian experience is most intimately associated with historical facts, especially with the "fact of Christ"; and secondly, that faith, which conditions Christian experience, itself includes a knowledge of its object. Ritschl sought to avoid the abstraction or separation of Christian

⁵⁶ Schnedermann—"Subjectivismus und Objectivismus in der Theol.", *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschr.* iii., 352ff., *ibid.*, i., 416.

experience from objective historical facts. This he believed to have been the mistake of Schleiermacher and Frank. He agreed, however, with these theologians and Dorner in rejecting the idea that revelation involves the communication of truth by God to man, and consequently the authority of the Scriptures in the sense of the old evangelical theology. He agreed with Dorner as against Schleiermacher and Frank in his greater emphasis on the dependence of Christian experience on the historic Christ. But he agreed with Schleiermacher and Frank as against Dorner in separating Christian truth from philosophy. In this, however, Ritschl resembled Schleiermacher rather than Frank. For, like Schleiermacher, Ritschl allowed his idea of Christ to be determined by certain philosophical ideas drawn from a source outside the Christian revelation. The Christ with which Ritschl leaves us, is just the meagre portrait of Jesus that is left after a historical criticism determined by naturalism has done its work, and after every metaphysical element has been eliminated. Ritschl's theology, therefore, is determined by a certain philosophy rather than by Christian experience. He has kept theology free from Platonism and Hegelianism, but not from an incongruous mixture of Kant and Lotze. It is not without some degree of justice, therefore, though far from Ritschl's intention, that he has been accused of rationalism by a theologian of Christian experience, namely, by Frank. Ritschl's position, however, illustrates well what has been said, namely, that Christian experience cannot serve as the norm of Christian doctrine.

The doctrine involved in this experience is given by a historical revelation, and either that revelation in its purity or as moulded by some philosophy foreign to it, will necessarily determine the theological construction.

Very much the same thing is illustrated by Kaftan. He cannot accept the idea that the Scripture contains revealed doctrines, and his method of determining what in the Scripture is revelation, illustrates his subjective method. His idea of the nature and method of Dogmatic Theology in

relation to faith and Christian experience, can be best understood in connection with those of Schleiermacher, Frank, and Dorner, with whose views Kaftan contrasts his own.⁵⁸ Kaftan maintains that faith involves a knowledge of its own, which, though not a "theoretic" knowledge, is nevertheless an adequate knowledge of its objects. The problem of the nature of Dogmatics is simply that of the relation of scientific theological knowledge to this knowledge which faith possesses. Kaftan thinks that Schleiermacher made the mistake of conceiving of the Christian consciousness too much as if it were mere feeling, thus failing to apprehend the knowledge involved in faith. Frank, Kaftan thinks, also made the mistake of failing to recognize the knowledge actually involved in the Christian consciousness, so that he sought to obtain this knowledge by a process of inference from Christian experience. The result of this is that the scientific knowledge of theology is confounded with the knowledge which faith has, and theological knowledge is supposed to be of an experiential character. In addition to this, theological knowledge is supposed to be a direct knowledge of God, instead of being simply an exposition in scientific form of that knowledge of God which is involved in Christian faith. Dorner makes a different mistake, according to Kaftan. Dorner recognized that faith has a knowledge of God, but he failed to realize that this is an adequate knowledge, and so fell into the mistake of supposing that it was the task of theology to raise this faith-knowledge to scientific knowledge or to transform *pistis* into *gnosis*. In contrast with all these views, Kaftan affirms that the knowledge which faith has is an adequate one, and that the task of the dogmatic theologian is simply to set forth in a scientific and systematic form the knowledge which faith itself has. This knowledge is given by the Christian revelation, and this is contained in the Scripture, so that Kaftan affirms that this revelation in the Scripture

⁵⁸ Kaftan, "Glaube und Dogmatik", in *Zeitschrift für Theol. und Kirche*, i., pp. 479-549, especially 509ff.

is the "principle" of authority and knowledge in Christian Dogmatics.⁵⁹

But Kaftan affirms that we are not to take our doctrines directly from Scripture, as that would betray a misapprehension of the nature of revelation. The Scripture is not a sum of authoritative doctrine, but "every doctrine is in accordance with Scripture, which is a necessary part in the doctrinal expression of the faith which has appropriated to itself the revelation witnessed to in Scripture".⁶⁰ Faith, therefore, in the subjective sense of the term, is supposed in some way to mediate between Scripture and the statement of theological truth. But faith is just an inner attitude of trust, and Kaftan himself tells us again and again that the truth believed in comes from revelation. His idea of revelation is the important point. And here we seem to be moving in a circle. Revelation, Kaftan says, is not the supernatural communication of truths, but an activity of God in a series of historical acts. But Kaftan will not say with Herrmann that the historic facts arouse a Christian experience out of which the doctrinal interpretation of the facts is supposed to grow. He explicitly rejects this idea, and affirms that the facts must come to us interpreted, and that this interpretation is a part of revelation. And yet this doctrinal or interpretative element is not to be found in the New Testament interpretation of the great Christian facts, but faith, once more, is said to "mediate" between the Scripture statements and Christian truth.⁶¹ Thus we are brought in a circle back again to faith which cannot thus determine what in Scripture is revelation, since faith itself derives from this revelation its content of truth. In point of fact, however, it is Kaftan's philosophical views of the nature of the Kingdom of God and Redemption which constitute for him the norm of Christian truth. Like Ritschl, therefore, he too illustrates the truth that Christian faith and

⁵⁹ Cf. "Zur Dogmatik", *Zeitschr. für Theol. und Kirche*, 1903, p. 458.

⁶⁰ Cf. Article—"Was ist Schriftgemäss?" *Zeitschr. u. s. w.*, 1893, p. 120.

⁶¹ Cf. §§ on Faith and Revelation, in Kaftan, *Dogmatik*.

experience have a doctrinal element already given, and that if the Scripture doctrine is not accepted as an objective revelation, it must be a philosophical or rational idea which is made the norm of Christian truth.

Haering,⁶² on the other hand, can seek to escape this rationalistic element only by becoming more avowedly subjective. The norm of Christian truth, Haering says, is the revelation contained in the Scripture. But the way in which, and the extent to which, the Scripture is authoritative, is determined by his idea of revelation which involves the notion of approval by the Christian consciousness or experience as aroused by Christ. Hence the authority of Scripture is held to extend only to matters of faith, and then only as they approve themselves to Christian experience. Thus Haering approaches more closely to the "experiential theology", in making the Christian consciousness the final norm of Christian truth.

Wendt⁶³ likewise is to be classed here. It is true that he keeps distinct the question as to the truth of Christianity, and that as to the norm of Christian truth. And this latter he says is a historical question and to be objectively determined. He finds this standard of Christian truth in "the Gospel of Jesus". He says that this is to be found in what Jesus taught, and he rejects what he calls the method which "determines the revelation-content of Scripture". Nevertheless he has not given an objective standard for determining what in the New Testament is Christian truth. He affirms that the Gospel of Jesus is not identical with the teaching of Jesus, and that in the latter we must separate the abiding truth from that which is only accidental. This after all is really an attempt to determine the "revelation-content" of the Scripture, and to "distinguish between the divine and human elements" in the Bible, methods of procedure which Wendt wishes to reject. This is also the

⁶² Haering—*Der. Christl. Glaube (Dogmatik)*, 1906, pp. 145ff., 159ff., 172-179.

⁶³ Wendt, *System der christl. Lehre*, 1906 & 7, i., pp. 45-55.

judgment of S. Eck⁶⁴ who, in reviewing Wendt's book, asks if it does not presuppose a peculiar spiritual "sensorium", thus to set forth a scale of values and determine what is of abiding value in the teaching of Jesus. Wendt is not, after all, so very far from the "experiential theology".

Herrmann⁶⁵ realizes fully the necessarily subjective and individualistic character of a theology which thus rejects the authority of the Scripture doctrine. His idea of revelation is limited to the experience of God through the so-called historic Christ, the doctrinal element of Christianity being simply the ideas implied in this experience. And since it depends thus on the experience of the individual, it is impossible for theology to state any universally valid Christian doctrine. This is fully recognized and asserted by Herrmann. In this way Christian doctrine becomes a matter of individual experience. Whereas in his idea of the so-called historic Christ, Herrmann like Ritschl is governed by philosophical presuppositions, so that he shows really a combination of the rationalistic and experiential methods.

This method of the Ritschlian school thus illustrates the principles which have been expounded. If Christian experience is really Christian, it is connected with the great historic facts of Christianity, which are connected primarily with the life of Christ. And if this is so, then Christian experience is conditioned by a faith which is not a mere subjective feeling, but which, in trusting in Christ, receives Him as Saviour, as Saviour from sin, and as a divine Saviour. We cannot speak of the bare fact of Christ, and consequently Christian experience is determined by an interpretation of Christ and of Christianity. This interpretation, we have seen, cannot be evolved or deduced from Christian experience. If Christianity, that is, the Christianity of the New Testament, were the product of natural

⁶⁴ Cf. Eck on Wendt's *Syst. d. chr. Lehre*, in *Theologische Literaturzeitung* No. 21, 1907, p. 596.

⁶⁵ Herrmann, "Christl. prot. Dogmatik," in *Kultur der Gegenwart*. Teil. i., Abt. 4, Lief. 3, pp. 583-630. Also "Die Lage und Aufgabe der ev. Dogmatik," Articles in *Zeitschr. für Theol. u. Kirche*, 1907.

religious sentiment, it would then be possible to derive the doctrinal content of religious experience from the human reason and to exhibit Christianity as the product of the evolution of human religious thought. But if sin is a fact, if it has darkened our natural knowledge of God, and if the nature of the Christian revelation is historical and supernatural, then this revelation is the norm as well as the source of Christian truth and knowledge. And if it is a truly supernatural revelation, we must go to its bearers or organs in order to determine to what extent the books in which it is recorded contain it.

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Princeton.

THE KOINÉ, THE LANGUAGE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

To the student of the New Testament it is of primary importance to know something of the nature, history and stage of development of the language in which the New Testament is written. To this it may be objected that the great thoughts propounded in this book are alone worthy of careful and reverent study. The linguistic dress in which the divine oracles are clothed is of no importance, but may be cast aside capriciously. The Greek is but the veil to be removed on entering the holy of holies. This may be true to some extent. But since speech is as yet the only known and general medium of communication of the thoughts of one person to another, and written language the only representative, however faint, to serve in the absence of the living tongue that same purpose, it is evident we must first interpret language before we can comprehend thought. We must be assured of the meaning of words in their grammatical and syntactical relations. When thought has been once crystallized into language the student of language must come before the student of thought. The canons of language must be satisfied before the philologist may allow its treasures to be scattered. The philologists are the keepers of the house of the Lord and allow no theologian, however subtle, to enter except in accordance with their rules. Theology, the queen of the sciences, finds her best friend in her humble handmaid, Philology.

It is not only of great interest but of vital importance for the New Testament exegete to be well informed of the nature and stage of maturity of the New Testament Greek or, better, of the larger *κοινή* to which the latter belongs. Is it the language of the highly educated or that of the poor and the masses of humanity—a language falling from

unsophisticated lips, intended for and immediately intelligible to the "little ones"? We must know whether to interpret the New Testament Greek by parallels from the speech of daily tragedy and comedy in humble life, or in terms of carefully trained philosophic thinkers, historians and diplomats.

The New Testament is written in Greek, but Greek may mean anything from Homer to the speech of the modern Psicharistae, the carefully chiseled Attic or a semi-Greek letter; it may mean dialect or a universal language. It is better therefore to find some other term, not so general as Greek, yet comprehensive. Of a specific "New Testament Greek" we may no longer speak, except in the same way as we might speak of Platonic, Aristotelian or Neo-Platonic Greek, but not even with so much propriety, for these three designations represent each a rather homogeneous unity, while the Greek New Testament represents various degrees of culture and education from the Greek of the Apocalypse teeming with solecisms, and the quaint popular Mark, to the Lukan introduction and the Epistle to the Hebrews and that of James. The expression "New Testament Greek" as connotative of something uncorrelated to or disjoined from contemporary Greek is unscientific in view of our modern discoveries, but may be used both as a convenient and practical designation for the language in which a body of different books unified by their subject-matter has been transmitted to us, provided we do not mean that "New Testament Greek" is unlike the Greek of its period.

Much the same may be said of the terms "Biblical" Greek (embracing LXX and N. T.), "Christian", "Jewish", "Judaeo-Christian", "ecclesiastical Greek". These all refer to the subject-matter, not to any corresponding particularism in the language in which it is treated. The *modus loquendi* "Biblical" or "Christian" Greek has been long in vogue; one can find it prominent in Thayer's *Lexicon* and Kennedy's *Sources of N. T. Greek*. It arose from two causes: first, the extension of the ideas of the New Testament canonicity

to the language itself. The very idea of the canon seemed of necessity to canonize the written medium. The language seemed to have risen above that of the day; many new vessels, it was assumed, were required to carry the new treasures. The New Testament language did not connect itself with but contrasted itself to that of the surrounding pagan world. It was overlooked that Christianity did not endeavor to make for herself a peculiar language but a peculiar people. Second, ignorance of the vernacular language of New Testament days. The sources of this vernacular available were quite limited until this generation. In 1863 Bishop Lightfoot with prophetic instinct said, "if we could only recover letters that ordinary people wrote to each other without any thought of being literary, we should have the greatest possible help for the understanding of the language of the N. T. generally".¹ And Lightfoot's words have proved true. A vast wealth of Greek inscriptions has since been brought to us from all parts of the Hellenistic world, (as well as from the earlier period). But more valuable because more vernacular are the unliterary papyri. It is for our estimate and interpretation of the New Testament of infinitely more value that the ordinary unknown and forgotten man lived in Egypt and wrote letters to his intimates than that the divine Plato visited that wonderful country. Among these artless Hellenistic letter-writers arose no Cicero befriending his Tiro with a view to ensure for his letters the admiration of future generations.

Adolf Deissmann has shown us that the language of the Septuagint and New Testament is intimately connected with the vernacular of that day and James Hope Moulton has shown that grammatically it is the same language, while

¹ J. H. Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 242, note to 3rd ed. Lightfoot was in some measure anticipated by Benedict Hase in Paris, who in 1843 pointed out that the LXX was to be explained as "Volkssprache" (Wellhausen, *Einleitung* p. 14). Deissmann had almost come too late, for Walch in 1779 had begun to use Greek inscriptions in interpreting the N. T. in his *Observationes in Matthaeum ex graecis inscriptionibus* (Jena, 1779), cf. *Licht vom Osten*, p. 6.

Albert Thumb has informed us of the nature, composition and relationship of the "common dialect". It must shock those who cling to the old view to be told that not more than one per cent.² of the New Testament vocabulary can be proved specifically "Christian" or "Biblical", and that the Greek Testament has its innumerable points of contact not with the language of the highest and purest philosophy of Greece, not with the most sober of her historians or the most earnest of her orators, but with the late or new comedy of every-day life, the comedy that delighted in depicting the intrigues, passions and foibles of ordinary folk. And many of the most striking Christian terms are borrowed from, suggested or modified by existing pagan and Jewish usages, e. g., *σωτήρ*, *υἱὸς θεοῦ*, *ἐπιφάνεια*³ and *ἐπιφάνης*.

To apply the term "ecclesiastical" to the Greek of the New Testament is an anachronism. It was indeed in New Testament times that the Christian ecclesia arose, but a specific ecclesiastical literature did not come till later, in the period of dogma, theological discussion, apologetics and church history. In the early pre-Constantine ecclesiastical period Christian writers were on the whole more indifferent to style than afterwards. Their writings show the seriousness of their defense of Christianity, and even in this period distinctly Christian words began to be coined. In the era beginning with Constantine, when Christianity became the State religion of the Roman empire, ecclesiastical writings depart still more from the simplicity of the earlier period. In New Testament days Christianity mingled more with the outside world and in some degree remained in contact with that world. When the hostile world was subdued to Christianity and Christianity attained high place at the imperial court and resided in palaces, she began, with the weakness of her human representatives, to array herself in more stately dress. She then elevated, or tried to

² Cf. Deissmann, *op. cit.*, p. 47, and *Expositor*, Jan., 1908, pp. 70-7, in opposition to Kennedy, *Sources of N. T. Greek*, pp. 60-83 and p. 93.

³ Cf. Moulton, *Proleg.*, p. 84, and Wendland, *Hellenistisch-römische Kultur*, p. 100, *et al.*

elevate, her diction above the simplicity of her infancy days.⁴

In spite of Zahn⁵ and Viteau⁶ we cannot regard the language of the New Testament as "Jewish" Greek. This is too large a subject to discuss here. Suffice it to say that of a specific Jewish Greek we have no evidence. It is a hypothetical idiom of which there are no evidences, so one is free to speculate at will. If the New Testament Greek is Jewish, then we must admit that the whole remains of the contemporary colloquial and quasi-literary Greek are also Jewish, for it is all one language with common features. How is it that Jewish writers like Philo and Josephus wrote virtually the same kind of Greek as their Hellenistic contemporaries? Josephus wrote in Hebrew and afterwards caused a translation to be made, in which translation only one Semitism can be proved, *προστίθεσθαι* with the infin. in imitation of *הוסיף*.⁷ The idea of Jewish Greek arose rather from what was supposed must have taken place when the members of a stubborn race came in contact with other peoples and with their language. The Palestinian Jew preserved his Aramaic so far as he could, as all people naturally cling to their mother-tongue when practicable. But many of the Jews in Palestine spoke Greek along with Aramaic. They were surrounded by Hellenism on all sides and were brought in contact with Greek in their dealings with the imperial government. And Herod the Great had Hellenized the country as much as he could. If the Jews of Palestine spoke a Jewish Greek we cannot prove it. A native Copt's or Phrygian's first attempts with the universal language ought in the same way to create a Coptic or Phrygian Greek. The Jew is supposed in all ages to betray himself by a peculiar

⁴ Cf. E. Schwyzer, *Die Weltsprachen des Altertums in ihrer geschichtlichen Stellung* (Berlin 1902), p. 32.

⁵ Cf. "Die griechische Sprache unter den Juden" in *Einleit.*, vol. I, par. 2.

⁶ Cf. the *Etudes* I and II *passim* and *Rev. de Philologie*, 1894, vol. 18, pp. 1-41.

⁷ Thumb, *Die griech. Sprache*, p. 125. See also Schmidt, *De Flavii Josephi elocutione* (Leipzig 1893), par. 43.

pronunciation of a foreign tongue, but neither is there the slightest evidence of this as affecting Greek though we hear of a peculiar Syrian pronunciation of Greek.⁸

Outside Palestine the Jews of the diaspora soon gave up their sacred tongue and allowed themselves to become Hellenized. In fact, they took deep interest in the civilization of Hellenism, took over to a certain extent Greek philosophy and metaphysics, and, as a climax, adopted Greek even as the language of their religion, the same quality of Greek as we find everywhere else.⁹

Viteau's "judeo-chrétien" Greek is as baseless as the "Jewish" Greek, corresponding like the latter to external rather than linguistic facts.

The New Testament Greek is also designated as "late" or "post-classical" and "un-classical". These are entirely relative terms depending on the view point. It is "late" compared with the *floruit* of the great masters of style who have for two milleniums formed the basis of a liberal education. And it is easy to see that we have in the New Testament a very different style of Greek from what the verdict of time has pronounced classical.

We must go farther afield and seek more comprehensive and scientific terms to describe the Greek of the New Testament. Two more general terms are at hand though not entirely free from objection. We may name it Hellenistic Greek. Hellenistic corresponding to Hellenism as Hellenic to Hellas. What then is Hellenism or the difference between Hellenism and Hellas? Briefly Hellas stands for what we know as Greece proper and the interests that were purely Greek and for Greeks, and for that wonderful civilization and unsurpassed intellectual life which we associate with classical Greece. Hellenism is something far more extensive—that culture and civilization that went out from Hellas on a world mission. It is Hellas cosmopolitanized.

⁸ Thumb, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

⁹ Deissmann, *Die Hellenisierung des semitischen Monotheismus in Neue Jahrbücher f. d. Klas. Altertum*, 1903, pp. 161ff., also *Bible Studies*, Eng. trans. p. 63ff.

Not only was the circumference of Greek activity widened but the centre also was removed. Greece had no longer one dominant intellectual city centre—Athens—in which the chief and noblest activity of the Greek genius found scope, to which Greeks everywhere looked as their spiritual centre. We find in Hellenism several large city centres like Alexandria, Antioch and Pergamum. In Hellenism civilization turned her gaze—the last time for centuries—in an eastward direction and wrestled with hoary sphinx-like Orientalism, with results for which we have not space here. Hellenistic activity differed from Hellenic in directing itself to land empire as well as fringing the sea coasts. Hellenism, or the civilization of older Hellas, had largely both at home and in its colonies been thrown in contact with barbarous civilizations and unorganized society, but Hellenism came in contact with established, national civilizations before which she stood in wonder and in which she found some things worth imitating.

But Hellenism was far from being merely a geographical widening of the Greek world—it was a corresponding spiritual expansion. That human individuality, which can never be successfully suppressed or neglected, asserted itself against the Hellenic restraints. Such individualism, when it asserts itself, confronts two objects—man himself as a responsible distinct being and man as a member of human society. In the old Greek republic states man was taught by his political education to regard himself as primarily a citizen. His duty as a citizen embraced all other duties. His native city's duties were the motive power of his best activity. Political and moral duties were regarded as identical; if a man proved a good citizen he was consequently a good man. And his duties as a citizen were numerous and exacting. But soon the thoughtful Greek, in spite of the din of city life and his innate fondness for it, and amid crowds of his own species, began to reflect that he was an individual distinct from the members of the human masses surging around—in short that he was a man primarily,

and after that a citizen. Here in one aspect arose Hellenism and the true root of that Greek, if not yet human, brotherhood. The individual now began to consider his own interests and seek his own advancement. But unfortunately owing to the strange and narrow circumstances of old Greek political life, these individual efforts ran counter to conservative patriotism. As a second step this new sense of individualism led the logical Greek to see that others too were individuals and had their rights. Hence there arose a Hellenistic universalism as opposed to previous Hellenic exclusiveness. A man was no longer an Athenian, a Spartan or a Theban, no longer known as speaking Attic or Dorian, but a Greek—a Hellenist; he was no longer a burgher of a small and jealous city state, but a citizen of that world which his enterprise, his language, art and civilization were conquering for him. We find painful examples in Hellenistic inscriptions to show that Greek cities had not forgotten their destructive habits of jealousy, but on the whole Hellenism brought a wider humanity with larger interests as the political and intellectual horizon widened. The Greeks found that they had something to teach the outside world, and the non-Greek peoples could not but recognize this and turn to the Greeks and learn their language and habits. The Greeks, however, must not be regarded as saints who set out with the serious purpose of bettering the world. No one familiar with their history will accuse them of such a purpose. They looked upon the new world opened to their genius and activity as something to be grasped for their personal or national advancement. They were always given to commerce, and so they perceived in the new kingdoms vast opportunities for mercantile life. This commercial activity was given an impetus by the scattering of the long hidden oriental treasures by Alexander and the bringing of millions of money into circulation. Scholars have had the notorious habit in all ages of thronging where their services are most substantially paid, and to this the ingenious and well-educated European Greek was no exception. He con-

veyed his genius to the courts and city centres of Asia, Syria and Egypt not because he liked these places best nor because they were more conducive to refined activity, but because there his spiritual and artistic wares found the best market. The blessings of Hellenism were largely by-products arising out of the mingling of Greek with Greek and with non-Greek, out of brisk commerce, and the education which no Greek could neglect and the culture to which in some degree he could never become indifferent. It was a struggle of civilization with civilization and a survival of the fittest elements, with an eclectic weakness for borrowing good things wherever they could be found.

What was at once a cause and a result of Hellenism was the spread of the Greek language, not Greek dialect but a universal tongue. As the military and civil powers favored Greek civilization its language must become widely known. And from each of the many city centres Greek influence went forth to the world. A semi-barbarian king caused his son, Alexander the Great, to be brought up under a Greek tutor, the father of the Peripatetics, and Greek became familiar at the court of Macedon. A Greek, Eumenes of Kardias, was Alexander's private secretary. The world conqueror realized that Greek was the only available universal medium of communication for his empire. The Diadochi surpassed him in their Greek sympathies. Even a Parthian King heard the presentation of a drama of Euripides at court. If men wished amusement the versatile Greek was surpassed by none in adroitness; if men wished to think the Greeks had observed, classified and laid down the laws to which thought must conform to be valid; if men wished to write the Greeks had with assiduity fashioned the most perfect organ of expression; if men wished to trade they found the Greek language the best known and most practical because of the commercial propensities of the Greeks;¹⁰ if men wished to build and govern cities (and Hellenism at

¹⁰ "Cette race, qui ont fait du commerce une poésie."

least in its earlier period maintained the true Greek love for city life), then who had succeeded in this like the Greeks? if men grew weary and stood perplexed before the riddles of existence and futurity who had endeavored to solve such problems like the Greeks? and what language was more familiar with the burden of philosophy? Besides it was two systems of Greek philosophy that supplied the pre-Christian Hellenism with its religion.

The Greek language, in the course of expansion, suffered many irreparable losses, but not, when one carefully weighs all considerations, without compensating advantages. Among the losses is to be counted that exquisite and inimitable sense for the niceties of language. Never again has such a fascinating prose style been reached as that of Plato, and it may be well questioned whether the world has ever been entertained by such perfect mastery and technique in oratory since the day Demosthenes descended from the bema after pronouncing the *De Corona*. Gone too was that Attic precision and that scientific labelling of words.

What, however, was loss to standard Attic was gain to the ecumenical tongue. The language in which Hellenism expressed itself was eminently practical, better fitted for life than for the schools. Only a cosmopolitan speech could comport with Hellenistic cosmopolitanism. Grammar was simplified, exceptions decreased or generalized, flexions dropped or harmonized, construction of sentences made easier.

Such briefly is Hellenism—Greek culture gone forth to conquer and transform her conquerors whether Alexander, the Diadochi or the Romans. And Hellenistic is the corresponding adjective, one of whose functions is to describe the language of that period—the language in which the New Testament is written.

Another method of designating the original of the New Testament is to say that it is the *κοινή*. But the question arises: what is the *κοινή*? Practically the *κοινή* is the language of Hellenism, the language of the Diadochian and

Graeco-Roman civilization. The *κοινή* and Hellenistic Greek may be regarded as synonymous terms.

There is some uncertainty as to what the ancients thought of the *κοινή*. The common dialect was a spontaneous and gradual evolution which attracted comparatively little observation. Men finally woke to find that they spoke no longer dialects but a common language. This common form of speech was regarded by the Atticists with abomination, unfit to be the language of an educated gentleman. They were too much absorbed with the classics of the Attic dialect to give any earnest attention to the *κοινή*, regarding it as "utterly barbarous" and "outlandish" and warning all who desired to be considered educated, against presuming to speak or write it. *Κοινή* was simply the antithesis to *Ἀττική*.¹¹

The ancient grammarians recognized that the *κοινή* was something quite distinct from the ordinary classical Greek; they showed, too, by the five-fold classification of Greek into Ionic, Attic, Doric, Aeolian and *κοινή*, that they regarded it as distinct from the ancient dialects.¹² Quintilian speaks of *quinque graeci sermonis differentias* (*Inst. Orat.* II. 2. 50). The ancient definition of *κοινή* as *ἥ πάντες χρώμεθα* comes near the truth.

What is now generally understood by the term *κοινή*? First, how is it related to literature? Is the *κοινή* a literary or the spoken language, or both? Krumbacher, Jannaris, Schmiedel and others understand by the *κοινή* only the literary language which stood in opposition to the living popular speech. Hatzidakis understands by *κοινή* the common spoken language of the Hellenistic age, and Kretschmer only the "*mündliche Sprache*".¹³ With this Thumb agrees

¹¹ The way in which the Atticists, especially Moeris, use their terms is sometimes quite confusing, cf. *ἐξῆλθεν Ἀττικοί, ἐξέργειν Ἑλληνες, ἐκβάλλειν κοινόν* and *οἶσε Ἀττικοί, φέρε ἑλληνικόν καὶ κοινόν*, and again other usages where *κοινόν* refers to agreement of dialects as opposed to *Ἑλληνες*.

¹² For further details cf. Thumb, *Die griech. Sprache im Zeitalter des Hellenismus* (Strassburg, 1901), pp. 2f., and Jannaris in *Clas. Rev.*, 1903, pp. 93f.

¹³ *Die Entstehung der κοινή*, p. 36.

in the main, making the literary *κοινή* an offshoot of the spoken *κοινή* under classical influence. So also Deissmann, Schwyzer and others understand the term. It is on the whole more satisfactory to use the word *κοινή* in this wider sense—the written and the spoken language, allowing in both different strata. *Κοινή* is then all the remains (literary and popular) with the exception of the Atticists, of Hellenistic times. The student must discriminate between the literary and the written, for of course the popular language has perished except in its written remains. By literary we understand what consciously raises itself above the colloquial, pays more or less attention to conventional forms and courts publicity and fame. The popular *κοινή* stands opposed to the literary *κοινή* in being the nearest possible reproduction of the conversational language of daily life, reflecting the illiteracy or degree of education and facility of expression of the speaking-writer. The literary *κοινή* shows various grades according to the effort or the success with which the writer rose above the speech of careless conversation and approached that of standard literary models. The New Testament belongs largely to the first grade of the *κοινή*; most of it is popular and unliterary, the writers paying little attention to form and grace of diction with no conception of writing for fame or futurity. It is true we must recognize in the New Testament also various strata of literary style, as in the writings of Luke and Paul.

What are the *κοινή* dates? Here there is variety of opinion, but fortunately exact dates are of little importance. In any case only approximately correct dates can be given, for it is impossible to say in what year the old Greek dialects lost their independent existence and in what year the preparation for the *κοινή* may be regarded as complete. Neither can we assign one particular year as that which witnessed the end of the *κοινή* or rather its passing into and continuation in middle and modern Greek. We are dealing with the history of language. We might choose the date of the battle of Chaeroneia (338 B. C.) as a starting point. Here

the dream of separate Greek autonomy was forever shattered. Greece came under the heel of Macedonia and unwillingly recognized Philip as leader of the united Greek and Macedonian forces in the campaign planned against the East. The Greeks were thus thrown in contact with each other and there was left little hope in exclusive petty state life. Their contact with each other and with the Macedonians who had adopted their language and civilization, must have had a corresponding effect upon the language. Or we may come down later and, as is usually done, regard the reign of Alexander the Great as the starting point of the *κοινή*. And here somewhere we find the spread though not wholly the origin of the *κοινή*. If pressed for exact dates we may give the date of the accession of the great conqueror to the throne (336 B. C.) or the date of his premature death at Babylon (323 B. C.) after he had opened a future for Greek civilization that the petty jealousies of the Greeks could never have opened. Or in round numbers 330 B. C.

There is more diversity as to the lower limits of the *κοινή*. We may allow it to extend until the period when the modern Greek began to arise, that is about the sixth century A. D., thereby including what is usually known as the Byzantine period which is the same language. Others fix the limit with the edict of Justinian requiring the expulsion of philosophers and the closing of the heathen schools at Athens (529 A. D.). Others exclude the so-called Byzantine period and assign the lower limit to the date of the transference to the East of the centre of gravity of the Roman Empire with the foundation of Constantinople (330 A. D.).

Schwyzler allows the widest limits understanding by the *κοινή* the whole development of the literary and oral Greek from about 300 B. C. to the present day¹⁴—a cycle of twenty-two centuries. His *κοινή* would thus embrace the usual Hellenistic, Byzantine and modern Greek. Schwyzler's long *κοινή* has this in its favor, that it represents the common Greek language as opposed to the former dialect period.

¹⁴ *Gram. der pergamenischen Inschriften*, pp. 19ff.

But he himself found this definition rather cumbrous, so he subdivided it into an old Greek *κοινή*, a middle or Byzantine, and the modern *κοινή*. The first he defines as that language which reaches from the time of the rise of a common form to the end of antiquity, i. e., from about 300 B. C. to about 500 A. D. This period agrees with what other scholars usually understand by the *κοινή*. Deissmann¹⁵ says if we divide the Greek language into (a) a period of the old dialects (b) middle or late Greek and (c) modern Greek, then Hellenistic Greek, i. e., the *κοινή*, is identical with (b), admitting that the limits at both ends are moveable. Dieterich¹⁶ follows Hatzidakis in fixing the limits 300 B. C.—600 A. D.; Thumb¹⁷ from Alexander the Great to the end of antiquity.

Now for practical purposes this long period of eight or nine hundred years of linguistic development may be subdivided in two ways, first, into subdivisions which correspond rather with external historical or political events than with philologic phenomena. Jannaris subdivides thus: Hellenistic period 300-150 B. C., Graeco-Roman 150 B. C.—300 A. D., Transitional period 300—600 A. D., and Wilamowitz-Moellendorf thus: Hellenistic 320-30 B. C., Roman 30 B. C.—300 A. D., East-Roman period 300-529 A. D.; Viteau, following Sophocles, Alexandrine period from the first year of the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus to the reduction of Corinth 285—146 B. C., Roman period 146 B. C.—330 A. D., Byzantine period 330—1453 (capture of Constantinople), while Sophocles gives 330—622 A. D. as the first Byzantine period.

More logical is the bipartite division suggested by Professor Thumb and approved by Witkowski¹⁸ making the dividing line about the Christian era. This corresponds to the internal phenomena of the language. In the first three centuries B. C. the *κοινή* continued energetically to displace

¹⁵ Art. "Hellenistisches Griechisch in Herzog-Hauck *Realencyclop.*

¹⁶ *Unters. zur Gesch. der griech. Sprache* p. XVI.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

the dialects and became the established ecumenical speech. Also in this period set in those definite phonetic morphological and grammatical transformations which finally altered the character of the language. During the Christian era the *κοινή* reached its zenith, gained a final victory over the dialects and became the speech of the Christian ecclesia and finally of the Byzantine empire. In this period were completed those transformations which made the ancient *κοινή* the stepping stone to modern Greek.

How did this common ecumenical language arise? We are confronted with the fact that before the *κοινή* days there existed no Greek language but only Greek dialects each of which had its own peculiarities and its own geographical limits. And each dialect mirrored remarkably well the character of the race who spoke it and their susceptibilities toward culture. In the pre-*κοινή* literature we may learn to read the remains of one dialect with facility and then turn to another and encounter almost a new language. For example when we have read Thucydides or Plato and open the history of Herodotus we find many new forms, strange words and unfamiliar constructions. Or turning to Homer after reading Sophocles we encounter almost as many differences as obtain between one romance language and another. The old Greek world was unique for its pronounced dialects, each little city state having a mode of speech unlike that of its near neighbors. Physical and political conditions, racial strife, city jealousies, love for autonomy, mountain chains, favored this diversity.

Three distinct dialects stand out, and a fourth closely akin to and a descendant of one of the others. The Aeolic was spoken chiefly on the north-west coast of Asia Minor to the entrance of the Hellespont, in the island of Lesbos, Arcadia, Elis and Achaea in the Peloponnesus, in Boeotia Phocis, Aetolia and Acarnania, Thessaly, Croton and other colonies in Magna Graecia. This dialect was strong and fiery like the chivalrous Aeolians. It never took kindly to literary expression except in the lyric poetry of personal

passion. Aeolic retained the oldest *forms* of the language and favored the *o* and *u* vowel-sounds. The Doric, represented chiefly by the Spartans, was spoken in southern Peloponnesus, in Megara and Corinth, Tarentum and other Doric foundations in Magna Graecia, Syracuse and other colonies in Sicily, and on the south-west coasts of Asia Minor including the islands of Cos, Rhodes and Crete. It was notorious for its steadfast adherence to the broad *ā* sound, and in general preserved the oldest *sounds* as Aeolic the oldest *forms*. Doric was used for choral lyric poetry.

The Ionic dialect was spoken in the Dodecapolis on the west coast of Asia Minor between the Aeolians of the North and the Dorians of the South, in almost all the Aegean islands, Euboea, and in several colonial foundations in Sicily, Italy and the shores of the Euxine. This musical and graceful dialect gave expression early to the martial Epic and the tender Elegiac and began the formation of a Greek prose literature.

But it was the Attic dialect, a modified form of the Ionic, which attained highest artistic perfection and was fashioned into a perfect medium of expression. The Athenians struck the happy mean in their temperament between the effeminateness of the Ionian and the austerity of the Dorian. They were by nature the most versatile of all Greeks. It was they who made the world forever debtor to "the illustrious land of Pallas."

For some centuries these dialects retained their isolation and each went its own way. Finally they began gradually to lose their pronounced characteristics. To this disintegration a common language, to which each contributed according to its ability and merit, fell heir. First, Attic came to be recognized as at least the standard literary dialect of the Greek world. This was more than any of the other dialects could accomplish. The Athenians gave to their work a more universal and pan-Hellenic stamp which compelled all Greeks to recognize a Greek spirit. In this way Attic became in a large measure the educational dialect of the

Greeks. Other dialects had some excellencies and points of contact with narrow racial sympathies, but in the Attic all excellencies focused. Other dialects had a limited literary expression, but Attic was familiar with almost every form of literature. So that it was partly the intrinsic merit of this particular dialect which standardized it. No other Greek race took so much pride in their speech as did the Athenians. They were beautiful themselves and moved among beautiful forms; they also coveted and attained beauty in language. They thought most and wrote most, so that the attention of the Greek world—by which culture was never neglected—was naturally directed to Attic models. Attic in no way labored under difficulty of grammar and expression. No thought was too subtle, no conception too profound, no distinction too precise to tax its resources.

But there were external and political reasons which led to a more universal form of speech in the Greek world. The sword is as powerful a factor as literary worth in the establishment and spread of a language. When the Persian threatened to crush Greek independence, the Greeks were compelled to unite for self-preservation. In 500 B. C. the Ionians, with the assistance of Athens, revolted from the Persians, but after a war of six years they were again reduced. Persia next turned upon Greece with the desire to punish chiefly Athens for her sympathy with the Ionians. It became a war of Persia versus Greece. And no people come forward more whole-heartedly and poured out greater treasures of blood and wealth than the Athenians for that liberty so dear to every Greek heart. The Athenians were later joined by the Spartans. The allied fleet had chosen the Spartan Pausanias as leader, but on discovering his disgraceful treason, transferred the command to the Athenians. To this position Athens was eminently entitled. She was strongest numerically in ships, and the battle of Salamis had been won largely by the preponderant naval power of Athens as well as the genius of the Athenian Themistocles.

And the Ionians, cousins to the Athenians, realized that the latter were the only power able, because of their fleet, to maintain the recently acquired Ionian independence. A league was accordingly formed, known as the confederacy of Delos, at the head of which Athens found herself. At first her fair dealings pleased the allies, but before long with the insolence almost invariably the appanage of power and with human frailty she started on a career of personal aggrandizement at the expense of her weaker colleagues which ended in the short-lived Athenian empire. Under this empire began that levelling process in dialects which finally resulted in the *κοινή*. Athens established a literary as well as a political hegemony, the former of which survived unchallenged. The presence of the Persian power ever ready to profit by Greek disunion, geographical proximity and commercial interests together with kinship of race and language drew the Ionians and the Athenians, the most gifted of the Greeks, together. In this Ionian-Athenian world the *κοινή* found its origin. The effeminate Ionic speech was sure to be worsted and to disappear before or be merged into Attic. Neither were the Ionians longer much occupied in literary production, their attention being rather directed toward ease and the acquisition of wealth. An almost inevitable and advantageous common form of speech arose. The Attic dialect had the big battalions on its side, and the speech of the more influential must win, all else being equal. Attic then stepped into a position similar to that once held by the alliance of English and French, English representing the politically powerful, the colonising and the commercial people, French the language of culture and of courts. This position is considerably changed since Germany has come forward and taken a prominent place in political and commercial affairs. As the Aegean Sea was policed with Athenian guard-ships the islands and the coasts were inevitably brought into contact with Attic. In the halcyon days of Athenian supremacy Attic was the language of culture, administration and colonising. It was the language the

κληρουχίαι carried with them when they were sent out to hold a *coin d'avantage* or refractory dependents. Athenian garrisons were stationed in important foreign centers and became potent factors in the spread of Attic Greek. It was also the heyday of prosperity, and commerce has a habit of following the stronger flag. Athenian bankers, merchants, sailors carried everywhere their dialect, which active commerce used as most widely known. All who wished to engage in mercantile life (and the Greeks have from the earliest times shown propensities for commerce) naturally made themselves familiar with Attic. Greeks from all parts met in the Peiraeus and in Athens and the flourishing marts and spoke or tried to speak an eclectic Attic form.

All these and other causes favored the spread of Attic and caused it to be recognized and well known in a very considerable part of the Greek world. Another factor toward the breaking down of dialects must have been found in the active formation of alliances and the meeting of different Greeks who served in the same army.

At Aegospotami (405 B. C.) the sceptre was wrested from Athens and passed into the hands of her hated Doric rival, Sparta. But Sparta, while she might lead in the councils of Greece, never had produced any literature worth mentioning and did not attempt even in the days of her power to produce anything beautiful—impervious to literature and culture. Still her exaltation opened a larger and more homogeneous Greek world for a common form of speech, although, as will be seen later, the embryonic Koiné encountered its most obstinate resistance in the Doric soil.

At the end of her thirty years' dominion, however, Sparta was humbled at the battle of Leuctra (371 B. C.) by Epameinondas and his Theban phalanx. Thebes too, though now politically mistress among the Greek states, made but a poor showing in literature. No Epameinondas could win for her literary hegemony—the "Theban eagle" is almost a solitary figure.

Meantime a strong robust nation was coming to maturity in the North. The Macedonians, unlike the Greeks, living in the open air on the plains and mountains and avoiding city life, despised by the Greeks as barbarians, a nation, according to Demosthenes, from whom one could not procure even a respectable slave, began to cross the northern frontier and to take part in the councils and especially in the internal quarrels of the Greeks. Finally Athens and Thebes united to withstand the invader, but were defeated at Chaeroneia (338 B. C.). Philip thus became master of Greece and was proclaimed at the Congress of Corinth as commander-in-chief of the united Greek forces in a campaign planned against Persia. Independent Greece was no more. But by a strange irony of destiny enslaved Greece fulfilled a far larger mission for the world than free Greece. Amid all the vicissitudes of Greek history one thing remained unchanged, the impregnable intellectual position of Athens. There was now less cause for one state to stand apart from another. All were under the same yoke, and thus united forwarded the progress of a Koiné. The question was no longer whether a man was an Athenian, a Spartan or a Theban, but whether he was a Greek; not what dialect he spoke, but did he speak or pretend to speak the Greek language. The pan-Hellenic words of the orator Isocrates in his *Panegyricus* are striking "Athens has so distanced the rest of the world in power of thought and speech that her disciples have become the teachers of all other men. She has brought it to pass that the name of Greek should be thought no longer a matter of race, but a matter of intelligence and should be given to the participators in our culture rather than to the sharers of our common origin."¹⁹

But before we continue the account of the growth and spread of the *κοινή* under Macedonian power let us go back and consider some other causes that made toward a common dialect.

¹⁹ R. C. Jebb's translation.

One will naturally think of the far spreading Greek colonies. For centuries however these did little for the κοινὴ owing to the peculiar exclusiveness of the home Greek city life. The Greeks were fond of colonizing. Colonies themselves colonized. Miletus boasted herself the mother of seventy-five cities. After the early migrations affecting the mother country and the adjacent coasts of Asia Minor the Greeks settled down to a period of political and social development until they outgrew these bounds. Then about the beginning of the eighth century B. C. a period of great activity in colonizing began. The Greeks loved the sea and in the pre-Alexandrine period colonized only by the sea. Wherever they could find a good harbor sheltered in a bay and commanding the mouth of a river, with an eminence near to serve as an acropolis, an arable tract of land in the neighbourhood and behind them an open country with the natives of which they could traffic, there they founded a colony. In this way the Greeks carried their colonies northward to Chalcidice and on both shores of the Euxine, southwards to Cyprus and the northern shore of Africa (Libya). The Greeks knocked early at the gates of Egypt in which they were for some time excluded from founding colonies, though we find in quite early times a flourishing mart, Naucratis, on one of the Nile mouths. But it was chiefly in a Western direction that colonizing proceeded, no doubt partly because in the West the Greeks came in contact with peoples of inferior civilization who had not yet realized the advantages of commerce. The shores of Sicily and Southern Italy were studded with Greek foundations. Some 250 ἀποικίαι were established between the middle of the eighth and the middle of the sixth century B. C. forming an almost unbroken line of Greek influence along the shores of the Mediterranean, the Levant and the Euxine. The Ionians ventured as far as Massilia (the modern Marseilles).

These colonies did much for the coming of Hellenism. But for some centuries while the Greek home states retained autonomy the colonies were bitterly partisan accord-

ing to the status of the mother city. The latter exploited the rapidly growing colonies for purposes of trade and kept up close relations with them, protecting them during their days of infancy in the hope of receiving help in arms when they had grown strong. It was also for the interests of the colonies to sympathize with the mother and manifest filial duty though politically independent. Each colony maintained the dialect of the founder, preserved the religious rites, and reproduced more or less faithfully the inherited customs and traditions. But even Greek colonies could not avoid being in some measure cosmopolitan. Few colonies long maintained exclusive homogeneity of race; hence in Dorian colonies we find bodies of Ionians and *vice versa*, merchants, scholars, adventurers, prisoners, political refugees. Commerce grew and every seaport (and practically every Greek colony was a seaport) became a meeting place for Greeks from all parts of the Greek world. According as the colonies became powerful²⁰ and the home states lost autonomy the spirit of exclusiveness must have diminished in the colonies. The Macedonian conquered the home Greeks, the Carthaginian advanced in Sicily and caused the flourishing Greek colonies to yield one after another. Magna Graecia herself passed under the iron rule of Rome. History witnessed the passing of the Hellenic and the advent of the Hellenistic.

Another cause favorable to the spread of a common language was the propensity of the Greeks in all ages for serving as mercenaries. Individuals and bodies of mercenaries, ruffians and gentlemen, took service with foreign princes who could pay them well. With these men there was no principle at stake; in fact, they were almost as unprincipled as the Crusaders. Fighting was their profession. They often fought against their own native states, as Xenophon did, and more frequently fought under opposing foreign kings, as in the case of the constant hostility between the

²⁰ At least two Greek colonies, Syracuse and Byzantium, have changed the course of human history.

pre-Ptolemaic Egyptian and Syrian kings. One will recall the severity with which Alexander the Great treated a body of such mercenaries in the pay of Persia as traitors to the Greek cause. In such a life Greeks of all dialects far from home and adventurous in spirit must have dropped their most marked dialecticisms to be intelligent to each other. History has preserved for us an example of this cosmopolitanizing in the case of the Ten Thousand Greek mercenaries whom Cyrus took up with him to the battle of Cynaxa.²¹ Xenophon himself shows in his own style how Attic could not thrive in a foreign land and in contact with other dialects: and the "Koineising" that is so evident in Xenophon must have taken place in thousands of cases, and even in a larger degree, as Xenophon was a man of letters.

A fine example of the intermingling of Greeks of different races and dialects may be seen in the case of Naucratis founded in the Delta land about the middle of the seventh century B. C. These Greek settlers were mostly of the Ionian and Dorian stock and though they preserved racial distinctions to a large extent, the Samians founding a temple of Hera, the Milesians one of Apollo, the Aeginetans one of Zeus, yet common Greek interests blended in the Hellenion. The very name in a foreign land is significant. In the precincts of the Hellenion met the Greek nationality confronted with the venerable civilization of Egypt, threatened by external dangers or drawn together by the innate Greek love of barter and curiosity of hearing some new thing.²¹ Unfortunately we have not evidence to show how this nationalizing process worked upon the language, but it must at least have been contributory to an intelligible common medium when Ionian greeted Dorian.

But undoubtedly the greatest factor in the formation of a common standard of daily communication is to be recognized in the Macedonian conquests. Alexander opened up for Greek enterprise and so for the Greek language and

²¹ Cf. P. Gardner, *New Chapters in Greek History* (N. Y. and London, 1892), chap. VII.

civilization a future forbidden to Greek jealousies and disunion. Alexander, it is true, may not be regarded as the creator of the *κοινή*, but his conquests did most for the evolution and spread of the incipient common dialect. In Greece proper the incentives for exclusiveness were not so numerous nor so great when separate Greek autonomy had gone or when it became an idle dream. And the Greeks had in council elected Alexander's father generalissimo of the Greek forces against Persia. After Philip's death some of the Greeks thought they might again be free, but Alexander taught them the cruel lesson of submission. Then with his Greek allies and native Macedonian army he destroyed that empire that had so long menaced Greek independence. Alexander's army, as well as his policy, was unfavorable to the maintenance of separate Greek dialects. Where Macedonian, Spartan, Boeotian, Athenian and Thessalian were messmates a *κοινή* was inevitable. Pronounced dialecticisms which would render a speaker unintelligible or ludicrous to others were dropped. Extremes were avoided. Greeks regarded each other no longer with the intense racial jealousy of the old city states but as sharers and coöperators in the work of a vast empire. Alexander opened up to the Greeks the land of the Nile and penetrated Asia to the shores of the Indus and the remote regions of Bactria and Sogdiana and spread Greek civilization from Alexandria on the Nile mouth to Alexandria Eschaté. He founded Greek cities and Greek centres everywhere throughout the empire, and into many oriental cities he introduced numbers of Greek and Macedonian settlers. Alexander was shrewd enough to realize that there was only one language in which the government of the different regions could be conducted—the Greek. In spite of his later Persian sympathies, which were no doubt largely political, Greek was the speech of his army and his administrative bureaus. He had in his suite Greek scholars and authors. He favored the Greeks (as distinct from the Macedonians) for positions where shrewdness and diplomacy were re-

quired. He stimulated commerce both by opening up new fields of enterprise and by bringing into circulation the accumulated millions of the Persian royal treasuries: and all this commerce used Greek as a medium. Money called for art, refinement and education—commodities which the Greeks had ever ready for the market. Thus in Alexander's empire the incipient *κοινή* found its full development and spread as the administrative, commercial and educational language.

The first attention of Alexander's successors, the Diadochi, was directed to the carving of his empire into kingdoms, those of the Lagids, the Seleucids and the Antigonids and later the Attalids. Greek found even higher favor in these monarchies. The Ptolemies, the Seleucids and the Attalids of Pergamos tried to outdo one another in beautifying their capitals with Greek art. Greek continued to be the official and court language. Literature was encouraged and large salaries were paid to Greek professors and tutors—which robbed Greece proper of her best talent. By the time the Romans came to interfere with the East, Greek had become firmly established as the common idiom. This the Romans accepted as the language in which they ruled their Eastern subjects.

Thus arose and spread the ecumenical *κοινή*. The question, however, of the rise of the *κοινή* is closely connected with another: what is the composition of the *κοινή* or what relation does it hold to the old dialects? Yet this question involves a discussion too broad for us to enter upon in this paper. Nevertheless, for our present purpose, it is important to discriminate between the vernacular and the literary *κοινή*.

For the latter we must admit a preëminence of Attic. Educated men, having read widely, when they set about to write, naturally took the great Attic masterpieces as a norm. So on the whole Attic vocabulary, grammar and method of building sentences dominated so far as the particular writer's ability or concern allowed. But many words

which would have been judged incongruous on the pages of an Attic writer made their appearance, words from poetry,²² the harbor, the market place, and from other dialects. Un-Attic modes of expression were not banished even from the literary *κοινή*. It was not Attic prose, at least not correct Attic prose, but it was modelled after Attic. Other interests than those of pure Attic style lay near these later writers' hearts. The Attic had for them been mellowed with the lapse of years and had cast off its sternly forbidding character; it had been transplanted from its native soil where alone it could thrive. To live even a decade abroad without losing its true native flavor was impossible. This later prose of the Hellenistic period lacked one great incentive and purifier—it was not written for the free opinion of Athens, but for those whose ears were not trained to Attic cadences. It was psychologically impossible that the status of a cosmopolitan educated public should not tell upon the achievements of those who catered to its taste. Besides, the Greek language—no longer dialect—was not now confined to the heavily charged atmosphere of the schools, but was taken out into the fresh open air of Hellenism: and this living cosmopolitan language must perforce enter even the domain of lettered ease. The language of a larger life could not daily be heard in vain. These writers (Atticists excluded) were not tied down to one particular style, but allowed themselves liberty of choice between the language of daily life and that of books. Moreover we know that even in Attic days, the Attic as we know it was not the speech of the Peiraeus fisherman,²³ the *λαχανοπώλης* on the agora or of the slave in the silver mines of Laurium. It was a language which these could easily understand and to an extent appreciate, as no public was ever better educated to such things than the Athenian. The

²² For poetical words in the Hellenistic speech cf. Thumb *op. cit.*, p. 216f.

²³ Cf. P. Kretschmer, *Vaseninschriften* and Foy, *Lautsystem der griech. Vulgarsprache*.

circumstances in which the ordinary Athenian lived, his frequent attendance on the law courts, his participation in the ecclesia and his criticism of the bema, his seat in the great theatre accustomed his ears to the melody of graceful periods. But with all our admiration for what is Attic, we sometimes feel that it smells of the lamp: it bears the stamp of the most artistic and aesthetic workshops—not quite the product of nature. It is highly probable if we could have heard Demosthenes scold his slave or if we could read a letter from him to his wife (if he ever wrote one) we should not recognize in either the style and finish of the author of the *De Corona*. In the former we should find sentences thrown carelessly together and words smacking of the kitchen or the street corner, in the latter informality, anacolutha, and diminutives which could not be used on the dignified bema. The standard Attic was too intricate and delicate a structure for succeeding architects. This idiom became stereotyped for the highest forms of literature, but was too heavily burdened to move forward with the march of the language. The cosmopolitan Greek in the midst of political upheavals and social vicissitudes never lost his sense of the beautiful: he was ever conscious that the Athenians had attained a preëminence in literature and when he essayed to write he wrote with Attic standards before him without turning a deaf ear to the spoken language around him.

When we come to the vernacular *κοινή* what shall we say of it? Much of this never was granted expression in alphabetic symbols. Still we have ample remains of the language of the common man before, during, and after New Testament days to enquire whether he spoke dialect or a common tongue.

Sturz believed that the *κοινή* is a conglomeration of dialects in which not even Attic can be disentangled from Macedonian. Others consider it as chiefly Macedonian and Alexandrian, others again as chiefly Doric. But the prevailing view among scholars is that the *κοινή* was built

upon an Attic basis. This is the view of Hatzidakis, Thumb, W. Schmid, Krumbacher, Psichari and J. H. Moulton. Kretschmer has challenged this position in his *Die Entstehung der κοινή*.²⁴ He thinks that little stress is to be laid on lexical relations, partly because sufficient materials for determining them are wanting, and partly because the vocabulary of one dialect was easily influenced by that of its neighbour. In syntax we know little of differences between dialects. Consequently he confines his investigation to phonetics and flexion, with some notice of vocabulary. Judging the reconstructed common speech of the Hellenistic period from this standpoint Kretschmer concludes that it is neither Attic nor debased Attic nor Ionic, but a remarkable mixture of most diverse dialects in which Attic makes only a relatively poor showing. The elements of this mixture are given by him in detail.

The Boeotian contribution consists in the *i*-monophthongising, *αι* appearing in Boeotian since 400 B. C. as *η*, and *οι* since 300 B. C. as *υ*. This treatment of *αι* and *οι* appeared in Egypt before it appeared in Attica, having reached Egypt through Doric settlers. The *η* sound was in Attic and Ionic pronounced open, in Boeotian closed (shown in the interchange of *η* with *ι* and *ει*). In the *κοινή* these two pronunciations survived side by side till the shut, i. e., the Boeotian gained the advantage. Boeotian also is the *κοινή* tendency to carry the 3 pl. endings of the sigmatic aorist into the strong aorist and even into the imperfect indicative, hence such forms as *ἐφύγισαν* and *ἡμάρτοσαν* (which prevail mostly in the LXX). Perhaps the 3 pl. optative, e. g., *ἔχοισαν* belongs here.

The Aeolic element he finds poorly represented—only the modern Greek *r* in the neighbourhood of *i* changes the *i* to *e*, *κερά* = *κυριά* and *Σμέρνη* = *Σμύρνη*—also Aeolic-Thessalian.

²⁴ in *Sitzungsberichte der Kais. Akad. der Wiss. (philosoph-historische Classe)* in the *Wiener Studien*, vol. 143, 1900, X. Abh.

More liberal is the North-western Greek contribution²⁵: the carrying over of the dative plural of the *ο* stems (— *οις*) to the consonant stems by analogy of the genitive plural in — *ων* e. g., *ἄνδροις*. This same tendency affected also the formation of the accusative and nominative plural in some parts of the North-west dialect territory and is now well established in modern Greek. Other instances are the middle flexion in the present and imperfect of *εἶμι* (e. g., *ἤμεθα* in N. T.); the pronunciation of *σθ* as *στ*; and the incipient fusion of the *-αω* and *-εω* contract verbs.

More prominent is the Doric element: the softening of the mediae (*βγδ*) into spirants, e. g., *ράιδος* or *ράύτος* = *ράβδος*, *ύγιγαίως* = *ύγμαινεις*; the paroxytonizing of the 3 plural aorist and imperfect as *έλέγον*; the working of analogy in accent of forms like *άνθρώποι*; the aorist form in *-ξα* for the regular sigmatic aorist as *ἐπαιξα*. Doric made itself felt also in the vocabulary of the common dialect in which nearly all its contributions are marked by the obstinate adherence to the broad *a* sound, *λαός*, *ναός*, *λοχαγός*, *μεγιστᾶνες*, etc., the form *ἀλέκτωρ* (N. T.) for Attic *ἀλεκτρυνόν*. Also the change of gender in a few words as sometimes *ή* (for *ό*) *λιμός* (N. T. Luke) and *τὸ πλούτος* in Paul.

Ionians began de-aspiration²⁶ which finally became universal in the *κοινή* and gave forms which show disdain to Attic aspirate rules as *κύθρα* = Attic *χύτρα*, *κιθών* = Attic *χιτών*; non-contracting forms as *όστέα* = Attic *όστᾶ*, *χρυσέος* = Attic *χρυσούς*; *-οῦν* for *ώ* of the feminine *-ώ* nouns; the transference of the *-μι* verbs to the *-ω* conjugation.

The un-Attic elements are the predominance of *σσ* for *ττ*, *ρσ* for *ρρ*, the beginning of that tendency which has resulted in modern Greek in the softening of a tenuis after a nasal to a mediae as *μπ* = *mb*, *ντ* = *nd*, *γκ* = *ng* of Asia Minor

²⁵ Cf. Moulton *Proleg.*, p. 36.

²⁶ Cf. also Thumb *Unters. über den Spiritus Asper im Griechischen* (Strassburg 1888) p. 89.

origin; also the carrying over of the accusative singular of the *a-* stems into the consonant declension, e. g., *θυγατέραν*.

In opposition to all this array of evidence Kretschmer finds only *one* genuine Attic phenomenon—the representation of the original *a*-sound by *η* except after *ρ*, *ι*, *ε*, and before *η*, with the Doric exceptions noted above.

There is a large amount of truth in Kretschmer's contention, but he goes too far when he infers that Attic plays but an unimportant part. It is possible to admit all the phenomena in question into the vernacular *κοινή* without destroying its prevailing Attic character. Some of these phenomena had begun, whether independently, it is impossible to say, in Attic vernacular before the days of the blending of the dialects. This idiom diverged in pronunciation from that of the educated and was more kin to its Greek brethren: it also took words from other dialects to give them up later to the resultant common speech. The opinion of scholars is increasingly ranging itself with Thumb for an Attic basis against Kretschmer's contention. Prof. Thumb admits that in the conservative home land the dialect naturally had a longer life; there being fewer foreign disintegrating influences working upon them. But on the mainland, in Asia, Syria, Egypt and the Greek colonies, the *κοινή* sooner established itself over the dialects.

The sway of the old Greek dialects, their decline and disappearance before the *κοινή* may be seen in the direct statements of the literary remains, in the character of these remains, in inscriptions, papyri and modern Greek.

Thumb²⁷ quotes Dio Chrysostom who (in the first century A. D.) met an old woman in a remote part of the Peloponnesus who spoke good Doric. But Chrysostom's emphasis on this fact and indeed any notice of it serves to show that this was the exception and not the rule. If the dialects were still enjoying an unchallenged existence Chrysostom's remark would have about the same point as if a traveller were to note that in the twentieth century he found

²⁷ *Die griech. Sprache*, p. 32.

a farmer in England who spoke English well. Philostratus²⁸ tells us of an inhabitant of Byzantium who, a century after Dio's notice, could *δωριάξειν*, which word has however been satisfactorily proved to mean not to "speak Doric" but to "affect the Doric dialect".²⁹

The literature in itself is not of so great value to us having reached us in literary, that is largely Attic or Atticizing form. Weighty testimony to the decay of the dialects is borne by the archaizing activity of the second century A. D. Why was the attention of scholars directed to reproducing old dialects if these were still in vogue? "When a community archaized in its own dialect, it proved that the dialect of its ancestors was dead."³⁰ And more convincing still is the fact, pointed out by Hatzidakis³¹, that the numerous blunders of these dilettanti were impossible if the dialects had been living in their purity.

But the life and decay of the dialects may be best studied in the inscriptions which come from all parts of the Greek world and cover both the dialectic and the *κοινή* period. Although at times we detect in inscriptions elevation of style and a soaring above the speech of the people in the midst of whom they were chiseled, we can trust them to give us a fairly faithful reflection of the Greek language in relation to dialects. Wherever a Greek people settled they left us stone records of their existence from the formal *βουλή* inscription in the public square to the rustic mason's attempts in secluded burying-places to satisfy the instincts of humble sorrow. Here we fear no defacement of the autograph by the hands of "correcting" or "Atticizing" scribes.

Unfortunately the inscriptions have not been systematically examined from the standpoint in question, but Prof. Thumb's preliminary investigation and statistics of the col-

²⁸ Reference from Thumb, *ibid.*, p. 31.

²⁹ Add also the notices of Suetonius, *Tib.* 56, and Pausanias 4, 27, 11, for Rhodes and Messenia respectively.

³⁰ *Die griech. Sprache*, p. 31.

³¹ *Einl. in die neugriech. Gram.*, p. 167.

lection of inscriptions from Rhodes³² show from the beginning of the third century B. C. a gradual decrease of dialecticisms with a corresponding penetration of *κοινή* elements. We find everywhere in the Greek world a gradual converging of the language of Greek inscriptions toward a universally intelligible norm. The records of the old dialect territories naturally retain dialect elements longest and show a "dialect-colored" *κοινή*, while those of the colonies and cosmopolitan centres converge more rapidly. In the first Christian century the dialect forces were at quite a low ebb and after the third century inscriptions show scarcely anything but *κοινή*, at the end of the fourth all is *κοινή*. Such are the facts we meet in the inscriptions—the gradual retreat of dialect and the simultaneous penetration of *κοινή*. This striking phenomenon has been interpreted by philologists in two ways. Schwyzer³³ says this process has reference only to the literary or educated language: the ordinary people spoke dialect still, while such as set up inscriptions knew the more widely intelligible *κοινή* and availed themselves of it in their records. He believes with G. Meyer that the old dialects lived through the Hellenistic age and later. But Schwyzer has overlooked some facts; that the *Kanzleisprache* of the Pergamene and other (e. g. Ephesus) inscriptions is not the educated *κοινή* of that day, but a more artificial phase of speech written probably by the scholastic private secretaries of the governors and city functionaries, and the secretaries granted a renaissance to forms and constructions which we have reason to believe from other sources were practically dead or dying. He has also apparently overlooked the penetration of the *κοινή* even in the vulgar inscriptions—which surely must correspond to a linguistic reality in the lower strata of society. And in Attica itself, which in its classic traditions possessed most means of self-defense, the

³² *Die griech. Sprache*, pp. 37f.

³³ *Gram. der pergamen. Inschriften*, pp. 24f.

κοινή began slowly to appear, as we see in Meisterhans.³⁴ Also how is it, as Prof. Thumb remarks, if the inscriptions represent the literary κοινή which would not naturally change so quickly, that after the fourth and fifth centuries A. D. we find absolutely no dialect inscriptions nor dialect forms?³⁵ After this date the most vulgar inscriptions did not return to their enchoric dialects. Hatzidakis, Thumb, Psichari and others therefore maintain that the evidence of the disappearance of dialect elements from the inscriptions corresponds fairly accurately to the language spoken by the people. It is hardly probable if the dialects were dying only for the educated we should find after a certain period they were dead also to the common people. "The middle point of the spread of the κοινή seems to have been the Ionic island-world; the Ionic Asia Minor followed almost immediately, then the Aeolic Asia Minor, Thessalia and Boeotia. Its victorious course was checked longer in the more self-centered Doric world. . . . The struggle between Ionian and Dorian continued in the language to a time when the historic rôle of both stems had been played out, when the world-historic might of Hellenism had won a much wider basis outside these two peoples in Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt. This mighty expansion of Hellenism must have exerted a reflex influence upon the motherland and at all events in the first centuries of our era very easily ended the death struggle of the old dialects." So writes Prof. Thumb.³⁶

In this question the Egyptian papyri are instructive. They show us that, although Greek influence had begun to surge against the Nile land as early as the middle of the seventh century B. C., Greek dialect was practically never spoken in Egypt. The tendency toward some kind of common speech was unavoidable wherever different scions of the Greek race congregated. Two forces at least combined to

³⁴ *Gram. der attischen Inschriften*, 3rd ed. by Schwyzler (Berlin 1900) *passim*.

³⁵ *Die griech. Sprache*, p. 33.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

produce this: distance from a conservative motherland and the presence of a surrounding civilization distinct from that of the Greeks. The Greeks could not *colonize*³⁷ in Egypt before Ptolemaic days and then they came under circumstances highly favorable to a *κοινή*. The judgment of Edwin Mayser, the grammarian of the Ptolemaic papyri, may be taken as conclusive, and if his judgment holds for the Ptolemaic papyri it holds also *a fortiori* for those of the Roman period. He maintains that the Doric element plays an imperceptibly small part, most apparent Doric formations being capable of satisfactory explanation either phonetically or otherwise.³⁸ Traces of Aeolisms are scarcely to be found.³⁹ The Ionic forms the relatively largest part of dialecticisms—especially in the lexical department—in Egyptian Greek, although even here the number of absolutely certain cases is so extraordinarily small as to be a negligible quantity for the general character of the language.⁴⁰

We have yet another method of enquiring after dialectic elements in the *κοινή*. It has been satisfactorily proved by Heilmaier, and corroborated by Hatzidakis, Thumb and others that modern Greek goes back directly to and is evolved out of the *κοινή*, not out of the ancient dialects. This position has been vigorously assailed by G. Meyer and E. Schwyzer, who maintain that the old dialects survived through Hellenistic days and have borne fruits in the modern Greek dialects. At first sight the latter view seems to find support in the dialectic peculiarities of the modern tongue. But Hatzidakis, Thumb and their party do not deny that the remains of some old dialects are still to be found embedded in modern Greek: they maintain, however, rightly that if the old dialects had lived they would have disturbed the course of modern Greek more seriously than

³⁷ Long before this they established trading marts like Naucratis mentioned above.

³⁸ *Gram. der griech. Papyri aus der Ptolemäerzeit* (Leipzig, 1906), p. 5, 3).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-24.

is the case. Besides we find from the works of Dieterich and Thumb that the modern dialects do not correspond geographically with the old. Modern Greek on the whole may be regarded as a common language, but abounding in provincialisms; the differences which obtain in it are largely local, many of them due to phonetics and accent. They are little more than what we expect to find in any universal language. The geographical parts which are thrown most into contact show a similar or nearly similar type, while those kept apart by barriers physical or social tend to diverge. In modern Greek we find a large crop of localisms. There is a northern and a southern type of modern Greek, and in a fainter way an eastern and a western, but these types do not correspond to the ancient Greek dialects.

Is the *κοινή* then a homogeneous language? The answer is yes for the literary *κοινή*, and for the vernacular *κοινή* practically yes. "It was a language without serious dialectic differences, except presumably in pronunciation" says Prof. Moulton.⁴¹ Undoubtedly in out of the way districts the old dialects persevered longest, and on distinctly dialect territory a "Doric-colored" or "Ionic-colored" *κοινή* is to be expected. Taken as a whole we find in this far-spread *κοινή* only "localisms" or provincialisms, not distinct dialects as in the old Greek world. Under the former category will fall the many points of divergence pointed out by Karl Dieterich⁴² in the *κοινή* of Egypt, Asia Minor and Greece. Prof. Albert Thumb⁴³ in summing up will not admit "a number of distinctive and locally separate dialects of the Hellenistic language" but only "a variety of provincialisms or locally circumscribed traits in the manifest unity".

The greatest variety in the common dialect obtained in the department of phonetics. This will not surprise us when we notice, e. g., that the vowel in the word *man* is

⁴¹ *Prolegomena*, p. 5.

⁴² *Untersuchungen*, tables in chap. III, pp. 126-146.

⁴³ *op. cit.*, p. 200.

pronounced differently by an American, a Scotchman and an Englishman. So the Greek of the Hellenistic period scattered over so wide and widely separate geographical areas and spoken by different nationalities must have shown the varieties of pronunciation which are unavoidable in any universal language. Copts and Phrygians brought into their enunciation of Greek certain ineradicable traces of their native phonetics.⁴⁴

On the question of the pronunciation of the κοινή in general it is not the purpose of this paper to enter.⁴⁵ Fortunately in many respects it matters little what systematic (or unsystematic) pronunciation of the common dialect we adopt. In the study of the text transmission of the New Testament, however, the question of pronunciation finds its eminently practical bearing. We shall guard also in exegesis against hair-splitting differences hinging on forms which for the scribes of our Uncials had identical value phonetically, e. g., *oi, η, η, υ, ι, = ēē in feet, or ai = ε.*

Even the pronunciation of New Testament days (first century A. D.) was different from that of the period represented by our best manuscripts. After our best efforts we cannot attain with anything like mathematical precision the correct pronunciation of Greek in any definite period of antiquity. Blass⁴⁶ has well remarked that if an ancient Athenian were to rise from the dead and hear us speak

⁴⁴ For influence of native phonetics on Hellenistic Greek cf. K. Dietrich *Untersuchungen*, especially the summary pp. 126-146; Thumb *Die. griech. Spr.*, p. 133f.; Kretschmer *Einf. in die Gesch. d. griech. Spr.* 292f.

⁴⁵ The student will find much useful information on the pronunciation of Greek generally in the following: F. Blass *Pron. of Ancient Greek* translated by Purton (Camb. 1890); Arnold and Conway *The Restored Pron. of Greek and Latin* (3rd ed. Camb. 1907) quite elementary and giving way to convention; Jannaris *An Hist. Greek Gram.* (Lond. 1897) *Pron.* p. 31f. Also the rich material found in K. Dietrich *Unters. zur Gesch. der griech. Sprache* (Leipzig 1898); Thumb *Unters. über den Spiritus Asper im griech.* (Strassburg 1888); Id. *Hdbch. der neugriech. Volkssprache* (Strassburg 1895); Hatzidakis *Einf. in die neugriech. Gram.* (Leipzig, 1892); also in the works of Schwyzer, Meisterhans, Nachmanson, Psichari, G. Meyer.

⁴⁶ Eng. trans. by Purton, p. 17.

Greek with our utmost scientific method he would consider it "horribly barbarous", but if he heard the modern Greeks or their followers speak he would pay little attention as he would fail to recognize it as his own tongue. The limits at both ends must be reckoned with. We think we know to a certain extent the pronunciation of classical Greek and we do know that of the living modern Greek. Now somewhere on this road between the old and the new stands New Testament Greek, though at some points just how far it had broken with the old and progressed toward the new we are at a loss to determine. It is almost as false to apply the standard pronunciation of Periclean Athens as that of the modern popular Greek.⁴⁷

The sources of the *κοινή*. We may reconstruct the living speech of New Testament days from the following sources⁴⁸:—

I. We have first of all the autograph remains which are the most direct and reliable sources—(1) inscriptions (2) papyri and (3) ostraca. The non-literary papyri give us not only the *ipsissima verba* but the very autographs of those who spoke the *κοινή*, and fortunately the number of such papyri is legion. These however have the disadvantage of coming from only one section (though a large and important section) of the Greek world, leaving Syria, Asia Minor, Greece, Sicily and Magna Graecia unrepresented. But this disadvantage is not so great as it seems at first sight, because of the approximate uniformity of the *κοινή*-phenomena in all parts of the Hellenistic world. It is true that Egyptian Greek shows a few idiosyncrasies, a few foreign words and traces of Coptic activity, unknown in Asia or Greece, but these together exercise a practically negli-

⁴⁷ For an attempted phonetic representation of a N. T. Greek verse in the speech of 400 B. C., 100 A. D., and the present day respectively see Thumb, *Die sprachgesch. Stellung der bib. Griech.* in *Theo. Rundschau* 1902, 87-88.

⁴⁸ This is substantially the list given by Prof. A. Thumb, *cf.*, *e. g.*, art. "Hellenistic Greek" in *A Standard Bible Dictionary* (N. Y. and London, 1909).

gible influence on the general aspect of Egyptian *κοινή*, so that we may take the papyri Greek as mirroring to us faithfully the Greek in which the New Testament is written. Evidences of the great services which the papyri can render to the study of the New Testament Greek text are seen to advantage in the *Bible Studies* of Deissmann and the *Grammar of N. T. Greek* of J. H. Moulton.

There is an obvious disadvantage incident to the evidence of inscriptions for this purpose. They are intended to serve chiefly public or future needs and not infrequently employ archaic usages. Such usages may easily be detected. But even after the stereotyped forms have been discarded, abundant material remains in which the rise and evolution of the *κοινή* is disclosed. Moreover Greek inscriptions represent the whole Hellenistic world from the walls of Herculaneum to the remote regions of Eastern Asia Minor and from Africa to Thrace. The third autograph source is found in the Greek ostraca from the Nile valley and the districts south of Egypt proper. These, though often representing the most plebeian character of the *κοινή*, are not nearly so rich in content as the two above named sources, many of them giving us an endless monotony of business receipts. Still they preserve to us words and forms that would otherwise have perished and possess their value for the interpretation of the New Testament text.

II. After the autograph sources which are immune from the meddling hands of Attic or Atticizing scribes, come (1) the remains of the writers of Hellenistic Greek, beginning with Xenophon, whom Prof. Mahaffy regards as the precursor of Hellenism,⁴⁹ and with Aristotle who, though a narrow-minded Greek, is in style a Hellenist. In fact we must search all the Hellenistic writers of about nine hundred years—from 300 B. C. to 600 A. D.

Chief among the monuments of the *κοινή* stand the Septuagint and the New Testament. The former is translation Greek, but not a slavish or over literal translation. In oppo-

⁴⁹ *The Progress of Hellenism in Alexander's Empire*, chap. I.

sition to the view that seeks the origin of the version of the Seventy in a desire to increase proselytes among the Greeks, it is preferable to adopt that which sees its origin primarily in the practical liturgical wants of the *κοινή*-speaking Jews themselves. The object of the translators was to produce a correct and intelligible Greek rendering. That they in some cases gave the Hebrew rather literally was due as often to their ignorance of the exact meaning of the Hebrew as to their ignorance of Hellenistic Greek. So the Septuagint is a Hellenistic book and was not intended for anything else. "The Bible whose God is Yahweh is the Bible of one people, the Bible whose God is *κύριος* is the Bible of the world."⁵⁰ To the student of world history the Septuagint is of great interest, as furnishing the evidence of the at least partial conquest of Hellenism over Judaism. It shows us that the conservative Jew did not successfully resist Hellenistic surroundings but adopted Hellenistic Greek as the language of his heart and religion where we should expect most conservatism.⁵¹

The New Testament is a purer and more direct *κοινή* monument being mostly free vernacular Greek, while the higher strata are not unrepresented. No other *κοινή* monument is more interesting philologically because we have no other body of writings of this period from such different authors and from such different regions. Moreover the New Testament is an epoch-making book for the Greek language, as it first elevated to literature the colloquial speech of its day. It demonstrated what that natural living language was capable of in forcefulness and beauty. Hence no Hellenist can read the pages of the New Testament without a sense of the simple charm and power of the language, and classical scholars, as they come to study the

⁵⁰ Deissmann, *Die Hellenisierung des semitischen Monotheismus*, p. 174.

⁵¹ Jevons ("Hellenism and Christianity", in *Harvard Theo. Rev.*, April, 1908, pp. 169-187) does not believe that the Jews were much influenced by the thought of Hellenism, Philo being unique in this way, though they were overcome by the Hellenistic language (pp. 181-182).

whole living organism of the Greek language and not merely a disjointed part of it, are beginning to become conscious of that charm as well as to recognize the vast importance of the book from a philological standpoint.

The *κοινή* is also well represented in the early Christian literature, lives of saints, martyrologies, apocryphal writings and apologetic works.

(2). An indirect source is to be found in the extant remains of the Atticists. These men—the greatest enemies to the common vernacular dialect—put a dead weight upon the growth of the language and wrote volumes of great erudition warning all who cared to write or speak elegantly to avoid “barbarisms”. Their discussions of these barbarous words, inflections and the other general information which they give are to us of no small value for reconstruction of the common dialect and for occasional local and chronological data.

(3). The *Hermeneumata*, or Greek and Latin glossaries. Here we find words that would else have perished. They give us a good selection of the plebeian speech, setting opposite the colloquial word or form its literary equivalent. This source has not hitherto been minutely worked. The grammarians and lexicographers also furnish much useful information.

(4). The relics of Hellenistic Greek found embedded in other languages. We can generally tell at what particular period or periods any language came in contact with Greek and under what circumstances it borrowed. Here, too, we may detect transition-forms, that is, those elements that entered the *κοινή* from dialect sources, localisms or from the lowest circles, maintaining for a time a precarious existence until ousted as the *κοινή* passed to modern Greek, where transition forms have disappeared. Greek words found in other languages and unrepresented in ancient Greek are with a high degree of probability to be accounted as pure words of the common dialect. In the treatment that Greek words have received in these languages we find many useful hints

on the pronunciation of the common dialect. The languages concerned are Latin, Aramaic, Syriac, Gothic, Coptic, Armenian and Slavic.⁵²

(5). Another rich and fresh source from which we may continually supplement our knowledge of the common dialect of the Hellenistic world is the modern living Greek tongue. A knowledge of modern Greek is of the greatest service in the reconstruction of the *κοινή* from which it is directly descended, and also in the study of our New Testament manuscripts.⁵³

After the bloom of Greek literature known as the classical period had passed, two tendencies became pronounced in the history of the Greek tongue, the one toward slavish (and often misguided) imitation of the old, the other toward the rejuvenation of the language from the fresh living speech of every day.

The first or archaic school felt that τὸ καλῶς εἰπεῖν ἅπαξ περιγίγνεται δις δὲ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται: so nothing remained except to imitate the old models and confine the language forever to the classical moulds. Only the vocabulary the ancients had used was worthy of the notice of a cultured man; only the syntax and the sentence-building of the classics should be the norm for the Hellenistic Greek in all its centuries. It was as if the admirers of the early Chaucerian or Elizabethan English classics were to require the writers of the twentieth century to copy or imitate the style and vocabulary of those periods.

First to appear was Asianism,⁵⁴ which is purely speaking

⁵² See especially the following: Thumb, *Die griech. Lehnwörter im Armenischen* (Byz. Zeitsch., 1900, p. 388f.); Krauss, *Griech. u. latein. Lehnwörter im Talmud Midrasch u. Targum* (Berlin, 1898f.); Schlatter, *Verkanntes Griechisch* (Gütersloh, 1900); Lemm, *Kleine Koptische Studien* (St. Petersburg, 1900). The last mentioned I have not been able to consult.

⁵³ Modern Greek may even be applied in the interpretation of the N. T. text as has been begun in a slight way by Alexander Pallis in *Notes on the Gospels according to St. Mark and St. Matthew, based chiefly on modern Greek* (Liverpool, 1903).

⁵⁴ Cf. R. C. Jebb, *Attic Orators*, vol. 2, p. 439f.; E. Rohde, *Die asianische Rhetorik u. die zweite Sophistik in Rhein. Museum*, XLI, 1886,

only a geographical term for the Greek prose literature, especially rhetoric, which began in early Hellenistic days to be cultivated in Asia Minor. Imitation is full of pitfalls into which Asianists fell. They tried to outdo that chastity of style which they could not reproduce, and one of them, Hegesias, plumed himself on being so accomplished that the true Attic writers were as peasants in his eyes.

Asianism began its activity about 300 B. C. with the birth of the *κοινή*, spread rapidly in all Greek schools and became most pronounced in Asia. Cicero says that Demetrios of Phaleron, the pupil of Aristotle, first lowered the standard of Attic oratory. Kallisthenes of Stageiros, Timaeos of Tauromenium, Kleitarchus and Hegesias of Magnesia were its foremost exponents. In Christian times it was renewed under the so-called second Rhetoric or Sophistic.

Asianism was in essence a form of prose in which bombast and tawdry ornament prevailed. Elevated style was aimed at for its own sake as a mantle for commonplace thoughts. Conspicuous was the lack of judgment and proportion. Ornament was laid on everywhere without proper material underneath. Metaphors, tropes, similes, exaggerated hyperbole, poetic expressions were plentifully strewn. Affectation was prominent. Puerile enthusiasm was aimed at throughout, though mostly out of place. Short sententious phrases were combined with long sonorous periods, and the ears of the hearer were soothed with the sing-song of rhythmical clausulae. No earnest matter was treated, all was empiricism and play of words. Intonation was carefully cultivated to deceive the people in the absence of genuine feeling. So theatrical (*ἀναίδεια θεατρική*) were the displays of the Asianic declaimers that they may be regarded as taking the place of the theatre for public amusement. The end was gained, not if truth was attained or a great issue made clear to the public mind, but if the people received a pleasing sen-

pp. 170f., or no. XXII in his *Kleine Schriften*, vol. 2, pp. 75-97; E. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, index *Asianismus*; W. Schmid, *Atticismus*, vol. 1, pp. 27f.

sation and applauded, if *mirabantur adulescentes, multitudo movebatur*. An *extempore* character was given to the declamations, the highest value being set upon improvisation (τὸ εἰπεῖν ἐκ ἐπιδρομῆς). Asianism, however, remained on the whole a popular movement, seeking its glory or rewards not in the monuments of literature, but in the momentary applause of the crowd.

When Asianism had become universally triumphant, Hermagoras of Temnos began a reaction about 110 B. C. He took the first step by founding scholastic rhetoric and calling attention to oratory as an art—a factor forgotten in Asianism. It was in the centre of the Roman empire that the contest was to take place. About 92 B. C. L. Plotinus instituted in Rome schools of rhetoric to be conducted in Latin, not in Greek, and Greek teachers recognized that the Romans were minded to make their oratory in some way artistic—either in the direction of Asianism or of Atticism. Hortensius represented Asianism. Then Cicero came and tried to prune Asianism by introducing Rhodian eclecticism which on the whole was more favorable to Asianism than to Atticism. A further step in the right direction was taken by the orator and poet Licinius Calvus who was followed by Messalla Corvinus. Such was the state of reaction when Dionysius of Halicarnassus about the middle of the reign of Augustus sought to show that to Atticize in the direction of imitating Thucydides, Xenophon, Lysias or Hypereides was a mistake—that Demosthenes was the prince of orators and had set the norm of prose. We cannot here enter into the merits and demerits of the scientific literary criticism founded by Dionysius. To him Asianism was an alien that had immodestly crept into the place rightfully belonging to another; the Asianists were “barbarians of Asia, outlandish baggage from Phrygia and Karia”.

Atticism,⁵⁵ like Asianism, professedly imitated the canonized masters, but with a great difference. The former

⁵⁵ Cf. W. Schmid, *Atticismus*; Norden, *op. cit.*, index *Atticismus*; Jebb, *op. cit.*, *ibid.*

maintained that not the accidental nor the occasional excellencies of Attic prose were to be imitated, but the permanently excellent, their work as a whole, not piecemeal. "The old oratory" (represented by Atticism) "was an art, and therefore based on a theory, the new oratory (Asianism) was a knack (*τρίβη*) based on practice (*μελέτη*). Atticism was technical and scientific, Asianism empirical."⁵⁶ Dionysius confidently predicted the speedy and ultimate victory of Atticism, but he was sadly disappointed. The Attic standard of good taste was too lofty and arduous, while Asianism followed the line of least resistance and was greatly favored by the *controversiae* and *caussae*. It also pandered to the populace and sought to please the depraved literary taste of the influential. It held its place in the schools of declamation which were preparatory for forensic eloquence where Asianism found its practical application. Atticism too made a bid for popularity—and aimed at refining and purifying public taste, but failed permanently to dislodge its opponent. Accordingly after its defeat before the populace Atticism retired to the literary cloisters where it began its career of lasting enmity to the popular speech.⁵⁷ Henceforth the Atticists perfected their sense of what was genuinely Attic and therefore standard, and established themselves as dictators and literary censors. They gradually drew into their hands all the learned and literary work and zealously guarded it. If any one wished to write acceptably he must do so by Attic standards, otherwise he was branded as "barbarous", "vulgar", and the like. The Atticist hedged about the entrance to the realm of literary prose with dicta as terrible as any Athanasian *quicunque vult*, e. g., the words with which Phrynichus prefaces his first volume: *ὅστις ἀρχαίως καὶ δοκίμως ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι τὰδ' αὐτῷ*

⁵⁶ Jebb, *op. cit.*, p. 439.

⁵⁷ This should not blind us to the boons it conferred upon that age and even upon our own. It set the standards of correct and appreciative literary criticism and did much for the study and preservation of the classics.

φυλακτέα. Only a brave man could speak or write Greek under such conditions.

The Atticists began that terrible dualism in the Greek language which has lasted with such evil results to our own day, as a consequence of which only a few years ago on the streets of Athens lives were lost in a riot over a translation of the Gospels by Alexander Pallis into the vernacular speech. This perpetual *diglossie* or bilingualism has hindered Greek literature in the succeeding centuries by making an impassable barrier between the language of the schools and of the colloquial speech. Of course in all civilized languages there is a vernacular and there is a standard literary form, but these two are not, as in Greek, mutually opposed and almost unintelligible to each other. Any compromise between them was prevented by the Atticists. If a man did not write acceptably in Attic style he was relegated to the category of the vulgar. And few could presume to write according to Atticist standards. Even the Atticists themselves failed to write pure Attic and did not escape contamination with the vernacular. But so far as they could they gave the death-blow to the development of the colloquial *κοινή* for literary purposes. They ignored the living Hellenistic speech around them and sought in a dead past the norm for a rapidly moving present. They refused to take notice of any phonetic or morphological changes, the digressions in *κοινή* syntax and the pronounced analytic tendencies of the later stages of the language. Of course it must be remembered that there were among the Atticists both extremists and moderates and also that many of the most charming and cultured of later Greek writers were Atticists, for example Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, Lucian and Christian writers like John Chrysostom.

The New Testament dared to dispute or rather to ignore Atticism. Here for the first time the vernacular was elevated into literature though not primarily thought of as literature. The Atticists have undone in some slight degree the simple plebeian character of the New Testament. Still

we find in our manuscripts abundance of colloquialisms and much that is at enmity with Atticism. If we had the autographs we should no doubt find these phenomena more extended. Our principal uncial manuscripts were written between 300-600 A. D. when Atticistic tendencies were dominant. The Atticists, being a literary clique of dilettanti, took upon themselves the preservation of literature and the multiplying of manuscripts. And from the ranks of the Atticists the class of scribes must have been largely recruited who in copying New Testament manuscripts could hardly avoid correcting or expunging glaring vulgarisms. This answers the question why we do not find quite so many colloquialisms in the New Testament text as we find in papyri and inscriptions of the same strata. The Atticists have been at work, but our best thanks is due to them for having allowed so many evidences of colloquialism to remain and for withholding from blurring the individuality of the various New Testament writers. We may suppose that most of the scribes were Christians or of Christian sympathies and wrote in days when the canonicity of the New Testament was universally recognized.

The blessings which the *κοινή* bestowed upon Christianity are inestimable. It must be admitted that the common dialect brought about in no small way the fulness of the times. It furnished an ecumenical language for an ecumenical religion. And Christianity came indeed in the fulness of the times: linguistically, morally and politically the world was prepared for the new revelation. Now for almost the first time in world history was there "peace on earth". The Hellenistic kingdoms, which had passed into Roman provinces under the Republic, were under the Empire consolidated and better managed under a strong centralized government. The Romans had reaped the ripe fruits of Alexander's conquests and bestowed upon the world the longed for *pax Romana*. Philosophy had supplied the wants of religion and worked out schemes for the guidance of human conduct. Hellenism had introduced

into philosophy syncretism and eclecticism which greatly modified the outstanding differences and gave birth to a sense of human brotherhood. The philosophy of the East consorted with that of the West and the philosophy of the West with that of the East. They borrowed from each other and, instead of trying to make the points of difference pronounced, they showed a tendency to minimize the differences and to emphasize the apparent or real points of similarity. And the philosophies of the pre-Christian period, like other movements of Hellenism, had directed attention to man as an individual and as a morally responsible being. The noblest of these philosophies was Stoicism, which was weak in theory but strong in practice, laying the emphasis on conduct. The strong fearless characters which it produced deserve our admiration and remind us of the products of Calvinism in more recent ages. This form of philosophy has left traces of its influence on Christianity, as we clearly see in Paul.⁵⁸ Hellenistic philosophy deserves credit for all it accomplished in preparing the minds of thinking men for the higher truths. Its optimism as well as its despair conduced to the success of the Gospel.

But Christianity needed a language in which to convey to men the teachings of her great Founder. The sacred tongue of the chosen people of old had not kept pace with the expanding sense of human brotherhood. In political scales the influence of the Jew was considerable, but not to be compared with that of the Greek. The home-keeping Jew had adhered as tenaciously as Hellenism allowed to the modern representative of the language of the oracles, while his Hellenistic brother of the Diaspora had adopted the *Weltsprache* not only for commerce and culture, but also for domestic life and for religion.⁵⁹ Latin was the language of power, but not of a highly cultured or civilized

⁵⁸ Cf., e. g., Hicks, "St. Paul and Hellenism", in *Studia Bib. et Ecc.*, 1896, vol. 4, and E. Curtius, "St. Paul in Athens", in *Expositor*, 1907, pp. 436ff.

⁵⁹ Hence we find so many Greek epitaphs by the Jews, and synagogues with Greek inscriptions and Greek ritual.

race. Rome, though despising the obsequious Greeks, confessed the superiority of their civilization and assumed a philhellenic attitude. It was in Greek that the Roman Government conducted its administrative business with its vast Eastern dominions. Peace is ever the sister of commerce and prosperity, and to this the *pax Romana* was no exception. Commerce everywhere revived. The great highways of Asia, Syria and Egypt became alive again with a rich mercantile life. Very active were the emporia from which ships plied in great numbers to the centre of the world and to the various Mediterranean ports. All this commerce used Greek as a medium, because in no other language could so many nationalities express themselves. Greek too was preëminently the language of education and culture. From the days when Philip chose "the master of them that know" as tutor to the boy Alexander and the Ptolemies sent their sons to Cos for Greek education, Greek tutors were in demand generally and in no place more than at Rome. Even Roman emperors could write their confessions and reflections in Greek. All the great highways led to Rome where cosmopolitanism reigned, the strongest tincture in which was Greek. Horace bears witness to this when he says⁶⁰ *Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit*, and Juvenal, at a later date, complains that he cannot tolerate the *Graecam urbem*,⁶¹ meaning Rome herself. Arabs, Copts and Jews in Egypt did business in Greek; native Orientals in the heart of Asia Minor put Greek epitaphs on their tombstones. The names of the seven deacons chosen in the constitution of the early Church in Jerusalem are all Greek. Moreover the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews addressed his readers in the language of the civilization to which they had been subdued, and Paul wrote his Epistle to a Christian community in Rome in Greek. Josephus wrote in Greek for his Roman patrons.

Greek therefore was not ill chosen to carry the Gospel

⁶⁰ *Epist.* 2. 1. 156.

⁶¹ *Sat.* 3. 61.

over the Graeco-Roman world. It was one of the largest determining factors in the rapid spread of Christianity, which could not otherwise in three decades or so after the Resurrection have been established over Syria, Asia Minor, "all Asia", Thessaly and elsewhere. The early missionaries made no attempt, as modern missionaries do, to learn the native languages. They preached the Gospel only where Greek had prepared the way for them. This was quite as important a consideration as the Roman highways and centres of population.

Not only because of its universality but because of its facility of expression Hellenistic Greek was well fitted to be the vehicle for the world religion. Fortunately for Christianity it was not the highly artistic and polished Attic Greek. Had this been a requisite the New Testament writers would hardly have dared to write, for only the introductory verses of Luke show anything like classical Greek; the Greek of James and of Hebrews could not satisfy that standard. But in Hellenistic Greek one could say the plainest truth in the most natural way, while at the same time it cannot be denied that this same type of Greek has proved capable of conveying the most profound conceptions. It was a language which almost anyone could write and everyone could understand, and consequently appropriate for that religion which was intended to be intelligible to the masses of humanity.

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THE ORIGIN OF THE FISH-SYMBOL

I. INTRODUCTION.

Of all the symbols by which the early Christians attempted to embody, and at the same time perhaps to conceal, the concepts of their faith, the Fish is the most obscure in point of origin. The other symbols can usually be traced either to Old and New Testament types, to associations of ideas current in pagan thought, or to those which arose during the early development of Christian art itself. Thus the Good Shepherd which represents Christ in catacomb paintings and the reliefs of sarcophagi was obviously suggested by the use of the same image in the Evangelists, and the dove which answers to the Christian *pax*, the "peace that passeth understanding", seems to result from the fusion of two symbolical notions, according to one of which, derived from pagan sources, the dove was the emblem of purity, and by virtue of the other the type of divine deliverance first expressed by the dove which brought the olive-branch to Noah in the ark.

But it is quite otherwise with the Fish. Its meaning is plain enough—it almost always clearly represents Christ, though sometimes standing for the Christian, and its history can be traced from its appearance in the second century down to the fourth, when it begins gradually to disappear on Christian monuments, although sporadic instances of its later use may still be found. Only its origin remains to be explained. To this end the Old and New Testaments have been ransacked for prototypes, the writings of the Fathers have been carefully reviewed, antiquity has been searched for parallels, and every department of early Christian history, thought and custom has been laid under contribution, but the question seems still as far from solution as ever.

It would seem a hopeless undertaking therefore to try to unravel the puzzle which has baffled so many scholars, and the present writer would scarcely have the temerity to attempt it, were it not for the fact that the archaeological evidence now available is considerably fuller and more definite than that employed by previous writers on this theme. This increase of archaeological data is of especial importance in the question of the origin of the Fish-symbol, because in treating a type of a clearly popular character like the Fish, we can only grasp its meaning and derivation by searching the monuments of Christian art, inasmuch as these are certainly the surest expression of the ideas of popular Christianity. It is not in the pages of the Fathers that we meet the humble imaginings of the ordinary believer, but in the paintings on his tomb, the figures on the ring he wore, the formulae on his epitaph, and the sculptures on his sarcophagus.

Again, only a part of the theories regarding the origin of the symbol have taken into full account the exact significance with which it is in most cases used, and some of these have misinterpreted this significance through lack of accurate knowledge of the monuments. Yet the real meaning of the Fish is of prime importance in determining its origin. And it is obvious that a symbol of so special a character as the Fish was probably not originally used to represent Christ in all His aspects, but only in one. The object of this treatise therefore is three-fold: (1) to restate the evidence, and particularly the archaeological evidence, as completely as the writer's knowledge and facilities will permit, (2) to determine the predominating significance of the Fish-symbol in its earliest use, and (3) to deduce from this significance and the archaeological evidence the origin of the symbol itself.

The first monograph devoted to the Fish as the symbol of Christ was a *Dissertatio de nomine Christi acrostichio ιχθύς piscis*, by Johannes Cypriani, published at Leipzig in 1699. This author, as the title of his book shows, re-

lates the symbol to the famous Sibylline acrostic, 'Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς Θεοῦ Τίδς Σωτήρ, the initial letters of which spell the word *ἰχθύς* or fish. The relation of the Sibylline acrostic to the Fish will be taken up later, and I shall only remark here that there is evidence to show that the symbol antedates the acrostic.

The archaeological evidence was introduced in a monograph published fifty years after the work just mentioned. This was Costadoni's *Dissertazione sopra il pesce come simbolo di Gesu Cristo presso gli antichi cristiani*, an article in Calogera's *Raccolta d'opuscoli scientifici e filologici*, vol. XLI, 1749, pp. 247-329. About forty monuments are handled in this work, many of them non-Christian and forgeries.¹ No further work is recorded on the subject until 1843, when Polidori published an article entitled *Del pesce come simbolo di Cristo e dei Cristiani*, in the *Amico Catholico*, a periodical issued in Milan.

The real foundation for later investigations was laid by the exhaustive dissertations of the Benedictine (afterwards Cardinal) J. B. Pitra and of G. B. De Rossi, which were published in Pitra's *Spicilegium Solesmense* vol. III, 1855. Pitra's dissertation has for its title: *ΙΧΘΥΣ sive de pisce allegorico et simbolico* and contains a very complete collection of the passages in Christian literature which bear in any way upon the Fish-symbolism, together with a survey of the part played by the fish in the allegorical and mythological lore of antiquity, among the Egyptians, Assyrians, Syrians, Jews, Greeks and Romans. From this survey of the possible pre-Christian sources, he drew the important but negative conclusion that the earlier notions had no influence whatever in the formation of the Christian symbol. *Totam noctem laborantes nihil cepimus*, says Pitra, using the words of Peter, with reference to this portion of his work. The theory of origin which suggested itself to Pitra as the result of his investigations, traced the symbol to the

¹ Becker: *Die Darstellung Jesu Christi unter dem Bilde des Fisches*, p. vi.

dolphin, the fish ἀνθρωπότατος ² and *piscis salvator* of antiquity. The association of the fish with Christ would thus have come about through emphasis upon His function as Saviour, which seems to be supported by the final epithet in the acrostic formula, Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς Θεοῦ Τίος Σωτήρ, "Jesus Christ, Son of God, *Saviour*." There are, however, two considerations which negative Pitra's theory, namely, that it is not certain that σωτήρ was originally the final word in the acrostic formula, and second, if the Fish-symbol were derived from the dolphin, we should expect it to appear first on Christian monuments in the dolphin-form, whereas the latter form of the symbol does not antedate the second half of the third century.³

De Rossi follows Pitra's examination of the literary sources with a treatise on the archaeological evidence entitled: *De christianis monumentis ἰχθύν exhibentibus*. This was the great archaeologist's first published work, to which he was ever fond of alluding, having apparently conceived for it an extra-scientific affection. It comprises a *corpus* of the inscriptions, gems, paintings, sculptures, etc., in which the Fish appears, and each monument is given that comprehensive and lucid exposition which makes De Rossi's work so satisfactory to the student. An appendix contains an *Index inscriptionum quae ἰχθύος signo notatae sunt*. De Rossi's opinion, however, regarding the origin of the symbol was modified by the discovery of frescoes in the catacomb of Callixtus at Rome in which he saw the Christ-fish bearing the eucharistic bread and wine upon its back. This opinion is expressed in final form in his great work, *Roma Sotteranea*. "The Fish which symbolizes the eucharist does not come, as Renan supposes, from the fish cooked as an article of food and eaten at the suppers of Jesus and the Apostles. From the ἰχθύς, from the living fish which was used as a conventional sign for Christ in the secret symbol-

² Athenaeus XIII. 30. Pitra: *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 519.

³ Heuser, s. v. "Fisch" in Kraus: *Realencyklopädie der christlichen Altertümer* I. p. 520.

ism to indicate the mystic dogma of the eucharist, sprang the search for incidents in the Gospels where mention is made of the bread and fish, and the complication of the primitive simple symbol by allusions to these or other Biblical stories. I have no intention in this treatise of deciding the question whether the first use of the Fish as the hieroglyphic of Christ is due to the Sibylline acrostic, according to the opinion of several archaeologists, or whether the symbol arose in the Apostolic age, and subsequently inspired the author of the Sibylline verses."⁴

From this it will be seen that De Rossi leaves the ultimate origin of the symbol open, but believes that the Fish represents the eucharistic Christ, or Christ as mystically sacrificed in the Lord's Supper, and claims for the symbol with this significance an antiquity coëval with the beginning of Christianity itself. This position has for the most part been adopted by later writers whose works are largely based upon De Rossi's, as Marrucchi,⁵ and Lowrie.⁶

Alexandre, the editor of the *Oracula Sibyllina*, suggests, in his commentary on the Sibylline acrostic,⁷ that the symbol may be derived from Jonah's whale, "quae divinae resurrectionis imago fuit". The "whale", however, both in the Septuagint and New Testament, is κῆτος,—not ἰχθύς—and the type in Christian art is always the classic sea-monster. Another objection to this view is that the type of resurrec-

⁴ *Roma Sott.* I, 1864, pp. 350-351: "Il pesce simboleggiante l'eucaristia non viene da quello cotto ad uso di vivanda, mangiato nei conviti da Gesù con gli apostoli, come vorrebbe il Renan. Dall' ἰχθύς, dal pesce vivo segno convenzionale di Cristo adoperato nel simbolismo arcano per indicare il segreto domma dell' eucaristia, nacque la ricerca di fatti evangelici, ove è menzione del pane e del pesce, e il complicamento del primitivo semplicissimo simbolo con allusioni a queste e ad altre bibliche istorie. Se poi la prima origine del pesce come geroglifico di Cristo sia dovuta all' acrostico sibillini secondo la sentenza di parecchi archeologi, ovvero quel simbolo sia nato nell' età apostolica, ed abbia quindi ispirato l'autore dei versi sibillini nel mio trattato non volli definirlo."

⁵ *Eléments d'archéologie chrét.* I, 1899, pp. 286-288.

⁶ *Monuments of the Early Church*, 1901, pp. 223-236.

⁷ *Orac. Sibyll.* II., 1856, p. 338.

tion lies not in the monster itself but in the salvation of Jonah, as is brought out clearly by Jesus' own words in Matthew xii, 40: "For as Jonah was three days and three night's in the whale's belly; so shall the son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth".⁸

No further contributions to the subject were made until Ferdinand Becker brought out a popularized version of De Rossi's monograph⁹ in 1866. He made some small additions to De Rossi's material, but contributed nothing new in the way of commentary or conclusions. The same is true of Martigny's *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne* published in 1877, in which the article "Poisson" is a summary of the monographs of De Rossi, Pitra and Becker.

A new period of theorizing was opened rather inauspiciously by an article of H. Merz published in the *Christliches Kunstblatt* of 1880,¹⁰ in which he undertakes to explain the origin of the symbol as coming from the use of the Greek ὄψον to mean "fish". The "relish" which the word signifies was in earlier times meat, but later fish, as we meet it in Greek comedy, and it is used in the sense of fish in Plutarch (*Symp.* 4. 4. 2.) In connection with this Merz cites John vi, 51ff., and particularly v. 54: "Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood shall have everlasting life". We have then according to Merz a series of this sort: "Christ=flesh"=ὄψον="fish". Therefore, "flesh"="fish"; a symbolical hop, skip and jump which Merz believes would have offered no difficulty to an Alexandrian allegorist like Clement. This theory may pass without other comment than that of Achelis¹¹ who points out that there is no trace of such a use of ὄψον in Clement and that Christ said, not: ὁ τρώγων μου τὸ ὄψον, but ὁ τρώγων μου τὴν σάρκα.

Garrucci, in the text of his "History of Christian Art"¹²

⁸ Achelis: *Symbol des Fisches*, p. 49, note.

⁹ F. Becker: *Die Darstellung Jesu Christi unter dem Bilde des Fisches*, 1866. Second ed., unchanged, 1876.

¹⁰ Pp. 97ff. The theory is restated in another article of the same periodical in 1886, pp. 45ff.

¹¹ *Symbol des Fisches*, p. 50, note.

¹² *Storia dell' Arte Cristiana* 1873-1881, I., p. 154.

suggests that the symbol Fish=Christ may have been derived from the other symbol of Fish=Christian, assuming the latter to be the primitive significance of the Fish. He argues that the type was used to denote the assumption of mortality by the Son of God, who thus made Himself equal to the humblest of His followers, and cites a homily of Theophanes Cerameus (12th century) in which he speaks of the fish on the coals in John xxi as the "image of assumed humanity which swam like the fish in the bitter waters of mortality without shadow of sin". But that this unconvincing supposition did not commend itself to its author is shown by the fact that Garrucci elsewhere¹³ attributes the genesis of the symbol to the Sibylline acrostic. The grounds for rejecting this theory have been mentioned above.

De Rossi's association of the Fish with the "eucharistic" Christ was repeated by Heuser¹⁴ but his treatment amounts only to relating the origin of the symbol with the allegorical references to the fish in Luke xxiv. 42, John vi. 11-13, xxi. 8-13, and Matt. xiv. 19. "We have to do", he says, "with a mystic symbol of Christian origin, which has its ultimate basis not in the significance of the letters of the word *ἰχθῦς*, but in the pregnant relation in which the fish in the Evangels stands, according to the unanimous interpretation of the Fathers, to the suffering, eucharistic Saviour". Heuser, however, does not develop his theory and leaves the question practically where it is left by De Rossi. We are assured that the Fish represented the sacrificed Christ of the eucharist, and shown passages in the Evangels with which the origin of such a use of the Fish may be connected; but the intermediate steps are lacking. Heuser's brief suggestion, however, is important, and especially the citation of the three passages, Jno. vi. 11-13, xxi. 8-13, and Matt. xiv. 19, in which sufficient occasion may be found for the formation of a symbolical concept whereby the multiplica-

¹³ *Mélanges d' épigraphie ancienne*, pp. 18-20.

¹⁴ s. v. "Fisch" in Kraus' *Realencyklopädie der christlichen Alterthümer*, 1882-1886, vol. II., p. 520.

tion of loaves and fishes, or the bread and fish thereof, represented the Lord's Supper; at any rate, there is ample evidence in early Christian art that such a concept was formed, as will be shown later on. But the admission of this parallel does not solve the problem of the Fish-symbol, for in the Evangelists the emphasis is obviously laid upon the bread, not upon the fish, and we have yet to find out how the bread came to be eliminated and the fish remained as the sole symbol of the sacrificed Christ.

Schultze¹⁶ based a derivation of the symbol on Matt. vii. 10: "Or if he ask a fish, will he give him a serpent?" Fish and serpent are here opposed and the serpent is a familiar enough symbol of the devil throughout the New Testament; the fish by contrast therefore came to represent Christ. The objection to this theory is pointed out by Achelis,¹⁷ that however plausible such a derivation may be, we have no right to accept it, unless it is supported by evidence in the earliest *testimonia*, both literary and monumental, showing a connection between the symbol and Matt. vii. 10. Such evidence is lacking. The theory did not in fact commend itself to Schultze himself for in a later work¹⁸ he takes up the position held by De Rossi and does not attempt to trace the symbol to its origin, farther than to assume that the latter is independent of and earlier than the acrostic. "Alone", he says, "as in Lucina,¹⁹ or placed before the banqueters as food, the fish is surrounded and fraught with a secret meaning, and this secret meaning is the mystic offering of Christ to the believers in the eucharist".

The first writer to attempt to bridge the gap between the bread and fish of the multiplication and the isolated Fish-symbol was Hasenclever,²⁰ but his hypothesis, while a perfectly reasonable one, and one which would have been more

¹⁶ *Die Katakomben*, 1882, p. 129.

¹⁷ *Symbol des Fisches*, p. 50, note.

¹⁸ *Archaeologie der altchristlichen Kunst*, 1896, p. 173. Cf. also *Archäologische Studien* of 1880, p. 53.

¹⁹ The earliest portion of the catacomb of Callixtus.

²⁰ *Der altchristliche Gräberschmuck*, 1886, p. 232.

convincing if the author of it had been able to avail himself of the present archaeological data, is rendered untenable by the attempt he made to fit the Fish-symbol into his general theory of the derivation of Christian types. According to this, nearly all the types in early Christian art are derivations from the classic, and one of the examples of this relation is the banquet-scene which is frequent in catacomb frescoes and ordinarily interpreted as representing the multiplication of loaves and fishes. This in Hasenclever's opinion is simply a replica of the Greco-Roman funeral feast. The addition of loaves and fishes was thought of by way of associating the banquet-scene with the multiplication. Once formed, this type was gradually sifted of all unessential elements until bread and fish alone were left, as may be seen upon certain frescoes and epitaphs. "Is it then to be wondered at, that the bread also was dropped and the fish alone remained?" Briefly, the banquet scenes of the catacombs are first merely funeral feasts taken over from classic art; next they are assimilated to the Christian historical, not symbolical, episode of the multiplication, by the addition of loaves and fishes; third, this scene is abbreviated to loaves and fishes, or the fish alone, still retaining its reference to the miracle, and whatever symbolism the Fish betrays in later times is a subsequent addition.

Hasenclever's general theory of the complete dependence of Christian types upon classic art may be dismissed. We know enough now of the sources and development of early Christian art to give the antique its due appreciation as a factor therein, but it is by no means the governing one. Hasenclever was caught, like Raoul Rochette²¹ and Piper,²² by superficial parallels between pagan and Christian monuments, but the essential originality of early Christian art is now established. And deeper acquaintance with the catacombs is beginning to convince students that so far from

²¹ *Sur l'origine des types imitatifs qui constituent l'art du Christianisme*, Paris, 1834.

²² *Mythologie der christlichen Kunst*. Weimar. 1847.

being conservative in assigning a symbolical meaning to the early types, such a significance is generally to be predicated, the burden of proof being on the other side. Consequently, Hasenclever's theory regarding the Fish was discredited by his premises, and his really valuable contribution, the suggestion of the gradual abbreviation of the banquet-scene to the loaves and fishes has not been duly appreciated. This will be discussed later; but it must be remarked that he too gives no adequate explanation of the final step, the elimination of the bread.

The most ambitious attempt to settle our question which has yet appeared was Hans Achelis' *Das Symbol des Fisches*,²³ in which he elaborated the theory, based upon the literary sources, that the symbol of the Fish was derived from the baptism of Christ. It was on this occasion that Christ was first saluted as the Son of God, and the Fish was chosen to represent Christ as the type best suited to convey the allusion to the baptism. The symbol thus derived made its way from Rome,²⁴ its starting-point, throughout the Christian world.

The principal value of Achelis' work lies in his treatment of the literary sources, from which he has collected a convenient *corpus* of citations out of nearly all the authors of the first five centuries who make use of the Fish-symbol. His comments on these passages are often very valuable, but quite as often his judgment seems to be obscured by

²³ Marburg, 1888.

²⁴ Achelis' reasoning on this point is a good example of his occasionally confident deductions from unpromising premises. He derives the Roman origin of the symbol from the allusions to it in Tertullian: *De Baptismo*, in Origen, and in the epitaph of Abercius, and summarizes his deductions as follows (p. 48): "Tertullian was in Rome himself shortly before the composition of his treatise *De Baptismo*, and all the other threads (of evidence) lead likewise to Rome. Abercius in his epitaph speaks with enthusiastic words of the impression which Rome had once made upon him, and consequently the acquaintance with the (fish) symbolism, which he brings out very abruptly in his epitaph, may have been brought by him from Rome. It is well known that Origen was also in Rome. Rome therefore must be the home of the symbol".

blind adherence to his theory. The treatment of the archaeological evidence which forms the second part of his book, is superficial in the extreme. I shall defer discussion of his arguments until later, and refer the reader for an estimate of his work, to the terse statement of Harnack:²⁵ "Achelis' monograph has not yet lifted the veil."

Schultze, Hasenclever and Achelis were bitterly reviewed by Mons. Wilpert in his *Prinzipienfragen der christlichen Archäologie*, and his estimate of the value of their contributions is very frankly expressed in the closing paragraphs of this book: "they are lacking primarily in scientific earnestness" His own opinion on the subject of the Fish-symbol is recorded on page 44, note 2: "the question whether the acrostic suggested the Fish-symbol, or whether the latter was antecedent to the former, is at present not ripe for discussion",—from which it appears that Wilpert had adopted the non-committal attitude of De Rossi. Wilpert's opinion, as the foremost authority on the catacomb-frescoes, is of course of the greatest weight, and it is very interesting to find that, after having ridiculed Hasenclever's derivation of the Fish from the multiplication in *Prinzipienfragen*²⁷ he guardedly suggests in *Fractio Panis*, published in 1895, that the origin of the symbol may have to be sought after all in the representations of this miracle.

Hennecke's brief treatment of the Fish in his *Altchristliche Malerei*²⁸ evidently attempts to reconcile as many of the conflicting theories as is possible. But his conclusions are not positive ones, save that he finds that a eucharistic meaning cannot be derived for the Fish in its earliest use from the symbolical banquet-scenes, or representations of the multiplication. And he adds that "so long as no new monumental or literary sources illuminate the darkness which surrounds the origin of the Fish-symbol, one cannot

²⁵ Zur Abercius-Inschrift, p. 16, in *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Gesch. der Altchr. Literatur*, vol. XII.

²⁶ Freiburg, 1889, p. 100.

²⁷ Pp. 13, 14.

²⁸ 1896, pp. 270-275.

say that the other meanings of the Fish grew out of the eucharistic significance". With regard to the relation of the symbol to the acrostic, Hennecke is inconclusive.

The *Bulletin de la Société nationale des antiquaires de France* of 1898 contains a summary of a paper by Mowat²⁹, in which an entirely new theory of the origin of the symbol is broached. Mowat believes that it is derived from the acrostic formula Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς Θεοῦ Υἱὸς Σωτήρ, but thinks that this formula appeared long before the Sibylline acrostic, during the second persecution under Domitian. At Alexandria the titles of this emperor appear upon coins as Αὐτοκράτωρ Καῖσαρ Θεοῦ Υἱὸς Δομιτιανός, Θεοῦ Υἱὸς being the Greek transcription of *Divi filius*, referring to the deification of Domitian's father Vespasian. During Domitian's persecution, Mowat says, the Christians must have produced the ἰχθύς formula with its Θεοῦ Υἱὸς as a protest against the impious title of the emperor. This theory will scarcely be regarded as more than a suggestion of doubtful value on account of the impossibility of finding corroborative evidence for it. There is good reason to doubt that the formula is much older than 200, for the second century writers do not mention it. Furthermore, Roman emperors bore the title of *Divi filius* as late as the reign of Caracalla; the "persecution" of Domitian is an uncertain quantity, and the archaeological evidence tends to show that the symbol made its first appearance, not in Alexandria, but in Rome.

Another suggestion toward solving the mystery is found in Usener's *Sintfluthsagen*.³⁰ This writer, struck by the imagery of a passage in the *Narratio rerum quae in Perside acciderunt*, in which Mary is described as one "who hath a fish which is caught by the hook of divinity", thinks that the Christian Fish is derived from the fish in Indian legends of the Flood, which saves or grants the wish of the fisherman who has caught it, but spares it. An objection to this par-

²⁹ Pp. 121, 122.

³⁰ 1899, p. 277.

allel is pointed out by Bratke³¹, who says that Christ's quality as Saviour comes from His passion and not from immunity from suffering. But a suggestion of this sort can hardly be taken seriously without corroborative evidence from the monuments or from Christian literature, and aside from the *Narratio* cited by Usener, which is of the fourth century, there is no Christian monument or writer which can be cited in support of his view, with the possible exception of Origen's commentary on the incident of the tribute-money³² in which he speaks of the τροπικῶς λεγόμενος ἰχθύς, "which rose up of its own benevolence (αὐτὸν . . . ἐϋεργετούμενον), caught upon the hook of Peter". This fish has been taken by some writers to be the divine ἰχθύς, but there is quite as much reason for regarding it as a symbol of the convert.³³

Conybeare's *Myth, Magic and Morals*³⁴ briefly sketches the derivation of the Fish-symbol without taking the trouble to cite in support of his conclusions any writer other than Tertullian or any monument other than a late piece of sculpture at Grotta Ferrata. Discussion of his theory may be deferred, as it is practically that of Achelis, save that he explains the introduction of the acrostic as due to the necessity of finding an orthodox explanation of the symbol, for "in the third century this interpretation of the baptism of Jesus (that is, that with it He was endowed with divinity) came to be condemned as heretical in Rome". Pestalozza's article, in the *Rendiconti del reale Istituto Lombardo*, 1909, I have not been able as yet to consult.³⁵

Such is the history of the study of this curiously baffling question in Christian antiquities. The conclusions reached have been so widely at variance that scarcely one of the

³¹ *Religionsgespräch am Hof der Sassaniden in Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchr. Literatur*. N. F. vol. IV, p. 182, note 3.

³² *In Matt.* xiii. 10.

³³ Hennecke, *Altchristliche Malerei*, p. 272, note 3.

³⁴ London, 1909, pp. 173, 174.

³⁵ Pp. 496-501, *Il simbolo cristiano del pesce*.

writers I have cited is in real agreement with another. The uncertainty which still prevails is indicated by the gingerly manner with which the symbol is handled by recent writers of handbooks. Von Sybel in his *Christliche Antike*³⁶ says little more of the Fish than to point out that when it occurs in Christian epitaphs it may be used with a reference to the eucharistic meal. Bürkner in *Geschichte der Kirchlichen Kunst*³⁷ says that "its meaning is still obscure", and contents himself with mentioning the chief theories: "perhaps the Fish is meant to recall that the element in which it lives is that of baptism. . . . Or perhaps the miraculous feeding of the multitude . . . is meant. Perhaps!" The question of origin is still open. The only result which may be said to have been reached by this long series of attacks upon the problem is the practical limitation of the possible meanings of the Fish to three: the word-play of the acrostic, the baptismal allusion, and the eucharistic significance. The last-named is supported by nearly all the Catholic writers, the second must be considered on account of the elaborate monograph which Achelis has devoted to its proof, and the first is the traditional origin of the symbol and cannot be ignored unless the original significance can be definitely proved to be independent of it.

C. R. MOREY.

(To be continued.)

³⁶ Marburg, 1906, p. 138.

³⁷ Leipzig, 1903, pp. 30ff.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

SPINOZA'S SHORT TREATISE ON GOD, MAN AND HUMAN WELFARE. Translated from the Dutch by LYDIA GILLINGHAM ROBINSON. 8vo.; pp. xxiv, 178. 1909.

THE FRAGMENTS OF EMPEDOCLES. Translated into English Verse by William Ellery Leonard, Ph.D., English Department, University of Wisconsin. 8vo.; pp. viii, 92. 1908.

Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. London Agents: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd.

The Open Court Publishing Company is doing much to popularize the Philosophical Classics. Additional evidence of this is afforded by the two attractive volumes before us. The former of these is a prose translation of Spinoza's "first philosophical work", preceded by the chapter on "Spinoza and his Metaphysics" in Schwegler's *History of Philosophy* and followed by a "Glossary of Terms". The second is a metrical translation of the "*Fragments*" of Empedocles introduced by a chapter on "Empedocles: the Man, the Philosopher, the Poet"; accompanied by a discriminating "Bibliography"; and concluded by a number of really explanatory "Notes". The usefulness of this little book is increased by the fact that the original Greek text is given in connection with the translation of each one of the Fragments. The special significance and value of these two issues appear in this, that Spinoza's "*Short Treatise*" "foreshadows some of the most important themes of the *Ethics*, and expresses them in a less pretentious and simpler method", while Empedocles, in addition to anticipating some of the more recent physical theories, "for the first time in the history of Greek philosophy makes an attempt to separate the efficient from the material cause".

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY. New Series. Vol. IX. Containing the Papers read before the Society during the Thirtieth Session, 1908-1909. 8vo., pp. 259. Published by Williams & Norgate, 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W. C. 1909. Price ten shillings and six pence, net.

This volume, as compact and well printed as ever, contains the following papers: I, Mental Activity in Willing and in Ideas, by S.

Alexander; II, Bergson's Theory of Knowledge, by H. Wildon Carr; III, The Place of Experts in Democracy, A Symposium by Bernard Bosanquet, Mrs. Sophie Bryant, and G. R. T. Ross; IV, The Rationalistic Conception of Truth, by F. C. S. Schiller; V, The Mutual Symbolism of Intelligence and Activity, by Hubert Foster; VI, The Satisfaction of Thinking, by G. R. T. Ross; VII, Natural Realism and Present Tendencies in Philosophy, by A. Wolf; VIII, Why Pluralism? A Symposium, by J. H. Muirhead, F. C. S. Schiller, and A. E. Taylor; IX, Are Presentations Mental or Physical? A Reply to Professor Alexander, by G. F. Stout. These able papers are models of directness, clearness, and strength. They are all so good that the reviewer hesitates to discriminate among them. He may say, however, that the discussion of "Natural Realism and Present Tendencies in Philosophy" he has read with peculiar satisfaction.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE PHILOSOPHIC BASIS OF RELIGION. A Series of Lectures by JOHN WATSON, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. The Macmillan Company, 66 Fifth Avenue, New York City. Pp. xxvi, 485. Price \$3.00, net.

In this volume Professor Watson wins and holds the reader's attention by his unfailing earnestness of conviction, his industry and conscientiousness as a thinker, and the attractiveness of his themes. It is a creditable but not a brilliant piece of writing. If one expects to find in the book the addition of a single structural element, or even of a new structural argument, to the well-known system of Speculative Idealism, a disappointment will be his. Indeed, when one member of this worthy school is known, there is no uncertainty as to what any of the others will say, an indication of organic consistency and developmental maturity in the doctrine—it has reached the stage of orthodoxy. A cynic, of course, would whisper in our ears that just for that reason the day of its power in contemporary philosophy is over. The real value of the book as a contribution to the system so exquisitely worked out by Edward Caird is its discussion of a few great theologians of the past, and its courteous polemic against some recently initiated movements in philosophy. In form it is a collection of lectures delivered at two different times and with two different purposes, the one philosophical, the other historical. Professor Watson has arranged them, perhaps, in the best order possible under the circumstances, but the lack of thorough consecutiveness is vexatious to those who have more than a casual interest in his thought. One must wander here and there to glean out and cumulate the argument. There is also no attempt made to trace the general development of religious speculation through the centuries. The author is inclined to choose a single representative for the thought of an age or for an aspect of the thought of the ages, point out his inconsistencies, and then pass on with satisfaction to something else. Such expedition keeps our interest from flagging, but let us hope

that Professor Watson will have leisure to finish at some other time the work which he has only begun.

Professor Watson's book is not to be commended to those who wish to be instructed in the leading philosophic movements of this present century. They are assuredly Pragmatism and the New Realism. It is not to be compared in lucidity and power with Edward Caird's splendid works. It is, however, very fine for a statement of Speculative Idealism to date, and one who is interested in the philosophy of religion will never regret having read it a second time. To those to whom the symbols are still dear, however, it will not be satisfactory, and the irenic value of Constructive Idealism to-day in the schools of philosophy is very doubtful, to say the least, as the Pragmatists are fairly maddened by its contentions.

Berlin.

THERON LEE.

THE GRAMMAR OF PHILOSOPHY. A Study of Scientific Method. By DAVID GRAHAM, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. 1908. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.

The purpose of the book is declared to be to induce men to lay the foundations of all philosophies broad and deep upon the Bed-Rock of all Science—*i. e.*, the Common Sense, the Universal Reason of Mankind (p. 15). Human consciousness is the real book of God. It is the chief revelation of God to man. On this score it is Petrus Smith contra Mundum (p. 29). In his polemic against Cardinal Newman's theory that theology cannot be taught, the author arrays the founder of Christianity against the Cardinal; and he reaches the absolute lordship of Individual Consciousness in the declaration: "Neither in life nor in death can any supra-rational or anti-rational doctrine, either sacred or secular, profit a man" (p. 36).

But this function of consciousness is to be accepted in its integrity. A man's faculties tell him a certain thing in strict good faith. He proceeds to place some interpretation upon it which it does not yield. No reproach to the faculty. Here the whole tribe of Idealists and Illusionists are in a state of hopeless confusion. Hume, with Berkeley, J. S. Mill and all the rest of them, would land in a lunatic asylum if they attempted to put their theories into practice. The book then runs on through the commonplaces in Philosophy, but the positions already indicated are determinant of the whole.

Now, beyond question, every thinking man must be guided in the last resort by the activity of his own consciousness, in the interpretation of the manifold of phenomena. But is that synonymous in all respects with the proposition that the "Individual consciousness of Peter Smith is the chief revelation of God to man"? Does not that create a species of Individual Absolutism; so that the issue is as many highest and ultimate authorities as there are Peter Smiths? And then what becomes of the guidance of the boasted universal common sense?

That opens the way for the question on p. 36. The heart of the

matter here is this: Is there anything beyond the power of unaided human reason to originate, which yet may be welcomed by the Reason as in strictest consonance with its laws? Our author's reply is a flat-footed negative. But if he be right, then every man must write his own text-book in Geometry. Not only so, but he falls into flat contradiction with himself. In his tilt with Cardinal Newman, he endorses Christ as enjoining upon his followers the obligation of teaching the Gospel (p. 36). But why attempt to teach him to whom "neither in life nor in death can any doctrine supra-rational or anti-rational, either sacred or secular, be of any profit"?

Finally: Perhaps not a few competent readers will rise from the perusal of this book with the feeling that the "Scottish Philosophy" in the hands of Mr. Graham digs its own grave. He opens the rift for the end of the wedge that splits the whole system. We may take the bald assertion of the naive man that the sun actually rises and sets as it seems to do. But that puts the lid on all attempts at philosophizing. That our author is not prepared to do. Consciousness is to be accepted in its integrity. This, as we understand it, is precisely what is attempted by every considerable Idealistic scheme—Kant, and even Berkeley included. I do not know that Berkeley for a moment doubted the existence of the material precipice. It is all a question of the adequate interpretation of the totality of consciousness; and that is a question that is not to be settled by a flourish of phrases, however amusing as to the hasty retreat of the Idealists from a "defective drain".

The book is original, interesting and brilliant. We admire the author's sturdy vindication of the inviolable rights of the individual; and also of the old-fashioned positions in morality, causality and design. He has the happy faculty of making a subject, usually tedious, fresh and fascinating.

WM. M. JACK.

GENERAL THEOLOGY.

THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE.

Based on the Third Edition of the Realencyklopädie founded by J. J. Herzog and edited by Albert Hauck. Prepared by more than six hundred scholars and specialists under the supervision of Samuel Macauley Jackson, D.D., LL.D., with a distinguished staff of associate and department editors. To be complete in twelve volumes, large quarto. Funk & Wagnalls Company, New York and London. \$5.00 per volume in cloth. Volume IV. Draeseke to Goa.

In this volume of 500 pages 948 topics are treated by 176 collaborators. In the selection of the topics, in the quality of the treatment, in the soberness of the point of view, in the bibliography and the cross-references, in the mechanical make-up, the volume is up to the high

standard established by its predecessors. Like volumes II and III, it is prefaced by a list of works recently published, bringing the literature of the first four volumes down to June, 1909. It still remains true that for a large part of its contents this Encyclopedia is the only up-to-date compendious source of information accessible in English. It ought to have a wide circulation.

After this hearty and unqualified commendation one may be permitted to say a few sentences in regard to improving the quality of our reference work on the Bible, without having his words understood as adverse criticism on the Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia. From the beginning, the majority of the men who have written on biblical topics have regarded the Scriptures as worthy, for religious reasons, of especial reverence; but many have failed of the kind of reverence which a true scientist feels for the fact which he is investigating. Perhaps there is no other region in which able men make so many careless and hasty statements as in the region of Bible study. Of course, there is much high-grade biblical work, but the average of quality is lowered by the presence of elements that are as weak as they are common. This will be illustrated by a few instances taken from articles in the volume under review, but similar instances occur in numberless other biblical articles in books of reference old and new.

The article on Esther in the Schaff-Herzog is by no less distinguished a scholar than Dr. Conrad Von Orelli. For the new edition the article has been rewritten throughout. It is reverent, relatively conservative, and exhibits a wealth of erudition and reading. Perhaps no scholar of the century has higher qualifications for the task, save perhaps in the matter of the simple ability to understand simply a simple story, written for people of all sorts and conditions.

The book of Esther is a graphic religious story. It is religious notwithstanding its studied avoidance of religious terms and of the mention of Deity. It is the story of a beautiful Jewish girl, at the outset vain and superficial and faulty, though with reserved strength of character, who comes into conflict with the world empire of her time, with results that illustrate the truth that one person is a majority provided she is on the same side with God. It is a story of God's purpose with Israel and the nations, illustrating the truth that in all events, including all human efforts great or little, fine or mean, there operates "an unseen power that makes for righteousness". The avoiding of religious terminology has the fine literary effect of making the presentation of these great truths unusual and fresh, and such as to appeal even to a mind of agnostic tendencies.

The book of Esther is also the story, whether historical or imaginary, of the origin of the extrapentateuchal Jewish feast of Purim. We have no information as to whether it was written on purpose to be read at that feast, but it came to be so used. The spiritual note which it strikes is one peculiarly fit to be the dominant note of that feast.

Dr. Von Orelli is too appreciative not to perceive that these are the great things in the book of Esther, the things that chiefly appeal to

an intelligent and serious reader. In his article he calls attention to them partially and incidentally; but he does not make them central, and does not use them as the key to the critical questions that arise. The explanation that the scantiness of "specifically religious phraseology" "is not a fault in a book read at a joyous feast" is as inept as it is needless. All the Jewish religious feasts are joyous, and religion is conceived of as the most joyous thing in them.

For many centuries the book of Esther has generally been regarded as historical. If one hesitates about this, the natural alternative is that it is religious fiction, invented for the sake of the great lessons it teaches, historically valuable not for the events narrated, but for the picture it gives of the times. Strange to say, Dr. Von Orelli does not define this alternative, nor mention it as recognized by any of the fifteen or more scholars whose opinions he cites, though possibly he does not exclude it. He mentions three alternatives: first, that the story is "pure fiction"; second, that it is an elaboration of a Persian or Babylonian or other folktale; third, that it has a "historical kernel". This last he seems to accept, regarding it as the majority opinion. What he means by it is indicated by certain statements which he makes. "These narratives were certainly orally transmitted with delight, and moreover, passed through a noteworthy literary redaction. In this way inaccuracies and exaggerations might easily creep in". Citing instances, he says that "according to Esther ii. 6-7 Esther and Mordecai had been deported with Jehoiachin" nearly 120 years before the date assigned for the marriage of Esther to Ahasuerus. What Esther ii. 6 says, by its most natural parsing, is that Mordecai's greatgrandfather was deported with Jehoiachin. The writer of Esther says that "the city of Shushan was perplexed" when the Jews seemed to be about to be destroyed, and that the city "shouted and was glad" when the decree was practically reversed. Dr. Von Orelli regards these statements as "too strong to be true". He would not think so if a crisis one-tenth part as serious arose in the city where he lives.

Ruling out all theological prepossessions, and speaking from a purely literary point of view, a criticism which ignores the heart idea of a writing is bound to misunderstand the details. These futile allegations as to incredible statements in Esther illustrate this, and the article includes other illustrations of it. It says, for example, "Haman having had a dispute with . . . Mordecai because the latter would not bow down to him". The book of Esther does not thus belittle the account of what happened; it represents that Haman was in his own eyes too high and mighty a person to get into an altercation with such a plebeian as Mordecai.

Dr. Von Orelli well says that "the narrative is harmonious and written with dramatic skill", and he speaks in high terms of its ethical and religious seriousness. Can he not see that the necessary inference is that the book is the work of one gifted author, and not a mere accretion of chance materials taken from popular stories? in other

words, that the book, if not historical, is a genuine religious parable and not a legendary outgrowth?

Turn to a different instance. Not many years ago, it was as much as one's reputation was worth to express a doubt of the essential correctness of the Egyptian chronology of Lepsius. Most of the men who accepted it did not take the trouble to notice that the Lepsius chronology was in conflict with all possible interpretations of the statements of the Bible, and those who noticed this did not say much about it. At present Lepsius is so completely out of vogue that he is not included in the comparative table of five schemes of chronology given in the Schaff-Herzog article on Egypt. Four of these five schemes are later than the Lepsius, and all, like the Lepsius scheme, disregard and discredit the numbers and the statements of the Scriptures. This is practically the one point in which the schemes agree. In the dating of events no two of them are alike. The differences for any particular event range from a few years to hundreds of years. The average difference is probably not less than several decades. They are presented with no reference at all to the fact that they are contra-biblical.

This way of dealing with the matter is neither scientific nor fair. The one principal reason why the Schaff-Herzog article deals with Egyptian chronology is that the subject has bearings on the Bible and its contents. To ignore some of the most important of these bearings is not good method. If the article-writer is convinced that the Bible chronology is largely false, he should not shrink from the responsibility of saying so. His neglect to say so leaves his readers in bewilderment. If he is not willing to take this position, he should at least call attention to the biblical dates as presenting an alternative, an alternative which may, at least, be considered along with the others. The great majority of the persons who will thoughtfully use this article have the impression that the historical materials found in the Bible are mainly trustworthy; in such a matter as this, he should give them the data for testing their impression.

The writer of this notice believes that when sufficient data have been examined, the final settlement of these chronological questions will vindicate the testimony of the Bible. He does not complain that other persons hold a different opinion; what he complains of is that in popular books of reference, in alleged impartial presentations of the case, there should be a suppression of essential facts.

There is another objectionable element. The table to which reference has been made conclusively proves that while there are men who think that they have established Egyptian chronology on an accurate astronomical basis, and while they may supposably be on the road toward such a goal, nevertheless they have not yet arrived. The differences in their conclusions render this certain. But the article-writer, without any notice given, proceeds to assume that one of the columns in the table is correct, and on the basis of that assumption he distributes the events of the history. The scheme which he thus selects is the one which goes to the extreme in discrediting the biblical statements. It

assigns to the Egyptian dynasties XXII-XXIV a period many years shorter than the total of the minimum dates of the Egyptian kings for that period, as found on the monuments. It contradicts the Assyrian records of Sargon. Its conflict with these wholly reliable sources can be obviated only by the most drastic harmonizing processes. Even if one accepts this scheme, he cannot ignore the fact that men of high reputation have reached very different conclusions from the same data. The objection here made is not that the article-writer holds a different opinion from the objector, but that he presents confessedly unsettled opinions as if they were settled facts. He would justly resent it if some one should charge him with pretending to know something that nobody really knows, but the effect on his readers is essentially the same.

To avoid misleading statements on such a subject is of course difficult, calling for great skill and painstaking on the part of a writer; but that does not absolve one from making the attempt. It will help if one has the habit of dating events by their synchronisms in cases when their date in terms of an era is uncertain. To understand the facts which underlie differences of opinion is worth more than to decide uncertainly which opinion is correct. In matters in which a consensus does not exist an honest man will take pains to distinguish between his own opinion, however certain it may seem to him, and a consensus opinion. If one feels constrained to teach views that antagonize the Bible, he should do it openly.

Let it be repeated that this criticism is not directed against the Schaff-Herzog encyclopedia nor against the authors of these particular articles, but against a well nigh universal current tradition followed by men who do reference work on the Bible. In some particulars the ideal of Bible reference work has been greatly advanced within the past few decades. The Schaff-Herzog is contributing largely to this advance. There are other particulars in which there is room for improvement.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE FUNCTION OF RELIGION IN MAN'S STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE. By GEORGE BURMAN FOSTER, Professor of the Philosophy of Religion in the University of Chicago, author of the *Finality of the Christian Religion*. 8vo; pp. xi, 293. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1 Adelphi Terrace. 1909.

This book has created a stir altogether out of proportion to its size and its quality. Owing to the broad margin on its pages, it is short; and so far from being an elaborate or even a careful treatise, it was, as its author says, "dashed off at white heat in about thirty days as a sort of by-product." Yet at the date of our writing so great is the demand for it that it is difficult to obtain a copy, and it has issued in

the suspension of its author from the Chicago Baptist Association. All this is due to the revolutionary—we do not say to the original or even the novel—character of its teachings.

The question which the writer essays to discuss is the place and consequent worth of religion in the development of the human organism, both individual and social. By an "organism" he means "a self-preservation machine". By "religion" he means "the conviction of the achievability of valid satisfaction of the human personality." By "religiousness" he means, "not that you have a God, but your God-making capacity." And by God he means "a symbol to designate the universe in the ideal-achieving capacity." Professor Foster believes, that Christ lived; that he exerted a unique religious influence; and that he was a good-enough man: but what he is most concerned to hold is that it would make no real difference if we had to give up our belief in the historicity of Christ, and that, after all, the greatness of Christ consisted, not in any revelation that he made of God, but in his likeness to what was already best in the world to which he came. Professor Foster believes that the church has a "function as natural and specific as that of the eye in the body", and that its function is the development of our conviction of the achievability of our ideals: but what he is most interested in showing is, that the church is doing almost everything else than this; and that, consequently, the masses by whom it is being deserted are the good and not the bad. Professor Foster believes that the Bible is a great book, in some respects a unique book: but what he is at most pains to establish is, that it has no authoritative force; that to think that it has is naive; and that the higher faith holds many of its clearest statements to be but myth or legend. Professor Foster believes in man, indeed, he believes only in man; for without man the world would have no value, there being no one to find value in it: but, on the other hand, he would merge man in the world; he denies that he is a spirit; "there is no such thing", he says (p. 21), "as a self-dependent soul freely active or interactive within an organism which we call the body, just as similarly there is no self-dependent deity freely active or interactive within that larger body which we call the cosmos." Finally, Professor Foster, as must have already appeared, abhors nothing so utterly as "the bugaboo of the Supernatural." He could not find a place for him, if he would. As there is no distinction between soul and matter, so there is no distinction between God and the world. Indeed, "the formula God plus the world is tantamount to the formula God plus God" (p. 183). The essence of this all-embracing organism which comprehends whatever exists is "forward striving toward a flying goal;" and religion is our response to the need of the conviction that this goal can be reached, and our God is simply our conception of the kind of being demanded if our ideal is to be attained. In a word, God is not a being, objective to the world and revealing himself to it as well as immanent in it: "our god-faith had its origin in human fantasy; it marks a stage in the growth of the organism which is at need God, man and the universe" (p. 63). Such is the

world view which underlies this much-discussed would-be philosophy of religion.

1. It certainly is not Christianity, though its author, in demanding that he be recognized as a Christian and a Baptist, would seem to think so. Christianity, however, has a fixed and definite meaning. Through nineteen centuries of history it has acquired a character all its own. From the first, Christians have been distinguished for their belief in the existence and personality of God, in the historicity and deity of Christ, in his incarnation, and in the authority of the Bible as His Word. While much emphasis has been laid on life and morals, these have been regarded as rooted in and determined by these great beliefs in these great facts. The religious philosophy of Professor Foster, therefore, cannot be Christianity. It may be an immense improvement on it; it may be the only true philosophy of religion; all this may with propriety be argued; but it may not be pretended that it is Christianity which is under discussion. As well might we identify the Copernician with the Ptolemaic astronomy. The former is the reversal of the latter.

2. No more is Professor Foster's philosophy a philosophy of religion. It may be a philosophy that he is developing; that remains to be seen: but it is not religion that he would explain. We can understand what he means by "the conviction of the achievability of our ideals", but we can not understand how he mistakes this for religion. Religion no less than Christianity has a definite and historically established meaning. It implies relation to and dependence on the Supernatural conceived as real and as distinct from because creating and determining the natural. It may not be that religion in this sense is justified by the fact. That question may properly be raised. We may not, however, speak of religion when what we mean is, the negation of religion because the denial of the Supernatural the distinctive mark of religion. To do that would be no less dishonest than confusing.

3. Just as little, however, is Professor Foster's philosophy of religion a philosophy. Of course, we are aware that it is of a piece with a great deal that passes for philosophy. It is as fine a specimen as one could find of that pragmatism which, it must be allowed, is the philosophy, or caricature of philosophy, now in the fashion. What we mean is that, if the aim of philosophy be, as historically it has been, rational explanation, then this religious philosophy of Professor Foster is not a philosophy; for precisely what it fails to do is to give a rational explanation of the phenomena of religion. Of the truth of this charge almost every page of the book under review affords both illustration and proof. From this multitude, however, our limits permit us to refer to but two:

a. If there be no Supernatural, no second order of existence prior to, independent of, and creating and determining and giving law to us and the world to which we belong, then it is absurd to speak of the "valid satisfaction of our personality". There is no standard by which to determine whether the satisfaction is valid or not, whether it corresponds to a need or only a want, whether it issues, as the idealists

say, in self-realization or merely in self-gratification. Indeed, all that it seems possible, on the author's scheme, to affirm of anyone is just, as in the case of Topsy, that 'he grew.' But this leaves the most essential phase of personality, the moral nature, hopelessly unsatisfied; and thus it makes religion, if it be the conviction of the achievability of satisfaction, inherently irrational.

b. If God be a "symbol of the universe in its ideal-achieving capacity, then it is absurd to speak of God as Professor Foster does and as religion must. A symbol cannot 'fulfill himself'; a symbol cannot be "a kind Providence"; a symbol cannot "live and speak and work." If we cannot be religious and not think so, this simply shows that our author's conception of God is the denial of the possibility of religion.

4. And yet, this revolutionary and most illogical book teaches some needed lessons:

a. With unmistakable clearness it shows up the philosophy of religion in which pragmatism when fully developed issues. Men have thought that they could be pragmatists in philosophy and Christians in religion. Professor Foster makes it clear that pragmatism is the contradiction of religion; that is, unless one is willing to commit intellectual suicide.

b. He has pointed out the fact that there is no halting place between the acceptance of the whole Bible as the "Word of God" and the uncompromising rejection of its historicity. Either its supernatural narratives are true and of vital importance or we cannot vouch for any of it. Of course, he takes the latter alternative; but the issue could not be put more plainly than he has put it, and we thank him for so doing.

c. His comments on the church life of our day are always pointed and often sound. He holds, and we hold with him, that the church should keep to her own sphere; and we agree with him that her sphere is not that of the state or of the school, or of the reform club, or even of the variety show.

5. Finally, while we are glad to acknowledge our indebtedness along these lines to Professor Foster, we cannot refrain from saying that we do not think that his discussion will accomplish its avowed end. He certainly has said much to stimulate doubt even to the destruction of hope, at least in the case of those not given to clear and close thinking; but if anywhere he has given "light and warmth enough to keep us from freezing in the dark", we have been unable to find it.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

MIRACLE AND SCIENCE. Bible Miracles Examined by the Methods Rules and Tests of the Science of Jurisprudence as Administered To-day in Courts of Justice. By FRANCIS J. LAMB, Attorney and Counsellor at Law. 8vo; pp. xiii, 338. Oberlin, Ohio, U. S. A. Bibliotheca Sacra Company. 1909.

This book is written in view of such radical but common questions as these: "Are the alleged Bible miracles verities?" "Is there competent evidence within human control adequate to prove the alleged mira-

cles true?" "Are miracles integral and constituent in God's economy of grace and revelation?" "Is miracle made the testimony of God?" "Do miracles have any function in theology, the science of religion?" "Can man have rational certainty that purported revelation is really such unless verified by objective evidence which Deity alone can produce, *i. e.*, supernatural evidence, which at the same time is evidence man by his normal powers can scrutinize, test, and know to be verity?" These questions the author, after the manner of Professor Simon Greenleaf in his famous work, "*An Examination of the Testimony of the Four Evangelists by the Rules of Evidence Administered in Courts of Justice*", discusses in the light of "jural science." "After showing the capacity of that science in proving miracles to be verities," he sets forth "to some extent its capacity in simplifying difficult and perplexing questions in religious matters, and in solving problems in theology and cognate questions."

Proceeding in this way, he proves, that the "alleged Bible miracles" are "verities"; that they are "integral and constituent in God's economy of grace and revelation;" that they are "the testimony of God"; that they have an important "function in theology the science of religion"; and that "man cannot have rational certainty that purported revelation is really such unless verified by objective evidence which Deity alone can produce."

All the excellencies of this specially timely and admirable work we may not even name. It must suffice to say, that it evinces ample legal learning and also an unusual command of the Scriptures; that, as is often not the case in the apologetics of to-day, it takes uncompromisingly the old and scriptural position as to the nature, the function and the necessity of the miracle; that its presentation of the evidence afforded by miracle, particularly in the case of the slaying of the first-born in Egypt, and in that of the resurrection of our Lord is profoundly impressive; that, as against even such apologists as Prof. Geo. P. Fisher, it takes strong and true ground in urging the miracles as proofs, as varied as they are striking, of both the deity of Christ and the existence and attributes of God; and that, in a word, it demonstrates all that it claims as to the applicability of jural science to the proof of the supernatural origin and nature of the Christian religion, by establishing the same, if once the possibility of supernatural revelation be admitted, "beyond all reasonable doubt."

Of course, it must be allowed that the controversy has come to be precisely with regard to the possibility of supernatural revelation and that, therefore, many will not so much as consider even the strongest evidence for the fact of such revelation. Still, this does not destroy the value of the argument. The best answer to a claim of impossibility is the presentation of actuality. A priori reasoning that something cannot be, loses all its force when confronted by the thing itself.

We venture to suggest only one change in the subsequent edition that ought to be called for. This concerns the author's use of the term supernatural. With Bushnell, he identifies the supernatural with

the spiritual. "It is the domination of mind or intelligent purpose over and superior to nature or insentient force" (p. 5). This definition, however, does not reach to the matter in dispute. The question is not whether man can control nature; it is whether God can control man and nature: and therefore, to avoid all confusion, the supernatural should denote the Infinite and Uncaused as in contrast with all the finite and caused; whether spiritual or physical, whether angel, man, beast or inanimate nature. This, however, is but a matter of terminology. It does not detract from the value of the work. That can scarcely be put too high. It is long since the reviewer read so strong and satisfying a book. He believes it to be, on the whole, the best one to put into the hands either of the inquirer or of the skeptic.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY, being an Examination of the More Important Arguments For and Against Believing in that Religion. Compiled from various sources by LT.-COL. W. H. TURTON, D.S.O. Late Royal Engineers. Sixth Edition. Twelfth Thousand (carefully revised throughout). 8vo; pp. viii, 604. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 27 and 29 West 23rd Street. 1909.

This admirable work was reviewed at considerable length and with much detail in the October number of *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for 1900, p. 690. We are glad to see that seven editions have been called for, and that the sale has exceeded the twelfth thousand. The additions and modifications made possible by so many editions have increased the value of the discussion; and in spite of its Arminian standpoint, it impresses us still as the best of our handbooks of Christian evidences.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

BUDDHISM AND IMMORTALITY. The Ingersoll Lecture, 1908. By WILLIAM STURGES BIGELOW. 8vo, pp. 75. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1908.

This is an exposition of the doctrine of Northern Buddhism with reference to Immortality, particularly as that doctrine appears in the teaching of the Tendai and the Shingon sects of Japan. The exposition is as clear and, we presume, as satisfying as could be in the case of such a bundle of contradictions as the learned and genial lecturer essays to resolve and explain.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

MODERN THOUGHT AND THE CRISIS IN BELIEF. By R. M. WENLEY, D.Phil., Hon. LL.D. (Glas.), Sc.D., F.R.S. (Edin.), Hon. Litt.D. (Hobart). New York: The Macmillan Company. Pp. xv.-364. \$1.50.

These are the Baldwin Lectures for 1909, delivered at the University of Michigan by Dr. Wenley, who holds a chair of Philosophy at

that institution. In view of the author's modest disclaimer of "expert familiarity with theology" his entrance upon the theological field in these lectures will be greeted sympathetically, and judgment upon what he essays will be correspondingly considerate.

The course of Dr. Wenley's argument may be pictorially, if somewhat obscurely, indicated by citing the poetically conceived titles which he has given to his successive lectures: "Sheaves on the Threshing-Floor;" "The Waters of Meribah;" "Breaches of the House;" "Humiliation in the Midst;" "The Preëstablished Discord;" "The Adjournment of Well-being;" "The Penumbra of Belief;" "The Valley of Blessing." Briefly, to be more explicit, there are two initial and determinative conceptions, though not thus formally expressed by Dr. Wenley, upon which the conclusions at which he arrives seem to be based. The *first* of these is the impression on his part that the processes within the historico-critical alembic in recent decades have definitely and finally evacuated history of anything that can be a basis for religious truth. The *second* is the conviction which he apparently entertains, that the famous dictum of Lessing bearing on the relation in which it is *a priori* possible for history and religion to stand, his dictum that "accidental truths of history can never be a proof of necessary truths of reason", is *self-evident*. Being convinced of these two things, and being nevertheless a man of deeply religious spirit, as is abundantly evident to anyone who will be fair enough to read his book through and not allow himself to be prejudiced by the extreme unqualified statements which in the course of his arguments the writer gives to his thought; and being, moreover, convinced of humanity's religious need, and convinced also that that need is fulfilled, and nowhere else fulfilled, in the Christ of the Johannine Gospel and of the Christian consciousness of the early Church, Dr. Wenley seeks at once to rescue Christianity from its imminent dissolution and to establish it free from all entanglement with historical dependence of whatever kind. And Dr. Wenley's mode of achieving this now-a-days so much coveted end is, as might be anticipated from what has been said, that of giving to the whole Christian subject-matter an interpretation purely idealistic, to which all questions that might be raised respecting the historical Jesus are regarded as entirely extraneous and, for the matter of Christianity, gratuitous.

Now, quite apart from the justice of the opinion to which many will incline, that in consenting to the total abandonment of history and the resolution of Christianity into "the power of the normative ideal to capture the whole person" and the power of "personal communion with the ripest actuality in our own souls" to "work deliverance from their lowest impulses"—quite apart, we say, from the justice of the opinion that in following this course Dr. Wenley has "das Kind", as the Germans picturesquely say, "mit dem Bade ausgeschüttet", poured out the baby along with the bath—it is obvious that the only thing which necessitates this resort to a purely idealistic avenue of approach in the construction of the spiritual realities of this thing that we call

Christianity, is the point of view that is required by these two assumptions. And it is precisely in regard to these two assumptions that Dr. Wenley's position, as seems to us, is exposed to very serious question.

In regard to the former of these two basal assumptions in the volume before us, there are two convictions that one cannot avoid. The first of these convictions is that, being an amateur, as he modestly confesses himself to be, in the whole subject of the critico-historical treatment of the sources of Christianity, and consequently entitled to no independent judgment in regard of anything belonging to *this side* of the general subject to which he has addressed himself, Dr. Wenley has allowed himself to be misled; misled, namely, in that he regards the most extreme type of current critical dissolvents of the historical basis of Christianity as representative of the mature and sober verdict of contemporary historical and critical scholarship. His note on page 148, to the effect that to him "it does not seem that the views of van Manen, Steck, and Professor Smith of Tulane University can be entertained seriously," does not qualify this first conviction on our part regarding Dr. Wenley's first assumption, of which we speak.

Our second conviction regarding our author's prior assumption is that he has not subjected to the test of a sufficiently rigorous analysis the philosophical presuppositions which quite evidently underlie the destructive processes of such writers as Wernle, Bousset, Wrede, Hatch, and many of the writers in the *Encyclopedia Biblica*, whose names are prominent among those cited by him on p. 189 as the authorities whom he has followed. To be earnestly commended to Dr. Wenley's attention are such poignant, pregnant and timely words as those of Professor Julius Kaftan of the Berlin University in his little brochure of three years ago, entitled "Jesus und Paulus." In this booklet, the forceful and vigorous thinking Berlin theologian is concerned, as it happens, with an incisive and penetrating criticism of those very books of Bousset and Wrede, recently so much discussed, to which Dr. Wenley with so much assurance, apparently, pins his faith as final utterances upon their respective themes—Bousset's "Jesus" namely, and Wrede's "Paulus." The words in which on the early pages Kaftan refers to the principles which according to Schiele, the general editor of the series of "Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher," the public may regard as determining the common point of view of all the books of his series (among which the books in question, of Bousset and Wrede, appear) are well worthy of quotation and thoughtful digestion in this connection. As the two first principles Schiele had enounced "The Law of Reverential Respect for Naked Reality", as fundamental, and, as primarily derivative therefrom. "The Law of the Inviolability of the Scientific Method, which disposes and orders all the spheres of world-knowledge (Welt-gebiete) in accordance with their respective particular charatcers under the common Rules of Reason." Upon which Kaftan forcibly remarks, in words which the present reviewer has endeavored to translate with fidelity: "That (second principle) I find myself unable to derive from the fundamental one (of respect for

naked reality.) Rather does it stand in contradiction with all else, in that it misleads us into mixing our own judgment upon things in with the things themselves, and our presentation of them. It is for this reason *inimical to all progress and all truth*, (the italics are throughout Kaftan's), and against it one cannot therefore be sufficiently on one's guard. What is meant by that phrase 'The Inviolability of the Scientific Method'? Method is not Ethics, which prescribes 'inviolable laws.' Method is a *technique*, which remains at all times subject to alteration. The history of every science establishes the assertion that the Method which had been regarded as inviolable was always the greatest obstruction and source of limitation, and every new epoch began with a revolution against that which had theretofore been regarded as inviolable. . . . My conclusion is, that what is meant (*i. e.* by Schiele and the authors in his series in their advertised Second Ground-principle) has its roots in entirely different ground from that of Method. It is, in brief, the so-called 'Modern View of the World' ('die moderne Weltanschauung') that lies behind it. For the reason that this 'moderne Weltanschauung' arises, more than out of anything else, out of the precipitation (Niederschlag) which the vast scientific progress of the past century has left behind itself in the general tone and mental atmosphere of the time, for that reason it has been brought into a close interrelation with the matter of scientific Method; but in reality the two things are quite distinct and different, and indeed in the critical and decisive respect stand in direct contrast with each other. The Method of Science is at home in the field of what is relative, and all knowledge which comes there under consideration is relative knowledge. The "World-view", in contrast with this, is something absolute, something "inviolable", in Schiele's phrase;—presents itself, in short, as essentially a Dogma (tritt kurz und gut als Dogma auf.) . . . When, therefore, "The Inviolability of Method" is exalted into a law in the investigation and presentation of history, this amounts to nothing more or less than the proposition: "Our intention is to know history, not as it is, or as it was, but *as it dares to be*—dares to be, that is, in the face of the presuppositions of our modern 'World-view'! And therefore against this principle, which is adduced and put forward as a Law of the Republic of Scholars, it behooves us to be on our guard with a diligence the most careful, as against a thing which is a veritable spring and fountain of misdirection and error." Of manifold application in all departments of present-day discussion of topics belonging to Christianity are these timely words of Kaftan, for quoting which at length, therefore, no apology is offered. It is difficult to avoid the conviction that criticism is at the present day, in the case of many of its representatives, in what must be termed a pathological condition. And of this condition Dr. Kaftan has made a truly sound diagnosis.

When, on the other hand, such a massive and convincing, such an utterly unbiassed and critically purged historical argument, an argument to our mind so absolutely impregnable, as has recently appeared

in Dr. Denney's probably epoch-making volume "Jesus and the Gospel", which comes from the press almost coincidentally with Dr. Wenley's Lectures, can be erected upon the most assured data of the most modern and ruthlessly self-critical criticism, we may be allowed to press upon Dr. Wenley the consideration that it is not yet time for one to whom the Person of Christ and the New Testament Christology has the ideal significance which it ostensibly (and doubtless really) has to Dr. Wenley, to speak of "Breaches of the House" as resulting in "Humiliation in the Midst." In contrast with a disposition so to capitulate, we are rather inclined to see, not indistinctly, in the whole trend of all recent representative criticism, a definite adjournment of the distressing time of such humiliation, an adjournment *sine die*.

The fundamentally determining element, however, in Dr. Wenley's whole mode of thought and in the whole construction of Christianity which results therefrom, lies upon the second assumption above indicated—in the circumstance, namely, that Dr. Wenley either tacitly or explicitly regards it as simply *self-evident*, that, to quote the brilliant Scotch writer above referred to, "eternal truth, or rather our grasp or apprehension of it, can be in no way historically conditioned," and "that no historical person could really sustain the phenomenon of the Christian religion." Whether this dogmatic dictum have, or have not, its sufficient justification, is open to examination. That it expresses what without more ado may be regarded as *self-evident*, this we emphatically deny. Lessing's oft-quoted aphorism, that "accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason", in its application to the matter of Christianity (which is its commonest application, as well as being the one which we believe Lessing originally gave it) roots in conceptions of Christianity on the one hand, and of history on the other hand, which we are constrained to regard, and which are to-day increasingly coming to be regarded, as exceedingly inadequate and as only superficially discerning.

If the eighteenth century did for a time in certain quarters find itself conceiving of Christianity as the acceptance of a well-proved assortment of "necessary truths of reason", that erroneous perspective is not thereby made *normative* for the recognition of what does constitute Christianity. Christianity has always consisted in a vital present-day attitude and relation of the soul to God, but *an attitude and relation which has always been, and is still to-day, specifically determined and definitely constituted by what Christians historically know of Jesus Christ*.

To regard history itself, moreover, as merely a succession of events bound together mechanically in a cause-and-effect sequence, or its successive temporal elements as in any sense whatsoever "accidental", is to hold a conception of history wholly foreign to the consciousness of the religious man, such a man as Dr. Wenley is; and represents an attitude to which he, Dr. Wenley, *ought not* to be able to consent. If history has any significance at all, and religion has any reality at all, history is *anything but*

"a darkling plain

Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,

Where ignorant armies clash by night".

History is itself the continuous mode and vehicle of a progressively self-achieving *Divine Purpose*. In history nothing, and least of all the Christian facts connected with the Christ of history and of experience, has about itself to a religious man anything to which the word "contingent" can be applicable. Moreover, a real subjection to history is no more a "bondage" to the free human spirit in its religious or other life, than it is a relation from which escape is even *possible*. The balloonists who are reported to have attained recently above Poland the almost incredible height of fifteen thousand feet did not find the matter of respiration simplified by their relative superiority to the atmosphere.

"Read my little fable—

He that runs may read."

After passing upon Dr. Wenley's volume from the point of view of these more fundamental considerations, it is perhaps somewhat ungracious to refer with regret to the predominating use by Dr. Wenley of highly recondite words and phrases, which, even where they do not obscure and retard the perception of the author's meaning, make reading often a burden through the constant sense of contact with a style stilted, self-conscious and over-strained. Such words are "remanent", "lightlie", "petrific", "provenance", "labile", "reticular", and such phrases are "the internal organization of constructive efflorescence" (p. 319) and "Jesus served himself Christ" (this idiom? *passim*). These things, conjoined with a frequent obscurity of allusion and a needless ponderosity of expression, have given to the language of Dr. Wenley's lectures a strongly mannered flavor, such as has detracted, in the case of the present reviewer at least, from the pleasure of reading what is otherwise an exceedingly readable book.

Whatever else one may be inclined to say of Dr. Wenley's Baldwin Lectures, they are certainly fresh, vigorous, and courageous. And certainly, too, his volume bears on many pages passages rich in suggestiveness, however radical may be our divergence from some of his presuppositions in the philosophy of history and of the religious consciousness, and however we may feel compelled to question the validity of his borrowed data in those matters in which he has been obliged to depend on authorities in a department foreign to that in which he is himself a master.

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EDWIN HENRY KELLOGG.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

ALTORIENTALISCHE TEXTE UND BILDER ZUM ALTEN TESTAMENTE in Verbindung mit DR. ARTHUR UNGNAD und DR. HERRMANN RANKE herausgegeben von LIC. DR. HUGO GRESSMANN, a. o. Professor der Theologie in Berlin. Erster Band: Texte, pp. xv + 253;.

Zweiter Band: Bilder, pp. xii + 140. Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1909. Price per volume M. 7.25. The two volumes in one M. 17.

If we are not much mistaken, this work is doubly important, first, for what it itself offers; second, for the recognition of the condition of affairs that has called it forth. The editor, who is also one of the contributors to the series known as *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*, has been moved, by the presence of so many and so strange hypotheses that claim to rest on the ancient literature, to feel the need of a work of convenient size containing accurate translations of the most important Babylonian and Egyptian texts, with only such notes as are necessitated by the difficulties of translation, together with some representation of the religious places and observances which may throw light on the Old Testament. Such a work as this he wanted to put in the hands of students to encourage them to investigate the matters in dispute for themselves. As there was no such volume available, he has associated with himself two other scholars and the work before us is the result of their collaboration. The three things that have been aimed at are objectivity, reliability and completeness. By objectivity is meant the avoidance of all theories and hypotheses; by completeness the inclusion of Egyptian texts, which have been recently much neglected in the interest for Babylon, and also the assurance that every kind of literature of interest to the Old Testament scholar has been given a place.

On the whole, Prof. Gressmann and his colleagues have lived up to their intention. They have given us a work of convenient size, with little or no *Tendenz*, scholarly, and containing a sufficient amount of material to introduce the student to the more specialized works on the subject of the relation of the Hebrews to their eastern and western neighbors. Indeed, it is amazing how much of the literature of Babylonia, for instance, has been put into 171 pages,—and not meagerly, but with sufficient linguistic and other notes as well as a list of some of the most important literature on the respective texts.

The larger portion of the first volume is devoted to Babylonian and Assyrian texts. Dr. Arthur Ungnad, who is responsible for this, needs no introduction to Assyrian scholars; for the sake of others it may be stated that he is one of the foremost of the younger Assyriologists, with a more than ordinary gift for languages. The unskilled reader may therefore take his translations into his hands with confidence, remembering always, as Dr. Ungnad warns us, that the science of Assyriology is not yet sufficiently far advanced always to guarantee the correctness of the translation. Doubtful translations are, of course, marked as such, and occasionally variants suggested.

The Babylonian and Assyrian texts are divided into three groups, religious, historical and legal. Under the religious appear first the myths and epics, in which are included the story of creation (best known to English-speaking readers from L. W. King's *Seven Tablets of Creation*), seven other fragments dealing with the same subject, two

stories of fights with dragons and demons, made famous by their importance for the hypothesis of Gunkel, Winckler and others, the legend of Adapa, of Oannes (according to Berossus), the Gilgamesh epic (the starting ground for Jensen's theory), with the story of the flood as one episode, to which is added several other recensions of the same story, and Berossus' prophecy of the destruction of the world by fire, the myth of Ea and Atrahasis, two stories of the underworld (one of them the descent of Ishtar), the stories of Urra and Ishum, of the future judgment on Babylon, of the King of Kutha and the legend of the birth of Sargon that has been compared to the story of Moses' birth. These are followed by selected hymns, eleven in all, illustrative of this kind of literature; three are hymns of praise, two processional, two complaints to the god or goddess, one a penitential psalm, one the prayer of a sufferer who feels himself guiltless, two are laments for Tammuz. These are followed by five selections of special interest from the immense mass of religious material. The first is the section of the *shurpu* series which Prof. Delitzsch compares to the ten commandments; the second, a didactic poem that exhibits Babylonian morality at its best; the third, the so-called "law of the Sabbath"; the fourth, the fragment which identifies Marduk with other gods (monotheism); the fifth shows the division of the months among the gods, and the last speaks of a lamb as substitute for a man.

The historical texts, 32 in number, are chosen with a view to exhibiting the relations sustained by the Babylonian and Assyrian kings to the peoples of the Mediterranean coast. The first is from Hammurapi (so Dr. Ungnad insists on spelling the name and probably with right), the last from Nebuchadnezzar. To these are appended seven letters, two of which were found in Palestine and five in Egypt, including the one from Abdi(?)-heba of Jerusalem.

Among the legal texts Dr. Ungnad gives us a new and full translation of the code of Hammurapi—a very valuable thing—and to this he has added five documents illustrative of the legal contracts that exist in such large numbers.

On looking over this table of contents we have to confess that the selections have been well chosen for the end in view. The student has here in accessible and orderly form enough of the literature of the Babylonians to begin an independent comparison of their history, religion and civilization with that of the Hebrews; and to form some conception of the value of this newly acquired external evidence for the Old Testament. Our only criticism would be that the selections are too few. We should like to have found some of the contracts of the first dynasty illustrative of the family life of the Babylonians for the sake of comparison with the stories of the patriarchs; also some texts to exhibit the nature of the controversy about the divine name Jahwe—though this is perhaps too specialized for the purposes of the editors; also more of the poetry illustrative of magic and sorcery, and at least one of the hymns in which the "word" of the god figures so largely. But this is not criticism; it is simply a recognition of the fact

that the work before us is what its editors intended it to be—a handy introduction to the study of Babylonian life and literature.

The Babylonian texts are followed by six north-semitic documents of value, also translated by Dr. Ungnad. These are the Moabite stone, the inscription of Zakir(?) of Hamath, the Siloam inscription, two of the recently found Aramaic papyri from the Jewish colony in Egypt (408 B. C.), and two sacrifice schedules from the Phoenician towns Marseilles and Carthage.

Of the Egyptian texts the reviewer does not feel so well qualified to speak. Dr. Herrmann Ranke, to whom is entrusted this section, is already known to American scholars from his work in the University of Pennsylvania. His translations of the Egyptian texts here given are additionally vouched for by the fact that he had access to the cards of the new Egyptian dictionary soon to be published by Prof. Erman. The order following in these is the same as in the preceding portion. First we have four mythological texts dealing with the creation and destruction of the world and the fight with the dragon. These are followed by two texts concerning the life after death; then come five poems, the first being the wonderfully beautiful hymn to the sun by Amenhotep IV, the second the "Israel stele", the last a love ditty. Next we have several selections from the proverbial literature, then prophesies, then lighter literature—among which are part of the "story of the two brothers" suggestive of that of Joseph and Potephar's wife, the story of the seven years' famine, and of adventures in Palestine. This is followed by historical texts, 27 in number, illustrative of Egypt's dealings with the countries to the east. A short appendix gives the account of the choice of a Nubian king by the god Amon-Re, and a list of Syrian and Palestinian towns.

The second volume, for which the editor-in-chief is directly responsible, is devoted to pictures (174 in all) illustrative of the religion (234) and history of the early Semites and Egyptians. To each picture is added a short note, in which the author aims at giving a description of the thing pictured without any interpretation. His remark concerning the so-called Adam and Eve seal cylinder may exemplify this. He says of it: "So-called 'Fall of Man Cylinder'. Two divinities sitting one on either side of a sacred tree, one half of which conventionally represents a date-palm, the other half a fir tree. Behind one of the divinities an upright snake, which is perhaps merely ornamental (nur Füllwerk)."

The objects illustrated are cup-marks (Napflöcher), 5 pictures; sacred stones, 26 pictures; altars, 17; temples, sacred tents, etc., 12; temple utensils, 10; sacrifice, 19; gods and symbols of gods, 48; bulls, 5; female divinities, 16; composite figures (cherubs and demons), 24; amulets, 9; seals, 21; myths, 9; deification of kings, 8; pictures from profane history, including types of different nationalities, caravan, treasure cities (Pithom), notable monuments, circumcision, portraits of kings, etc., 40.

We have given a rather full account of the contents of these volumes

because they seem to us to present in small compass a better picture of Babylonian and Egyptian civilization in so far as it affected the Hebrews than can be found in any other one place. For that reason they deserve to be widely read. They are not perfect. The perfect objectivity sought after by the editor is impossible of attainment by man, but in these volumes personal views are reduced to a minimum. As we said before, we regard the appearance of this work as a happy sign of continued interest in the Old Testament, and of a saner view of the external evidence for it. As such we hope it will meet with the favor of many.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

THE OCTATEUCH IN ETHIOPIC, according to the text of the Paris Codex, with the variants of five other manuscripts. Edited by DR. J. OSCAR BOYD. Part I, Genesis. Leyden: E. J. Brill, and Princeton, N. J.: The University Library. 1909. Pp. xxii, 158. Being Volume III of the Bibliotheca Abessinica, edited by Dr. E. Littmann.

Half a century and more after the publication of Dr. Dillmann's *Octateuchus Aethiopicus* this new edition of the first eight books of the Bible appears, claiming the advantage over its predecessor chiefly in two respects, namely, utility and comprehensiveness. On the former score it offers the advantage of a beautifully clear and legible type in place of the now obsolete Ethiopic type used in the edition of 1853, and the decided advantage for those interested in textual problems of having the various readings on the same page with the text to which they refer instead of grouping them all in a *pars posterior*. In point of comprehensiveness the new edition surpasses the old in that it gives all the readings of Dillmann's four manuscripts, F, H, C and G, and in addition presents the text of the Codex Y, which has hitherto been regarded by all Ethiopic scholars as the oldest Ethiopic manuscript known. This manuscript, preserved in the *Bibliothèque nationale* at Paris, was not available for Dillmann's edition, but Dr. Boyd has made it the basis of his text, which he has reconstructed only so far as to remove obvious errors of the scribe and to afford readings capable of grammatical construction. All such alterations, moreover, are duly noted, along with the corrections in the codex itself by later scribes, in a special series of notes independent of the notes containing the variants of the other manuscripts. In this latter series are included, besides the readings of Dillmann's four manuscripts, those also of the Haverford Codex of the Octateuch, the codex described and estimated by Dr. Boyd in a preliminary study thereof published in 1905 as Number II in this same Bibliotheca Abessinica.

In the introduction the editor gives brief descriptions of the manuscripts collated, and in the preface he outlines the prospective division of the work of which this volume is Part I. Exodus and Leviticus are promised as Part II and are now in the press. Part III will include Numbers and Deuteronomy, and Part IV the three shorter books that

complete the Octateuch. As a work presenting the materials for reconstructing, as far as this is possible, the text of the old Ethiopic Version,—one of the ancient primary versions of the LXX,—this edition is of value to the Old Testament textual critic; and as a clear, readable Bible-text, it is a suitable reading-book for students of the Ethiopic language and literature, that chief representative of one of the five great branches of the Semitic group.

Princeton.

J. O. B.

BEL, THE CHRIST OF ANCIENT TIMES. By HUGO RADAU. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1908. Pp. vi, 55.

Dr. Radau has republished in this book an article that appeared in the *Monist* in October, 1903, pp. 67-119. He tells us in the Preface that it is the forerunner of a work in which he intends to adduce evidence for his "contention that the Babylonian religion is a purely *monotheistic religion*, more particularly a *monotheistic trinitarian religion*, patterned after the Nippurian prototype Enlil ('Father'), Errish (or *NIN-IB*, 'Son'), Ninlil ('Mother'), which Trinity in Unity is represented in the Old Testament by *Yahveh* (or *Elohim*, 'Father'), *Mal'ak Yahveh* (or '*Angel of the Lord*', 'Son'), *Ruach* ('Spirit', 'Mother'), and in the New Testament by '*Father*', '*Son*', '*Holy Spirit*',"

The book is divided into two parts, the first treating of "The Babylonian Pantheon" and the second of "The Essential Doctrine of Babylonian Religion". The title indicates the result toward which the discussion moves. The interest of the book centers not in the exposition of the Babylonian religion but in the light which this exposition is supposed to throw on the Christian religion. The essential doctrine of the Babylonian religion according to Dr. Radau is the belief in resurrection. From this belief, it is argued, the New Testament account of the resurrection of Jesus is to be explained.

Two instances of Dr. Radau's interpretation of the New Testament cast a somewhat unfavorable light upon his exegetical methods. The words of Jesus (recorded in John viii. 58, *πρὶν Ἀβραὰμ γενέσθαι, ἐγὼ εἰμι*) are quoted as follows (p. iv): "The 'Light that lightens the world' said of Himself, 'before Abraham was I was'." And these words are then interpreted: "He was and existed and was worshiped as 'Son of the God of Heaven and Earth' under various names as early as 7000 B. C., when the monotheistic trinitarian religion of Babylonia was systematized." Again, Paul's argument in 1 Cor. xv is said to rest on the "fact that the dead *can* and *do* rise, and because *they* can and do rise therefore *Christ* also *could* and *did* rise" (p. 32). In other words, Paul's argument to prove the resurrection of Christians, which is based on the admitted resurrection of Christ, is reversed. The point of Paul's argument and the historical conditions which confronted him are clearly indicated in xv. 12. Dr. Radau, however, begins his statement of Paul's argument with xv. 14 and concludes that Paul did not mean "because Christ rose, therefore the dead rise", but *vice versa*: 'If there be no resurrection of the dead, then Christ did not rise'; he [Paul] wants us, however, to draw the last conclusion: 'there is a resurrection

of the dead, and if there be, then did Christ rise'!" (p. 32) Now all this simply inverts Paul's argument, which is based on the fact, universally admitted among Christians, that Christ did rise. This fact must have been admitted in Corinth, for Paul uses it as a premise in his argument for the resurrection of Christians.

In applying Babylonian ideas to the elucidation of the New Testament Dr. Radau discusses the resurrection "on the third day". This is explained as follows: "As Marduk had displaced old Enlil and his messenger, so Christ displaced Marduk. Marduk is the God of light—and Christ is the 'light of the world', he was therefore made to have been born on the 25th of December—the festival of light—when the days begin to lengthen again and thus save the world from falling into utter darkness. Marduk was the light as a 'life-giving principle, he died, and was in the grave during *three* double-months [a foot-note explains this: '*i. e.*, during the six months of the winter'], but rose again in the spring, on the first of Nisan, when he acquired new life, new strength, new power, and entered into a wedlock with mother earth, his wife, *i. e.*, with Tsarpanitum or Ishtar. Christ, too, died, and was put in the grave, where he was for *three* days, but had to rise again on *Easter*—the festival of Ishtar" (p. 49).

All this, and more, is supposed to lead the readers to "see in the Christian Religion, as I do, the glorious culmination of the wisdom and faith of ages past" (p. iv),—in a word, a natural religion.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

THE SAYINGS OF JESUS: The Second Source of St. Matthew and St. Luke. New Testament Studies. II. By ADOLF HARNACK, Professor of Church History in the University of Berlin. Translated by the Rev. J. R. Wilkinson, M.A., Late Scholar of Worcester College, Oxford; Rector of Winford. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons; London: Williams & Norgate. 1908. Pp. xvi, 316.

Those who wish to be informed upon recent phases of Synoptic criticism should read Wellhausen's *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien* (1905), Burkitt's *Gospel History and its Transmission* (1907), Harnack's *Sayings of Jesus*, translated from his *Sprüche u. Reden Jesu* (1907), and B. Weiss' *Die Quellen der synoptischen Ueberlieferung* (1908). All four writers hold what is called the "two document" theory of the composition of our Synoptic Gospels, but they differ widely as to the character and extent of the Greek document supposed to underlie the non-Markan matter common to Matthew and Luke. This latter document it is now the fashion to call Q (*Quelle*) rather than the Logia, and to depend less than formerly upon tradition for proof of its existence and character. Thus Harnack agrees with Wernle that, when Papias speaks of Matthew's Logia, both he himself and Eusebius who quotes him are thinking of our Gospel. Harnack suggests, however, that the presbyter whose testimony Papias is giving had in mind an underlying document, consisting mainly of discourses and perhaps composed by the Apostle Matthew. Burkitt thinks that by Papias' Logia should be understood, not Q, but a series of Messianic

passages from the Old Testament, arranged possibly by the Apostle. If it be asked what has become of Q, the answer is that it has been swallowed up in our Gospels of Matthew and Luke, and the fragmentary character of the text of Mark xvi is appealed to as indicating that at one time this Gospel existed only in a single copy.

If the existence of Q be assumed, interesting questions arise as to the possibility of restoring its text, as to its extent or contents, and as to its historical value when compared with Mark. To the first of these questions Burkitt gives a decided negative. He says that if our Mark were lost we could not reconstruct its text out of Matthew and Luke, the two Gospels which incorporate almost all its contents. "How futile, therefore, it is", he says, "to attempt to reconstruct those other literary sources which seem to have been used by Matthew and Luke, but have not been independently preserved" (p. 17). In spite of this warning, the attempt to reconstruct the text of Q is made, with widely varying results, by Harnack and Weiss. Harnack's tendency is to exclude from Q what might seem to have a reasonable claim to be included, while Weiss includes in it much Markan matter, such as the healing of the leper, the raising of Jairus' daughter, the parable of the sower and the feeding of the five thousand. Wellhausen believes that Luke reproduces the text of Q in purer form than Matthew, but Harnack in matters of phraseology gives preference to Matthew, his conclusion being that Matthew has made fewer changes than Luke, while those that he has made are more drastic than any that Luke has allowed himself. Harnack's minute and painstaking examination of the text seems to us to support his inference that Luke is more apt to change words and phrases in the interest of a more polished Greek style, but, in the nature of the case, the reasoning by means of which he seeks to determine the true text which underlies the parallels is not always convincing. Who would have supposed that by the insertion of *πρῶτον* (which may mean "supremely", "above all") in vi. 33, Matthew "has thus limited the exclusiveness of the command to seek after the kingdom of God" (p. 37); or that when Luke says "it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away" instead of Matthew's "till heaven and earth pass away", we can discern "Luke's genuine Hellenic reverence for the Old Testament—a reverence which could be so deep, because the writer stood remote from the controversies concerning the application of the precepts of the Law to the daily life" (p. 56)? In settling the text of Q, the author is compelled to reconstruct the exact mental processes of each Evangelist in determining his own text. Take, for example, three successive instances in which Luke, contrary to the rule, has a shorter text than Matthew. In the Lord's Prayer, we are told, Luke could not have passed over the seventh petition if it had existed in his exemplar. (*Contra* Weiss, who adopts for Q the longer text found in Matthew.) Again, Luke has the shorter form in xii. 33 because he "adopts, as it were, only a reminiscence" (p. 66), while similarly in xiii. 24 he "gives only an extract" (p. 67). (*Contra* Wellhausen, who thinks Matthew has worked up a shorter text). Much of this, ingenious

as it may be, must be set down as mere guess-work. A few variants are given up as incapable of explanation, such as the two sparrows of Mt. x. 29 and the five sparrows of Lk. xii. 6, and the egg and scorpion of Lk. xi. 12 and the loaf and stone of Mt. vii. 9. At this point the author suggests that Luke perhaps had before him another recension of Q, and the suggestion is repeated to account for the insertion by Matthew of the fish in the Jonah passage, and to explain the secondary character of Matthew in some of the Beatitudes. With these possible exceptions, Harnack asserts that "one and the same text lies behind Matthew and Luke" (p. 40), and he concludes that we cannot with propriety speak of Q¹, Q², etc., nor appeal to oral tradition.

Harnack's method of conducting his argument for the existence and integrity of Q is worthy of attention. He first considers a group of passages, embracing some 87 verses of Matthew, in which the differences between Matthew and Luke are comparatively slight, and concludes that behind these lies one and the same text, and that the dependence of each upon common oral sources is not a sufficient explanation. Having gained this "firm standpoint", he next examines another and larger group of parallel passages in which the differences are much greater (102 verses in Matthew) and concludes that both Evangelists draw from the same document, and that there is but one source for both classes of passages examined, namely, Q. It will occur to the reader who looks at the parallels closely that another critic of equal ingenuity might reverse this argument. Taking Harnack's second group of passages, he might argue that the differences between Matthew and Luke are so great that dependence upon a common written source is improbable, and that the closer parallels could be explained by a written source (or sources) limited in extent, or even by fixed oral tradition. The Sermon on the Mount offers a convenient test of the Q hypothesis. In the Beatitudes, aside from the longer form of several of them in Matthew, we have a difference in person, in order, in words used to express a similar idea ("mourn" and "be comforted" for "weep" and "laugh"), and, besides, the interpolation of beatitudes by Matthew and of woes by Luke. In spite of Harnack's explanations of the changes made, here by Matthew and there by Luke, it is difficult to accept the hypothesis of a common source, unless it be in the convenient form of different recensions. Take again the conclusion of the Sermon, where Wellhausen thinks that Luke, Harnack that Matthew, has the purer text. Plausible explanations of the variants are not wanting: "Matthew thinks of storms of wind and rain, but to Luke it seemed improbable that these could overturn a house, and he therefore supplies a flooded river. . . . The thought that a good foundation depends upon labor is first introduced by Luke, and was suggested by the words in Q: *τεθεμελιωτο ἐπὶ τὴν πέτραν*, where, however, the emphasis rests upon *πέτραν*" (pp. 72, 73). The changes, whether made by Luke or Matthew, are at any rate sufficient in this and other passages to weaken confidence in the existence of a unitary written source underlying the Matthew-Luke parallels. Where dependence is no longer

placed upon the Papias tradition, and the Q document is conceived, as it is by Harnack, as without historical continuity and "wanting in historical climax" (p. 170), confidence in its integrity will be still further weakened. It is interesting to note that Stanton agrees with Harnack that the matter common to Matthew and Luke may be divided into (1) passages closely resembling one another and (2) those where the verbal differences are relatively great. He sees, however, no reason for either Evangelist having preserved the original with less fidelity in the one case than in the other, and suggests the hypothesis of "two compilations which had in the main an independent history" (see art. "Gospels" in *D. B.*, vol. II, p. 240). Similarly Allen thinks that "both Evangelists had before them a Sermon, but not identically the same Sermon, that is, they were borrowing from different sources." (*Com. on Mt.*, p. xlix.)

Did Q, assuming its existence and integrity, contain an account of the Passion? Wellhausen and Burkitt think that it did, the former arguing that passages from Q in Mt. xxii and xxiv are so closely connected with passages in Mark's narrative of the Passion week as to imply a similar account in Q; and the latter believing that the promise that the disciples shall sit upon twelve thrones (Lk. xxii. 30, *cf.* Mt. xix. 28) is correctly placed by Luke at the passover meal, and therefore implies an account of the last days. Both Weiss and Harnack hold that Q contained no description of the Passion. The Q of Weiss, however, presupposes the Passion, its last words being "she has anointed my body for burial". Harnack goes farther than Weiss, and sees in Q no reference to the Cross and Passion. (See p. 310n. and p. 170.) Ramsay, as is well known, accepts this theory that Q contained no reference to the Passion, but pushes it to a novel conclusion. He argues that it is impossible that so considerable a Christian document, beginning with the ministry of John and containing some narrative, but lacking all reference to the central article of the Christian faith, should have been written at the time assigned, during the seventh decade or earlier. He thinks that this strange omission can only be accounted for under the supposition that the notes of discourses which make up the body of Q were written down before the death of Christ. ("The Oldest Written Gospel", *Expositor*, May, 1907.) But has this lack of reference to the Passion been conclusively proved? The Passion seems to be assumed in general by the references to persecution of disciples, to taking up the cross (Harnack allows one instance), to losing one's life (although Harnack both here and in the Beatitudes would eliminate "for my sake"), and to the Parousia. Two passages in particular should be noticed. In Mt. xii. 37-42, in answer to the Pharisees' demand for a sign it is said that no sign shall be given but the sign of the prophet Jonah. "For as Jonah was three days and three nights in the belly of the whale so shall the Son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth." Then follow statements about the repentance of the Ninevites and the coming of the queen of Sheba to Solomon. Instead of the allusion to the fish's belly

(v. 40), Luke has (xi. 30) "For even as Jonah became a sign to the Ninevites, so shall also the Son of man be to this generation". Then follows in Luke, reversing the order of Matthew, the statements about the queen of the south, and the repentance of the Ninevites. Harnack, in *Q*, restores Matthew's order, but elects Luke v. 30 instead of Matthew v. 40, saying that in *Q* the sign of Jonah was the preaching of Jonah. It is hard to see how the preaching of Jonah, apart from his former experiences, is to be regarded as a sign, and it is not perfectly clear that Luke so understood it. Certainly the sign of Jonah as explained in Matthew is more intelligible, and in its veiled allusion to His death and resurrection is similar to the answer of Jesus to the same request for a sign in Jn. ii. 19. Harnack, indeed, concedes that what he regards as Matthew's "transformation" of the sign of Jonah, "may have been found by him already carried out in his exemplar of *Q*" (p. 38).

Another passage of similar import is the lament over Jerusalem (Mt. xxiii. 37-39; Lk. xiii. 34, 35). This is placed by Matthew in Jerusalem in the last week at the close of the woes against the Pharisees; by Luke, in Galilee on the occasion of the warning against Herod. While Luke's connection is not altogether inappropriate, the words belong more naturally to Jerusalem and the final conflict with the Jews. Harnack escapes the reference to Jerusalem and the implied reference to the Passion by asserting that the words, if spoken by Jesus, are a quotation from a lost apocryphal book, "the Wisdom of God". His argument is that the apostrophe to Jerusalem in Matthew follows immediately the saying, "I send unto you prophets, etc." (Mt. xxii. 34-36). With Luke this latter passage is introduced (xi. 49) with the words, "Therefore also said the wisdom of God, I will send, etc.", and then the apostrophe to Jerusalem is given separately in ch. xiii. Matthew, says Harnack, suppressed the "wisdom of God", not wishing to quote from an apocryphal book, while Luke, being uncertain where the quotation from this lost book ended, transferred the latter part to another connection. Even if we accept this argument, each step of which is doubtful, the question remains whether the whole quotation belongs most appropriately at a Pharisee's table in the Perean period, where it must be placed according to Harnack's connection of xiii. 34 with xi. 49f., or at Jerusalem during the last days. (See Lk. xi. 37, and Weiss on the Jerusalem passage). Harnack's argument can scarcely overcome the conviction that the words of lament over Jerusalem are among those which bear most clearly and most indelibly the stamp of originality, and that they undoubtedly imply the approaching Passion.

Another question of interest, discussed at some length by both Wellhausen and Harnack, is the relative priority alike in point of time and historical value, of *Q* and the Gospel of Mark. In this comparison it must be remembered, of course, that *Q* is differently constructed by different critics. Wellhausen argues stoutly for the priority of Mark, while Harnack defends the priority of *Q* with equal vigor. Wellhausen asserts that in Mark the picture of Jesus is Messianic only in the latter

part, after the confession of Peter, while in Q, contrary to his conception of the facts, it is Messianic from the beginning. The temptation, he says, is not Messianic as it is in Matthew-Luke, and the title "Son of man", though used in the earlier chapters, properly means "man"—man has authority to forgive sins, and men, that is the disciples, were lords of the Sabbath. (*Einleitung*, p. 74.) To this Harnack replies that Mark records the Divine voice and the descent of the Spirit at the baptism, and declares that the subsequent temptation, to which Jesus was driven by the Spirit and in which angels supplied Him with food, could be no ordinary temptation, but "the period *par excellence* of Messianic temptation" (p. 195n.). The term "Son of man", it is held, can never have had in the mouth of Jesus any other meaning than the Messiah (p. 239). Harnack finds that page by page in Mark "the student is reduced to despair by the inconsistencies, the discrepancies, and the incredibilities of the narrative", while in Q alone there is "a really exact and profound conception of the teaching of Jesus" (pp. 49, 50). These criticisms largely neutralize each other, and it may be claimed that the really impressive thing in the comparison of Mark with the conjectural Q is their essential unity in their accounts of the ministry of John, of the baptism and temptation (the words of Satan, "If thou be the Son of God", implying according to Harnack the baptismal voice, at least in the form of the Second Psalm), the evangelizing activity in Galilee with Capernaum as a center, the ministry of healing (Mt. viii. 5f.; xi. 5), the casting out of demons, the imprisonment of John, the mission of the disciples, the preaching of the kingdom, the Parousia and the probable implication of the Passion (?), the supreme authority of Christ over human life and destiny, "the self-assertion of the great Example of humility".

With some deductions where he thinks Christological dogma has been at work, Harnack believes that Q gives us reliable tradition. When it agrees with the independent but nearly contemporary document Mark, the united testimony is strong. "On the rock of their united testimony the assault of destructive critical views, however necessary these are to easily self-satisfied research, will ever be shattered to pieces" (p. 249). Dr. Denney has recently shown in his *Jesus and the Gospel* how the conclusions here reached can, with some criticism, be used in an apologetic interest. In his investigation of the text of Q Harnack has not worked without prepossessions, but he has at least labored with untiring industry and entire independence, and as is usually the case with him, he has not left the question where he found it. In his microscopic examination and comparison of the texts of Matthew and Luke there is of course danger that we see the Gospel material a little out of focus, and lose sight of the woods for the trees, but all students will agree that our knowledge of the Gospels will be increased by the minute verbal study to which he has called us. The *Sayings of Jesus* remains a notable and original contribution to the study of Christian origins and of the Synoptic problem.

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DES PETRUS VON LAODICEA ERKLÄRUNG DES MATTHÄUSEVANGELIUMS.

Zum ersten Male herausgegeben und untersucht von D. C. F. GEORG HEINRICI. Beiträge zur Geschichte und Erklärung des neuen Testaments. V. Leipzig: Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung. 1908. Pp. xlviii, 356. Marks 20.

A Greek commentary on Matthew hitherto known only from manuscripts in the libraries of Europe has been made accessible to students of the New Testament by this volume of Dr. Heinrici's *Beiträge*. In its publication Dr. Heinrici has made an important contribution to the literature of New Testament interpretation. For although the Commentary of Peter of Laodicea is not one of the great commentaries, it has value in itself, in its relation to the history of New Testament interpretation, and in the use it makes of earlier commentaries.

The plan of editing this commentary was entertained by Ch. F. Matthaei and Angelo Mai. In the third of his *Beiträge* (1905) Dr. Heinrici discussed the literary remains of Peter and edited the interpretation of the Lord's prayer, together with an interpretation of the Lukan hymns and a discussion concerning degrees of kinship attributed to Peter.

The Commentary on Matthew is closely associated with the Commentary of Victor of Antioch on Mark, with a Commentary on Luke in which Titus of Bostra seems to hold the most important place, and with a Commentary on John (of uncertain authorship)—together making up a Commentary on the Four Gospels. The Commentary on Matthew consists of 272 scholia which follow the text closely (except for one break at Matt. xxvii. 57-66). It is contained in a number of manuscripts and in certain catenae. The text is well transmitted, the authorities being in general agreement.

Formally the value of the Commentary consists chiefly in the fact that it furnishes a link of connection between original works of older exegetes and the catenae and commentaries which used it. In respect of its content its material value consists chiefly in its sources and the manner in which they were used. Among these are Origen and Chrysostom. Dr. Heinrici reckons the proportions as follows: from the *τόμοι* of Origen 5/10; from the Homilies of Chrysostom 3/10; from unknown sources and contributed by Peter himself 2/10. In the use of these sources sometimes sentences are quoted verbatim, sometimes only words and phrases; but the whole is wrought together into literary unity. In character the Commentary seeks completeness. Apart from Matt. xxvii. 57-66 only xx. 17-19 is passed over.

The Commentary is well described in the words which Dr. Heinrici uses in formulating a Preface that Peter might have written (pp. xxxf.): "I intend to give a clear, concise interpretation of the matter without edifying digressions and to give heed therefore first of all to the meaning of words and the historical content. I do not discuss exegetical problems. I do not seek for contradictions for the purpose of cleverly solving them, but I strive for a lucid paraphrase and for

psychological penetration; also, I arrange the interpretations in a certain order of rank. My principal source is the interpretations of Origen. But my cautious attitude toward his allegorising, in cases where I refer to it at all, shows that I use the rich material of his interpretations not without independent judgment. From Chrysostom I take over only what is important for the interpretation. His favorite word for the Gospel of Jesus *φιλοσοφία* I have not accepted. Besides, I have been diligent in other directions; above all, I have placed emphasis on the interpretation of names, as they are collected in the *Onomastica*, on exact determination of conceptions and on good tradition for exegesis. Here and there my own work may be somewhat uneven; in general, however, I have endeavored to give a smooth and well unified text. In it all I have striven after brevity."

The extensive use of Origen—of the grammatical and historical elements in his work but with rejection of the allegorical—makes the Commentary of Peter especially valuable for that part of Origen's *τόμοι* on Matthew which has been lost (Matt. i-xiii. 36 [except the scholion to i. 1, 5, 9] and xxviii [xxii. 34-xxvii are preserved only in Latin]).

Dr. Heinrici dates the Commentary between the 4th and 7th centuries, preferably nearer the former, and thinks that it was written by Peter of Laodicea (Phrygian rather than Syrian). The text of the Commentary is accompanied by text-critical notes in which the variants in the different authorities are given and also by an historical commentary in which the sources of Peter and the use of his Commentary by later writers like Theophylact are carefully recorded. The latter feature especially reveals the thoroughness and breadth of view with which Dr. Heinrici has fulfilled his work as editor. It greatly enhances the value and usefulness of the book.

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WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

THE IRENAEUS TESTIMONY TO THE FOURTH GOSPEL. Its Extent, Meaning, and Value. By FRANK GRANT LEWIS. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1908. Pp. 64. 54 cents, postpaid. (Historical and Linguistic Studies issued under the direction of the Department of Biblical and Patristic Greek of the University of Chicago. Second Series. Vol. I, Part vii.)

In Chapter i, Dr. Lewis presents and interprets two tables, showing Irenaeus' use of the Fourth Gospel, (1) from the point of view of the Gospel and (2) from the point of view of the progress of Irenaeus' work. In Chapter ii, he removes all doubt that "the son of Zebedee was, for Irenaeus, the author of the fourth gospel". In Chapter iii he discusses "the value of the Irenaeus testimony for us". Here it is demonstrated that the testimony of Irenaeus from Polycarp really affords information from the end of the first century and establishes the Ephesian residence of the Apostle John (Papias is interpreted as referring to only one John). The testimony which Irenaeus derived from the "presbyters",

the oral character of which Dr. Lewis defends at some length, confirms the testimony from Polycarp in showing "how near Irenaeus felt himself to be to the apostles of the first century".

The first result of Dr. Lewis's investigation, therefore, is a vindication of the Irenaeus testimony. But if this testimony is so trustworthy, does it not place beyond question the Johannine authorship of the Fourth Gospel? This Dr. Lewis is unwilling to admit. All that we really learn through Polycarp is that John either wrote himself, or more probably permitted one of his disciples to write, certain short sermons or "booklets" which were founded on the life of Jesus. These were the "writings" with which Irenaeus says the oral discourses of Polycarp were in agreement. About the middle of the second century, these booklets were combined into our Fourth Gospel. Such an hypothesis, Dr. Lewis thinks, "is not necessarily out of harmony with what Irenaeus himself wrote of the authorship of the gospel". For when Irenaeus says that John gave out the Gospel (*ἐξέδωκε τὸ εὐαγγέλιον*) that need not necessarily mean that he published a single completed work.

This booklet theory (cf. Burton, *A Short Introduction to the Gospels*, pp. 117ff.) is thought to account for a number of puzzling facts. In the first place, the first definite attestation of the Gospel occurs about 170 A. D. That there is no earlier attestation is easily explained if the Gospel was not in evidence before the middle of the century. In the second place, the literary relation between Justin and the Fourth Gospel is best explained by Justin's use of material from which our Gospel has been compiled, for if he had had the Gospel itself and recognized it as Johannine, he would have made more abundant use of it. In the third place, the immediate acceptance of the Gospel after 150 A. D. is explained by the truly Johannine character of the material embodied in the Gospel. But for that, a "Johannine" gospel could not have been accepted at so late a time. In the fourth place, the "displacements" in the Gospel receive a satisfactory explanation, if the Gospel is a compilation.

Against such a theory, several specific objections may be made. In the first place, Dr. Lewis has not really done justice to the meaning of Irenaeus. There can be no doubt that Irenaeus regarded the Fourth Gospel as written by John himself and completed at the end of the first century. Therefore, his testimony, which is so convincingly defended by Dr. Lewis, casts its weight against Dr. Lewis's booklet theory. Again, if the booklets were widely enough known and highly enough valued to insure the immediate acceptance of the Gospel when it finally appeared, why should their scanty use in Justin and in the extant writings of the early part of the second century be any easier to explain than the scanty use of the Gospel, supposing the latter to have been already in existence? Finally, the theory shatters upon the character of the Gospel itself. Despite the efforts of certain recent scholars, the unity not only of style (that would be explicable on the

booklet theory) but also of plan throughout the book is too plain to be successfully denied. Hence, the literary connections existing (for example) between Justin and the Gospel and between Polycarp and the closely related First Epistle indicate the early existence of the Gospel itself and not merely of material from which it was later compiled. Dr. Lewis's late dating of the completed Gospel becomes, therefore, impossible.

The usefulness of the monograph, however, is quite independent of the incorrectness of the ultimate conclusion. For that conclusion depends, chiefly at any rate, upon considerations extraneous to the Irenaeus testimony. The Irenaeus testimony itself is perfectly compatible with the first-century origin of the completed Gospel, and Dr. Lewis has himself made this clear. The important result of Dr. Lewis's study is an emphatic vindication of the Irenaeus testimony to the Fourth Gospel, and that result has been reached by independent and thorough investigation. A number of criticisms might be made with regard to details, but in general the dissertation is admirable both in conception and in method. The somewhat condescending criticisms of Lightfoot and of Zahn are, however, quite gratuitous and out of accord with the objectivity that is characteristic of the rest of our author's discussion. What Dr. Lewis says at the end about the Apocalypse (p. 62) is, as the author himself recognizes, out of direct connection with the preceding investigation. At any rate, it produces somewhat the impression of a shot at a venture.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. By THEODOR ZAHN, Professor of New Testament Exegesis, Erlangen University. Translated from the Third German Edition by John Moore Trout, William Arnot Mather, Louis Hodous, Edward Strong Worcester, William Hoyt Worrell, and Rowland Backus Dodge, Fellows and Scholars of Hartford Theological Seminary. Under the Direction and Supervision of Melancthon Williams Jacobus, Hosmer Professor of New Testament Criticism and Exegesis and Dean of the Faculty. Assisted by Charles Snow Thayer, Director of the Case Memorial Library. In three volumes. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. New York, 1909: Vol. I, pp. xviii, 564; Vol. II, pp. viii, 617; Vol. III, pp. viii, 539. Price \$12.00.

The first edition of Zahn's *Einleitung* was reviewed in the PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW, Vol. xi, 1900, pp. 344-350. The translation of the third edition, undertaken by a number of Fellows and Scholars of Hartford Theological Seminary with the aid of Charles Snow Thayer, Director of the Case Memorial Library, and under the direction and supervision of Melancthon W. Jacobus, Hosmer Professor of New Testament Criticism and Exegesis and Dean of the Faculty, has now appeared in three volumes. Zahn's *Introduction* is a great book, em-

bodying the learning of one of the foremost patristic scholars of our time. By placing "its stores of critical investigation . . . at the disposal of the English-reading world," Dr. Jacobus and his fellow-laborers have rendered an important service to the study of the New Testament. The work of translation has undoubtedly been laborious, for Dr. Zahn does not express his thought in a perfectly lucid style,—at least this is the impression that his writings are apt to make on those of whom German is not the mother-tongue. He himself alludes gracefully in his Preface to a similar expression of opinion by Renan. But difficulties of form have not kept students from reading Zahn's works in German, nor have they prevented the translators from bringing their splendid plan to completion. Engrossed in his subject and seeking to do justice to every phase of it, Dr. Zahn is not unduly concerned for the weaknesses of human nature; but the translators have sought in various ways to meet the natural desire of English readers for simple, direct, and concise forms of expression by breaking up long sentences into short ones and by more frequent use of paragraphs. The Publishers also have contributed to the convenient form of the book by employing clear type, light and unglazed white paper, and by distributing the material into three volumes.

The *Introduction* of Zahn will thus fill an important place in the English literature on the New Testament. It ought to stimulate a deeper and wider historical study of the New Testament. It is a book for which many teachers have been waiting; a book which many students in our theological seminaries and many pastors and laymen can and will use with profit. And if a great book on such a subject finds the appreciation among English-speaking peoples that it deserves, the first edition of this translation will soon be exhausted.

Having in mind the high value of Dr. Zahn's work for historical study and the consequent importance of accuracy in translation and in printing, I have made a comparison of three sections of the translation (§1, vol. i, pp. 1-33; §36, vol. ii, pp. 54-84; §64, vol. iii, pp. 174-194) with the original. The more important results of this comparison are given below for the benefit of a possible second edition. Some of the points in which the translation differs from the original are mere typographical errors—errors from which the original itself is not free even in these sections, some of which have been corrected by the translators, some retained, and some made worse by the effort to correct. Other differences seem to be due either to a misunderstanding of the German or to an inadequate rendering of it. The system of citation—especially the insertion or omission of the abbreviation for page—is not uniform in the original and this has not been improved in the translation. One of the most serious formal defects of the translation is the omission of the section numbers from the pages, for the cross-references—and they are numerous—are generally made by this means. The translators have, however, increased the usefulness of the book for English readers by giving in a number of instances,—though not in all—the references to

English translations of German works in addition to the references to the originals.

ERRATA.

i., p. 2, par. 2, l. 15, "with Greek translations attached in various ways" for "vielfach mit einer griechischen Übersetzung versehen".

i., p. 11, l. 14, "Acts xxi. 40-xxii. 2" for "Acts xxi. 40, xxii. 2".

i., p. 11, l. 23, "some thirty years earlier" for "etwa 30 oder 50 Jahre früher".

i., p. 15, n. 3, l. 1, "Aramaic words" for "Aramäische und hebräische Worte und Sätze".

i., p. 15, l. 6 from bottom, before "xv. 35" insert "Mk."

i., p. 16, l. 12, "We cannot therefore be wrong in judging that the mutilated text . . . was traced back to the Aramaic . . . by those acquainted with Syriac, and was translated, as in D . . . by . . ." for "Darin kann uns nicht irre machen, dass der verstümmelte Text . . . von Kennern des Syrischen wiederum auf aram. . . zurückgeführt und wie in D . . . durch . . . übersetzt wurde".

i., p. 16, l. 25, "§ 2" for ZK IX 204" [i. e. *ZKom. Gal.*, p. 204].

i., p. 16, l. 3 from bottom, "John i. 43" for "John i. 42 (43)".

i., p. 20, l. 3, after "2 Kings i. 2," insert "6".

i., p. 21, l. 17, "*Ant.* vii. 14" for "*Ant.* vii. 1. 4".

i., p. 23, l. 19 from bottom, "p. 5f" for "pp. vi."

i., p. 24, l. 13, "347" for "337".

i., p. 25, l. 1, "*Dial.* lxxviii" for "*Dial.* lxxviii".

i., p. 25, n. 9, l. 9, "so that the tongue of the 'sacred language', or 'Sursi' . . . , which is but another designation of the same language, came to be contrasted with the 'sacred tongue' in like manner" for "so tritt die Idiotensprache ebenso der 'heiligen Sprache' gegenüber . . . , wie anderwärts das 'Sursi' . . . , welches eben die Idiotensprache ist".

i., p. 26, n. 11, l. 8, "194" for "19. 4".

i., p. 26, n. 12, l. 23, *ἑβραϊζειν* for *ἑβραϊζειν*.

i., p. 27, l. 27, "*Ancy.*" for "*Ancor.*"

i., p. 28, l. 13 from bottom, "Ἀκελδαμαχ D" [as in original] for "Ἀκελδαμαχ D."

— last line, יְרָאָה for יְרָאָה.

i., p. 29 l. 29, Σιλωά for Σιλωά.

— n. 16, l. 3, cf. p. 33, l. 3, "Jochanan" and "Johanan".

— l. 5 from bottom, "iv. 1. 41, 9" [as in original] for "iv. 1. 4; 1. 9".

i., p. 30, l. 23, "antiquated Hebraic" for "altertümlich hebräisirenden" [archaic Hebraizing].

i., p. 33, l. 7, "these" for "three" [drei].

ii., p. 56, l. 18, "conviction" for "connection" [Zusammenhang].

ii., p. 57, l. 12 from bottom, "in the spring" for "bald nach dem Frühling".

ii., p. 59, l. 13 from bottom, "If all this were told in the letter, or

even clearly stated as information, we might assume that it was forged", etc., for "Wenn dies alles in den Briefen erzählt oder auch nur als bisher unbekannt deutlich mitgeteilt würde, so könnte es erdichtet sein", etc.

ii., p. 65, l. 9, "latter" for "later" [späteren].

ii., p. 70, l. 8, "In 1900, without any idea that Mommsen . . . would really work it out, the present writer published the suggestion, that the seven imprisonments of Clement were to be explained by the addition of *πεντάκις* and *τῆς*, at the same time assuming a confusion of seven and eight" for "So liess ich im J. 1900 drucken, ohne zu ahnen, dass Mommsen, . . . es wirklich fertig bringen werde, unter gleichzeitiger Annahme einer Verwechslung von 7 und 8, die 7 Gefangenschaften bei Clemens aus Addition von *πεντάκις* und *τῆς* zu erklären".

ii., p. 70, l. 8 from bottom, *θένται* for *θέντα*.

ii., p. 71, l. 25, "37" for "xxxvii".

——— l. 29, omit period after "347".

ii., p. 73, l. 6 from bottom, "Can. Mur. i. 38" for "Can. Mur. l. 38".

ii., p. 75, l. 1, "Hispanium" for "Hispaniam".

ii., p. 75, l. 4, the reference to "*Ecclesiasticae historiae* (p. 163)" followed as it is by the clause "in which we are told", is somewhat obscure. This is true even of the third edition of the original, in which successive sentences of the first edition have been separated by new material. The obscurity might be removed by rendering "*Ecclesiasticae historiae*, to which reference has been made (Vall. iv. p. 163) for the journeys", etc.

——— l. 14 from bottom, insert *τῆς* after *διὰ*.

ii., p. 77, l. 10 from bottom *μέν* for *μὲν*.

——— l. 3 from bottom, "Theodorus" for "Theodore".

ii., p. 78, n. 9, l. 1. The following sentence, with which this Note begins in the original and which is presupposed in the subsequent discussion, has been omitted: "Die früheste Angabe über den 29. Juni als Peter- und Paulstag bietet die römische *Depositio martyrum* vom J. 336 (Lib. Pontificalis ed. Duchesne I, 11): *III Kal. Jul. Petri in Catacumbas et Pauli Ostense Tusco et Basso cons.* (= a. 258)."

ii., p. 79, l. 24, "is" for "are".

ii., p. 80, l. 7, "ii. 125" for "ii. 25".

——— l. 9, "ii. 33" for "ii. 333".

——— l. 19 from bottom, "Constantine" for "Constantius".

ii., p. 81, l. 8, "It is not impossible, though not probable" for "Es ist nicht unmöglich, jedoch nicht zu beweisen".

ii., p. 81, l. 15, "Prudentias" for "Prudentius".

——— l. 23, "hodiemus" for "hodiernus".

——— l. 25, "Natalito" for "Natalitio".

——— l. 27, "205" for "ccv".

ii., p. 84, l. 10 from bottom, after "ing" insert "(Lipsius p. 104, 4 ff.)"

iii., p. 176, par. 2, l. 15, "on" for "no".

iii., p. 177, l. 13, "I John i.-iv" for "I John i. 1-4".

iii., p. 178, l. 6, "The appendix of the Gospel of Mark, which at the

latest was probably added about the year 150" etc. for "Der wahrscheinlich dort spätestens um 150 dem Mrev beigefügte Anhang", etc.

iii., p. 179, l. 21, "Victorianus" for "Victorinus".

iii., 182, l. 15, "ἀξιόπιστος" for "ἀξιόπιστον".

iii., p. 182, l. 20, "160" for "150".

iii., p. 185, l. 3, "at the beginning of the second century" for "at the end [Ausgang] of the second century".

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

REGESTA PONTIFICUM ROMANORUM iubente regia societate Gottingensi congressit PAULUS FRIDOLINUS KEHR. Italia Pontificia Vol. I Roma, Berolini apud Weidmannos MDCCCCVI. Pp. xxvi + 201. Price, 6M. Vol. II Latium, MDCCCCVII. Pp. xxx + 230. Price 8M. Vol. III Etruria, MDCCCCVIII. Pp. lii + 492. Price 16M.

In 1896 the Royal Society of Göttingen decided to issue an entirely new and critical edition of the *privilegia et litteras* of the Roman Pontiffs. The reasons that led to this decision were the incompleteness and unreliability of the edition of Jaffé (Berlin 1851) which although re-edited by Kaltenbrunner, Ewald and Löwenfeld (1885-8) still lacked the scientific accuracy demanded by present day scholarship; for Jaffé not having had access to the original documents had been compelled to rely on printed copies and notices. The work thus undertaken was committed to Prof. Kehr, who entered upon his duties immediately, with, as he tells us, *magna animi voluntate*. The resultant volumes before us are sufficient evidence of his whole-hearted interest, as well as of the wisdom of the Royal Society's choice of editor. Ten years after the inception of the work, the first volume was published, and this has been added to at the rate of a volume per year, so that now we have three volumes and there are more to follow. Prof. Kehr has done his work admirably, and there is no doubt that his Regesta will become and remain the standard for many years to come. The period covered is from the beginnings of the Roman Church down to but not including the reign of Innocent III. Spurious acts are retained and marked as such, lost acts of which notice is found elsewhere are included and the source of information given; those of which the autograph is still in existence are specially marked. Under each number is given the date and a brief *resumé* of contents, followed by a list of the chief works in which it is treated. It will be seen, therefore, that the student has here an excellent instrument wherewith to work.

Professor Kehr has adopted the geographical method of arrangement, that is to say the *acta* are not arranged chronologically except within

very small groups, but according to the residence of the addressees. This is the meaning of the sub-titles of the individual volumes—Roma, Latium and Etruria,—although the editor warns us that as the boundaries of these districts fluctuated considerably through the centuries, they are not to be taken too strictly. The acts contained in Vol. I are divided again, when possible, according to the residence of the individual, church, etc., to which they were addressed, whether within or without the walls, making in all twenty-one subdivisions for 586 letters. Similarly the second volume is divided into twenty-five sub-sections, besides some *loca incerta* for a total of 677; and the third volume into twelve for a total of 1501. This arrangement has been admirably chosen, for it gives to the student at a glance a skeleton history of each church, monastery, etc., with which the papal see came into contact. For those who are studying history by periods rather than geographically, a chronological index is prefixed to each volume, giving the date of each document, its number in Jaffé when found there, the name of the Roman bishop by whom given, and its page in the volume, while spurious acts and those that are lost are denoted by dagger and star respectively.

It is a monumental work that the Royal Society of Göttingen and Professor Kehr have undertaken, and they are to be congratulated on their success.

Princeton, N. J.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

BIBLIOTHECA REFORMATORIA NEERLANDICA. Geschriften uit den tyd der Hervorming in de Nederlanden. Op. nieuw uitgegeven en van inleidingen en aan teekeningen voorzien door DR. S. CRAMER en DR. F. PYPER. Vyfde deel. Nederlandsche Anabaptistica. (Geschriften van Henrick Rol, Melchior Hoffman, Adam Pastor. De Broederlyke Vereenigingen) Bewerkt door Dr. S. Cramer. 's Gravenhage. Martinus Nyhoff. 1909. Pp. 650.

Our day is preëminently one of searching out the sources of our knowledge, and the world is immeasurably indebted to the toilers, who with infinite patience are collecting and, as far as is possible, are restoring, each in his own chosen sphere, the long forgotten writings of the past, which cast a new light on many periods of history.

The period just preceding and that synchronizing with the Reformation, in the Netherlands, was on many points poorly illuminated. As all know, the earliest or Sacramentist period of the Reformation was followed by the Anabaptist movement, to be succeeded in turn by the Calvinistic wave. And the latter completely swallowed up the Anabaptist type so that its history faded out and became enveloped with the haze of half known things. And just here the magnificent work of Drs. Cramer and Pyper came in to restore to us the indispensable sources of the knowledge of the true inwardness of the Anabaptist movement.

It is safe to say that more is known to-day about them and their martyrdoms and their theological views than ever before. It is now possible, since these old time-seared documents were rescued from oblivion, to paint a tolerably correct picture of the Anabaptist of the sixteenth century. What heretofore was accessible only to the specialist, who knew the hiding-places of these rare writings, is now the common property of all, who are able to read the quaint early Dutch, in which they were written. And therefore these two eminent Dutch scholars have placed the Church-historian under great obligation.

The volume before us contains the Dutch Anabaptistica, whose contents, as Dr. Cramer tells us,—“three and a half centuries ago filled so many hearts and minds”. But since that time “the possibility of making their acquaintance was practically wholly gone”. The work before us reopens this unknown territory for the first time in more than three centuries. With painstaking care the originals are reprinted in the quaint middle-Dutch of the period. The author has only corrected evident mis-spellings and defective punctuations. The possessor of this volume, therefore, is as well equipped for work as the man who, in the university of Europe, sweats over the musty originals. The special value of this work lies in the learned and very discriminating introductions to these various writings, which give us a correct idea of their place and value in the literature of the Reformation. We call special attention to the fine critical talent displayed in settling the question of Henrick Rol’s authorship of “*Die Slotel*,” also to the explanation of the remarkable fact that “*Die Ordonnantie Gods*”, the greatest and most logical work of Melchior Hoffman, “the father of the Dutch Anabaptists”, is never referred to by name nor even mentioned by Hoffman’s cotemporaries nor later in the sixteenth century; also to the illuminating discussion of the text of the “*Disputacie*”. In the introductions to the various tracts, Dr. Cramer has succeeded, with fine skill, in delineating their value and influence, the date of their origin, the critical questions presented by each text and such other matters as only attract the attention of a specialist. For the student of the Anabaptistic period of Dutch Church history, both the second and fifth volume of this remarkable collection of reprints of old reformatory writings are therefore wholly indispensable.

The first tract, in the volume before me, is: “*Die Slotel van dat Seccret des Nachmaels. Geschreuen doer eynen Henrik Rol. Item eyne rechte bedynkung hoe dat lichaem Christi van onsen lichaem tho onderscheyden isz.*” (The key of the secret of the Lord’s Supper. Written by one Henrick Rol. Also, a right mediation how the body of Christ is to be distinguished from our body.) The text covers about 80 pages of our volume. The writer combats the Romish doctrine of Transubstantiation, describes the supper as a meal, whose equivalent lies in the paschal meal of Israel; he warns against the overestimation of the sacraments, notably of the supper as a “saving institution.” Our space forbids a further discussion of this remarkable tract, which with

the other contents of this volume, gives us a clear idea of the doctrinal and practical trend of the Anabaptist movement.

The second tract in the collection is "*Die Ordonnantie Gods. Door Melchior Hoffman. Ten eersten ghedruckt Anno 1530. 1611.*" (The ordinance of God. By Melchior Hoffman. First printed 1530. 1611). This writing was saved from total destruction when, in 1611, a pious Mennonite in the Netherlands reprinted it, and of this reprint, so far as known, only two copies remain. As the title indicates, it is a treatise on the great command of Christ. Naturally it keenly antagonizes paedobaptism, which is "the work of antichrist", an "offense before God". The tract utterly rejects predestination. All men are called, elect are they only "who have fought the battle to the very end".

The next tract is another writing of Hoffman: "*Verclaringe van den geungen ende vrien wil*" (An explanation of the bound and of the free will). Of this tract only one copy remains. Again the title explains itself. It is an ardent, logical and keen defense of the doctrine of the free will.

The next tract is entitled: "*Handelinge van de disputacie in Synodote Straesburch teghen Melchior Hoffman door de predicanten dersuluer stadt. Anno MCCCCXXII*"... (An account of the disputation in the Synod of Strassburg, against Melchior Hoffman, by the preachers of that city. Ao 1533.) This disputation gives us a clear account of the reason why Hoffman was ecclesiastically condemned as a heretic. He is charged with four heresies to wit: 1. The denial of the virgin-birth of Christ; 2. the denial of the divine sovereignty; 3. a wrong conception of soteriology; 4. a denial of the value of paedobaptism. This tract is an absolute revelation of the trend of thought among the early Anabaptists.

The last tract is the largest and in our view the most important. Its title is: "*Underscheit tusschen rechte leer unde valsche leer der twistige articulen, die hyr vor angetekent syn, dorch A P.*" (The difference between the right and false doctrine of the articles in dispute, which are here enumerated, by A. P.) To it is annexed a report of a debate between Pastor and Menno Simons at Lubeck. This debate was preceded by one at Emden in 1547 and another in the same year at Goch, and from the internal evidence it must have been held in 1552. Pastor enumerates thirteen points of difference between him and his brethren. They touch: 1. the true God and false Gods; 2. the true and false view of the incarnation of Christ; 3. the true and false redeemer; 4. the true and false mediator; 5. the true and false doctrine of the time of grace; 6. the true and false preachers; 7. the true and false penitence; 8. the true and false faith; 9. the true and false baptism; 10. the true and false Lord's Supper; 11. divine and human commandments; 12. the doctrine of the true and false brethren, also of dominion, kings, plurality of wives and other false liberties; 13. the true and false books of Scripture.

As may be surmised, the reading of this theological tract

gives us a splendid idea of the doctrinal position of Pastor and his wing of the Anabaptist sect, in fact one is constantly reminded of the doctrinal dissension in the great Baptist Church at the present time in our country. Were it not that it is a physical impossibility, one might be led to believe that Pastors' tract had been in the hands of at least some of the professors of the University of Chicago. Pastor utterly rejected the dogma of the Trinity, the virgin-birth and the divinity of Christ, and this, of course, affects his entire Soteriology. The copy of this tract here reprinted was the only remaining one and was accidentally found in the Mennonite archives at Amsterdam.

It certainly is a document of the utmost importance. In conjunction with the other documents of the volume it seems to make clear two things. First, that the Socinian and later Arminian currents of thought are far more closely associated with the earlier Anabaptist movement than has generally been supposed. Secondly, that the early Dutch Anabaptists knew nothing of immersion, on which the English and American Baptists later on laid such dogmatic stress. At least, we find no trace of it in these discussions, not even in the ninth chapter of A P's "*Underscheit*", where more than fifty pages are devoted to the "*rechte und valsche doepe*". Inasmuch as the English Baptists originated in the main from the Dutch migration into England during the reign of Elizabeth and James, it seems to prove quite conclusively the contention of a prominent Southern Baptist professor, who was forced to leave his position for holding that the dogma of immersion was unknown to the early English Baptists. It was evidently a later conception of Baptism, which originated most likely, as far as the English Baptists are concerned, with the Arminian Rhynsburgers or Collegiants, as these in turn had received it from the Silezian Socinians.

All these "Anabaptistica" should be translated by the Baptist scholars of the country; it appears to us they owe it to themselves. We owe to Drs. Cramer and Pyper our warmest thanks for this magnificent contribution to the "*Quellenforschung*" of ecclesiastical history.

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HENRY E. DOSKER.

JUBILÉ DE L'ÉGLISE DE GENÈVE. 400e Anniversaire de la Naissance de Calvin. CALVIN LE PRÉDICATEUR DE GENÈVE. Conférence faite dans la Cathédrale de Saint-Pierre, à Genève, par M. le Professeur E. DOUMERGUE, Doyen de la Faculté de Théologie de Montauban. Edition Atar, Corraterie, 12. Genève. [1909.] 16mo. Pp. 29.

The address which Professor Doumergue delivered in the Cathedral of St. Peter on the 2nd of July last, in inaugurating the celebration by the Genevan Church of the four-hundredth anniversary of Calvin's birth, was recognized by all who heard it as one of the most notable events of that very notable week. It would have been a notable address on any occasion and before any audience. In it Professor Doumergue

summarizes the results of his long and close study of Calvin, and draws the portrait of the great Reformer with careful and brilliant touches. The aspect in which he presents Calvin, as best throwing into relief his fundamental traits as man and reformer, is that of preacher. He was no doubt a man of action and a man of thought, taking his rank high among men of action and men of thought. But above everything he was a man of speech, speaking steadily for twenty-four years, in the pulpit and the professor's chair, sometimes every day for months at a time, sometime twice a day for weeks. And this is, according to Professor Doumergue, the true and authentic Calvin, which explains all the others: Calvin the preacher of Geneva, moulding by his word the Reformed soul of the sixteenth century.

First, Professor Doumergue describes for us how Calvin preached. It was in the simplest and most unadorned fashion. There was no pretension, no redundancy; everything was with a view to the application, to edification, to substantial results. He spoke in the language of the people, making use of the phrases of everyday life, and illustrating what he said with the homeliest similes. It is remarkable how his pages bristle with the popular proverbs of the day: how dramatically he tells his story. A preacher like this was sure to be listened to,—and that is the first point for an orator. But Calvin spoke not only familiarly, he spoke also with authority. And it is this rare combination of qualities which makes the peculiarity of his preaching. "Such is the familiarity and the authority with which the preacher of Geneva dealt day by day for twenty-five years with the most living subjects of theology, ethics, politics and political economy, for to him all subjects were religious. . . . There was not a man, simple citizen or member of the Little Council, from the Marquis of Vico or the Syndics to the humblest workman, not a woman from Madam Budé to her chambermaids, who had not heard enumerated and expounded all his or her duties, the conduct, shall I say? which according to the Word of God was incumbent on the head, or the conscience, or the heart, in all the circumstances of life. There was not an atom of these personalities which had not been moulded and remodeled by this wonderful moulder: Calvin the preacher of Geneva, moulding by his word the Reformed soul of the sixteenth century" (p. 19).

Then Professor Doumergue turns to describe the matter of Calvin's preaching as through all these years he sought single-heartedly to instill in the mass of humanity the leaven of the Gospel. And here he lays stress particularly on the humanity of Calvin's preaching, and above all, on its heart; on his deep sympathy with all human needs, bodily and mental, as well as spiritual, and his profound sense, above all, of the needs of the heart. "The true doctrine, he reiterates from this pulpit, is a 'doctrine of practice'. The criterion of a doctrine is the edification it produces. Every doctrine,—no matter how holy, how profound it appears—if it is of no value for the edification of all, great and small, is a 'useless speculation', a 'frivolous curiosity', 'rubbish', 'a stork's

tale', a 'folly', a 'sacrilege'. And the true doctrine is not taught by any reasoning or any teacher. It is not merely the authority of the Bible that is truly proved only by the testimony of the Holy Spirit, but 'all our wisdom and all our knowledge remains folly and ignorance', all our salvation, all our religion remains uncertain, . . . so long as we proceed by human or philosophical reasoning, by demonstration of reason, by didactic or even historical proofs. We must have for our master, the sole master of theology, the Holy Spirit. And where is this mastery exercised? In the heart. 'The consent of faith is rather of the heart than of the head, rather of the affections than of the understanding'" (pp. 52-26).

Such, according to Professor Doumergue was Calvin the preacher, standing in the pulpit in bodily weakness, speaking with the slow enunciation, with the short respiration, that tells of the ravages of phthisis, "but with all his faith, all his energy, all his passion pouring from that noble head from which no eyes wander, from that feeble breath so distinctly heard", kneading—for this is Professor Doumergue's figure—the souls of the men of his age, and as he kneaded, working into them a leaven which could not fail to rise, and rising to raise them to hitherto unknown heights. "The dough had been kneaded. The kneader gone, it rises with an irresistible expansion. It rises here, there, in Europe, through years, through centuries; and then it will rise in the New World. And now the preacher of Geneva has demonstrated that, as he never ceased to declare, his work was not his work, his word was not his word. What is the kneader in the life of the yeast that he has hidden in the dough? Now, the preacher of Geneva, justified and satisfied, may lie down in an unknown grave, which no stone is ever to point out to human eye. From every side, there shall shine upon his work the only epitaph which he had ever desired, the humble and triumphant epitaph, *Soli Deo gloria!*" (p. 291).

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

ICONOGRAPHIE CALVINIENNE. Ouvrage dédié à l'Université de Genève par E. DOUMERGUE, Doyen de la Faculté Libre de Théologie Protestante de Montauban. Et suivi de deux Appendices: *Catalogue des Portraits gravés de Calvin*, par le Dr. H. Maillart-Gosse; et *Inventaire des Médailles concernant Calvin*, par Eug. Demole, Dr. phil. Avec 76 gravures dans le text et 26 planches en phototypie. Lausanne: Georges Bridel et Cie., Editeur. 1909. 4to. Pp. viii, 280.

Of the numerous books called out by the celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of the birth of Calvin—which was also the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the Academy of Geneva and of the publication of the definitive edition of the *Institutes of the Christian Religion*—it is safe to say that this beautiful volume of Professor Doumergue's is the most sumptuous. It consists of two very separable

parts. The former of these (pp. 1-91) is a very thorough and thoroughly illustrated study of the portraits of Calvin which have come down to us. To this part belong also the two valuable Appendices by Drs. Maillart-Gosse and Demole, which catalogue respectively the known prints of Calvin and medals concerning Calvin (pp. 223-258, pp. 259-275). The second part of the book is a less complete but an interesting study of the religious caricatures of the Reformation age, particularly those that concern Calvin and Calvinism (pp. 93-222). Both parts are fully illustrated by both engravings included in the text and full-page phototypes.

The former portion of the volume opens with an Introduction the design of which is to make clear the difficulty of the task which is undertaken when an attempt is made to ascertain from extant materials the precise appearance of Calvin. An example is taken from the case of Luther, which provides as well a contrast. Portraits of Luther from the sixteenth century are exceedingly numerous; they are dated; and they are signed by well-known names. Yet the critical student of them tells us that the real physiognomy of Luther has been practically lost from the current representations of him, and that only four of the early portraits of him are worth considering in an attempt to recover his actual appearance. Portraits of Calvin from the sixteenth century, on the other hand, are rare; none of them are by known painters or painters of talent; only an engraving or two are by known engravers; none are known to be directly from life; and, far from his features having been idealized by the traditional representations as in the case of Luther, they have been "caricatured, and made wrinkled and aged", to an absurd extent. One favorable fact, however, stands out in the midst of the difficulties. We know at least that numerous portraits of Calvin were made. Quite a brisk trade seems, indeed, to have been driven in Geneva in portraits of the great Reformer. Sojourners in the town wished them to take home with them; admirers of Calvin elsewhere wished them to satisfy their desire to look upon his face. The letters of the time preserve indications of this brisk trade, and prepare us to find representations of Calvin in distant places,—at Hanau, say, or Rotterdam. But they supply us with no assurances of the faithfulness of these portraits. "Portraits of commerce" need present only a general likeness of their subject: we do not know that Calvin ever "sat for his portrait"; we do not know that any competent artist ever had an opportunity to make a real study of his face or figure.

The current impression of the appearance of Calvin is derived from a portrait in the possession of the Library at Geneva, which has been frequently reproduced and very widely disseminated. This portrait undoubtedly preserves in a general way the features of Calvin, for it is itself a copy of the best authenticated of all his portraits. But it is a wretched copy, which libels rather than repeats its original; and its cadaverous appearance has not unnaturally given rise to the legend that

it was painted from Calvin's death-mask. The original to which it goes back, once the property of Beza, from whom it has come down by inheritance to its present owner, M. Tronchin, represents Calvin at the extreme end of his life, when he was worn out by labor and wasted by disease; but it is free from the distressing features which mark its more well-known copy. It was obviously the source from which the wood-cut in Beza's *Icones* was derived: and these two representations together give us therefore an authentic representation of the appearance of Calvin at the end of his life. Have we any equally authentic representation of him in his prime? Perhaps we can hardly say that: but there is a series of portraits belonging to an earlier date which undoubtedly preserves for us his general appearance in the maturity of his powers. Among these we do not set such store as is ordinarily done by the fine engraving by René Boyvin, because it seems to us clearly an idealized copy of the plate in the *Icones*, or if the dates will not allow that (the *Icones* were published in 1580 and Boyvin's plates seem all to come from 1558-1580), then of the Tronchin (Beza) portrait which must represent Calvin at about the age (fifty-three) at which Boyvin professes to depict him. Nor have we been able to place the value which Professor Doumergue does upon the unique wood-cut preserved in the Maillart-Gosse collection, and not only given by Professor Doumergue in his Plate VI, but placed on his title-page as if it were *the* portrait of most trustworthiness of all. This admirable cut purports to give us Calvin at the age of forty-eight and differs from the current portraits by portraying him with a robustness which Professor Doumergue speaks of as "as astonishing as it is authentic". This very trait which commends it to Professor Doumergue awakens doubts in our own mind, however, whether it too may not be an idealization. Was Calvin ever—was he particularly in 1557-8, between his two serious illnesses—ague and fever—which Beza describes for us—of this well-nourished and rotund figure and countenance? But in the Rotterdam and Basle portraits supported by the wood-cut published by Professor Borgeaud (Plate V) we have a type of likeness which we can trust,—“which remains for us”, as Professor Doumergue himself says, “the best and most trustworthy type of Calvin, during the years of his maturity, about forty to forty-five years old”. For the more youthful Calvin we are left more at sea. We find it difficult to believe in either the portrait of Tours or the enamel of Limousin; and we do not regret this. It is different with the Hanau portrait, which we would fain believe in,—but there are difficulties in the way. Comparing it with the later portraits, Professor Doumergue remarks, “There are common traits, but how different is the physiognomy!” It is at least a worthy beginning which is pictured here for what Calvin afterwards became: and there are no insuperable hindrances to believing it a fair representation of his youthful form and face.

The result of Professor Doumergue's researches we take to be that in the Rotterdam and the Tronchin portraits, with the engravings which follow them, we have preserved for us, certainly no such presentation

of Calvin's personality as a great artist, catching his spirit in his features and attitude, might have given us, but a very fair representation of the outward appearance of the great Reformer. On the other hand, we may remark in passing, the genuineness of the recently discovered portrait purporting to be of "Calvin's wife", is quite destroyed by Professor Doumergue's criticism.

The second part of Professor Doumergue's book treats of (in general) religious caricatures of the Reformation age. It is divided into two portions. The latter of these gives us reproductions and descriptions of a certain number of caricatures having more or less relation to Calvin and Calvinism. There is a chapter on Catholic Caricatures of both. Then one on Calvinistic Caricatures of Romanism. This is followed by one on Lutheran Anti-Calvinistic Caricatures. Other chapters on "Mixed" and "Irenic" Caricatures succeed this. The whole closes with a chapter on Numismatic Caricatures, and a few words under the head of "Divers" on a number of related topics. The essay finds its *raison d'être* in this its second portion; but it scarcely finds its center of interest in it. This rather lies in its earlier portion, which is entitled "Protestant Caricature and Satire", but happily treats rather of the broader subject "Protestant Satire" than of its application in caricature. The matter is disposed in three chapters, the first of which deals with German, the second with French Protestant Satire and Caricature, and the third with Calvin in his relation to satire. The whole forms an admirable brief treatise on its subject and lays before the reader a great mass of interesting information. Some of this Professor Doumergue had given us in earlier publications. But it is well to have it repeated here in more ample development.

In Professor Doumergue's view satire is the genus, caricature a species under it,—satire expressed in figures. Religious satire is as old as religious abuses, but a new epoch is marked in its history by the Reformation, when, as Fuchs remarks, "caricature was for the first time placed at the service of a great movement and officially elevated to the height of a regular weapon". Luther made full use of it, and, of course, so did Calvin and his companions. Only, in employing this "most powerful of all destructive weapons", these "leaders of the French Reformation", as M. Lenient, the historian of *Satire in France*, reminds us, transfigured it. "From the first day when they touched it", says he, "they separated themselves sharply from the professional railers and scoffers, who turned everything into ridicule, the good and the evil alike, the false and the true, and sought less to edify than to scandalize souls." "It is not to Lucian that this satire goes back", he adds, "but to the Prophets, to the Fathers of the Church, to Elijah and Isaiah, to Tertullian and St. Augustine, to those glorious athletes of the faith who did not disdain to apply the cautery of opprobrium to the faults of the people or the errors of the heathen. Sanctified by its end it ceases to be a mere scandalous amusement and becomes a weapon in the service of the truth."

The great Calvinistic satirists were Calvin, Viret and Beza, and

Professor Doumergue gives us an excellent brief account of their work in this manner. Viret, son of the people, writes satire for the people, in the language of the people, and thus becomes the father of Romance-Swiss literature. "Audacious, caustic, familiar, he works powerfully on the crowd, awakening in them their loud laughter and their sturdy good sense. His prolix style, his frequently heavy pleasantry, are far from equaling the nervous conciseness of Calvin or the biting vivacity of Beza. But Viret had his readers and his public, to whom his very vulgarity was an additional charm. . . . In spite of his natural causticity, he is at bottom good-natured, sweet-tempered and tolerant, even for his enemies. . . ." This is M. Lenient's characterization, repeated by Professor Doumergue, and it may serve us for a general description of the nature of early Calvinistic satire, whether in the hands of the bourgeois Viret, or the highly cultured Beza, or Calvin the great leader of them all.

Professor Doumergue devotes a whole chapter to Calvin's Satires, dividing the treatment between his satires against ideas—his *Treatise on Relics* and *Excuse of the Nicodemites* being taken as samples—and his satires against persons,—Cenalis, Antony Cathelan and Gabriel de Saconay being especially adduced. Professor Doumergue does not gloss the faults of Calvin's satire, especially of his personal satire. Those who gave him a Roland were very sure to receive an Oliver in return. But the difference even here was that, while those who attacked him dealt in calumnies, he, while calling a spade a spade with true sixteenth-century freedom, yet held himself strictly to the truth. "We do not contend", remarks Professor Doumergue of Calvin's response to Saconay, "that this language is nothing but pure atticism. Calvin is rude, violent, coarse. Saconay is paid in his own coin.—But it is a response",—and Calvin, in his response, was answering for his life, repelling the most gross calumnies by an appeal to truth—as even his enemies admit. A recent Romish critic, for example, after saying what he wished to say of the violence of Calvin's assault on Saconay, requires to add: "We have no desire to assert that the reproaches which Calvin addressed to G. de Saconay were not well founded. The precentor of St. John's could very easily seek to defend the Church in his writings and forget himself in his conduct." In his more general satirical pieces, when he has principles of action rather than particular assailants in mind, such personal invectives naturally fall into the background and we see Calvin as a satirist at his best, always earnest, no doubt, and never wholly free from the grossness of the age—there are passages even in his sermons, spoken to the mixed audience before him, which twentieth century eyes could scarcely endure in print—but never forgetful of the main issues or descending to mere abuse. And what an effective implement satire was in his hands! "We see", says Professor Doumergue, in closing, "what a great part ridicule played in this revolution of morals and of faith.—We see what particular kind of ridicule Calvin's was. It was often the arrow which pierced through and through; it was often the bludgeon which crushed

and pulverized; it was always a terrible weapon. With him pleasantry was relatively less gay; almost always, if not always, it was relatively more dignified: his end was legitimate, and his legitimate end explains, if it does not justify, at least for our age, his deflections."

The whole work brings the reader nearer to an understanding of the real Calvin which it has been Professor Doumergue's life-task to recover for our generation. The high praise is deserved by it that it is worthy of the author of the monumental *Jean Calvin* and forms a welcome part of the portraiture of the great Reformer which he is giving the world. And in the form in which it is presented, we may add, it is worthy of the occasion of its publication, when all the world had gathered to Geneva, Calvin's city, to do the memory of his person and achievements honor.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

A SHORT HISTORY OF PURITANISM. By JAMES HERON, D.D.. Edinburg: T. & T. Clark. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. 1908. viii, 232. Index. MAKERS OF THE SCOTTISH CHURCH. By REV. W. BEVERIDGE, M.A. Edinburg: T. & T. Clark. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. 1908. 212. Index. PURITANISM IN THE SOUTH. By J. EDWARD KIRBY. The Pilgrim Press. 1908. 144.

These three little books dealing with various phases of the history of the Reformed Church, each seeks in its way a popular audience. Dr. Heron's book, as its sub-title indicates, is intended to serve as a "hand-book for guilds and bible classes". It shows on every page the competent hand of the scholarly professor of ecclesiastical history and accomplished writer. The plan of the book is simple, yet comprehensive, the material is solid, yet enriched and varied by wide reading and a fine literary judgment, the point of view is that of a man in sympathy with his subject, and alive to its nobility and permanent significance in the history of human progress. Its use cannot be too highly commended.

Mr. Beveridge has undertaken to present a series of historical portraits illustrative of the rise and progress of the Scottish Church suited to the unlearned reader. His book is not uninteresting. It could scarcely be that, with the commanding interest of nearly all his subjects. But he lacks the story-teller's gift. His sketches are nearly all clumsily begun, and scarcely ever are they drawn with the sure hand which seizes the main lines of character and leaves a definite impression on the mind. Yet, it may be commended to those who can overcome the difficulties of the beginning of each sketch for the series of noble personages which it brings together, especially in the latter half, where Andrew Melville, Henderson, Rutherford, Cameron, Carstares, the Erskines, Chalmers and Rainy are portrayed.

Mr. Kirby's effort is chiefly interesting because of the lack of materials for the writing of a history of Puritanism in the Southern part of the United States, and the hopefulness of even so slight a sketch as indicating an awakening interest in this field. The book appears to be made up of a series of papers published in some newspaper; they are

journalistic in style, without consistent plan or adequate research. We cannot but welcome all such attempts to throw light upon our ecclesiastical history and awaken us to a more intelligent interest in it. Its main contention is that the South was as distinctly Puritan as the New England States, both in its original settlers and its social development, and that the favorite boast of "cavalier" descent was a popular fiction. The serious student of American history has always appreciated the predominance of reformed elements in Southern society, English, Scotch, Irish, and French, and of the reformed churches, Baptist, Presbyterian, low church Episcopalian and Congregational. What is much needed is materials for the more complete study of the origin of the various components of this religious complex and the causes which led to the survival of the independent type in some places such as Charleston, S. C., the more general absorption of all except the Baptists into the Presbyterian Churches, and the growth of Methodism in communities originally reformed in faith.

Lafayette College.

ETHELBERT D. WARFIELD.

HENRY CHARLES LEA'S HISTORICAL WRITINGS. A Critical Inquiry into their Method and Merit. By PAUL MARIA BAUMGARTEN. New York: Joseph F. Wagner. 1909. Pp. 200. Price, 90 cents.

This is an attack rather than a criticism. The author is a Romanist and disturbed over Dr. Lea's inimical attitude toward the Roman Church of the middle ages. He accuses him of lack of care in the use of his sources, and falsification—which he hopes is "objective". Also he declares him ignorant of Roman theology and governed by a prejudice that unfits him for the rôle of historian. To these and similar charges, insinuations are added, unbecoming a scientific criticism. M. Baumgarten is evidently displeased with the success of Dr. Lea's works in English, French and German. Most of his criticism consists in merely asserting the negative of what Lea affirmed, or denouncing his ignorance. In some few matters he offers proof of his statements; but granting that he be right in every case he does no more than to show Lea to be fallible. Sometimes his criticism overshoots the mark, as for instance when he jeers at Lea for discussing seriously the question whether a layman could hear confession and grant absolution. This, he says, was never countenanced by the church, after which he gives seven examples of priests, before mass, confessing to laymen. M. Baumgarten's point is that in every case the offending layman was punished. But if Thomas Aquinas discussed the matter, and ordained priests knew no better, or, as M. Baumgarten would prefer, were unspiritual enough to demand absolution from their inferiors, we cannot really see that Dr. Lea's discussion of the matter is so out of place.

The kernel of the dispute is to be found in this. M. Baumgarten would have Dr. Lea confine his discussion of the doctrines and usages of the church within the bounds set by the Roman authorities. He criticises him for using the Anglican translation of the Bible instead of the approved Catholic version, in his work on Auricular Confession.

Dr. Lea on the contrary has drawn on literature other than that emanating from Rome or stamped with its approval.

The last chapter is devoted to a comparison of lynching in the United States and the scenes of the Inquisition; and the inference is drawn that it would be just as unfair to blame the 2875 murders by lynching, which occurred between 1885 and 1903, on the United States government, as, with Lea, to charge the excesses of the Inquisition to the Church of Rome.

An appendix gives the text of thirty-five documents from M. Baumgarten's collection, dealing with the Inquisition and auricular confession to laymen.

Princeton, N. J.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

THE CHURCH UNIVERSAL. THE AGE OF SCHISM, being an Outline of the History of the Church from A.D. 1304 to A.D. 1503. By HERBERT BRUCE, M.A., Lecturer and Head of the Department of History in the University College, Cardiff; formerly Scholar of S. John's College, Oxford. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1907. Pp. 278. Price, \$1.00, net.

THE AGE OF REVOLUTION. Being an Outline of the History of the Church from 1648 to 1815. By the REV. WILLIAM HOLDEN HUTTON, B.D., Fellow and Tutor of S. John College, and Examiner in the Honour School of Modern History, at Oxford; Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Rochester. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. Pp. 301. Price, \$1.50, net.

The author of the second of these volumes, who is also the editor of the series, informs us in a prefatory editorial note that "the aim of the series . . . is to tell, clearly and accurately, the story of the Church, as a divine institution with a continuous life." To this he adds in the preface to the volume for which he is especially responsible, that he has restricted his "work to the history of those religious bodies which believe episcopacy to be of the *esse* of the Church and which claim to have, and appear to me to have, preserved the succession of bishops according to the ancient rule." It is in the light of these statements that we must understand the general title of *The Church Universal*.

As might be expected from the foregoing, the main theme of Mr. Bruce's volume is the fortune of the Papacy in the two centuries preceding the Reformation. The few pages devoted to the mendicant orders, the monks, the Inquisition (which is dismissed in a foot-note), the heretical sects, the Renaissance, education and literature, are so general and meagre that they are worthy of neither praise nor blame; certainly one who had a different conception of the Church Universal would have considered such matters of more importance.

The political and ecclesiastical condition of Europe receives more careful treatment; and necessarily so. The transition from the feudal to the modern state, and especially the growth of independent and self-centred nations, could not but influence men's opinions of the Church

as then organized—of the Papacy and the Episcopate. In dealing with this Mr. Bruce shows that he has read wisely and well, and within the bounds set by the size of the volume has presented us with a good review of the forces at work leading up to the reforming councils, of the legal and other obstacles in the way of reform, of the final failure of the Conciliar movement, and of the gradual strengthening of the national churches.

The principal chapter in the second portion of the volume deals with the popes of the latter half of the fifteenth century. In this the author is concerned to show that the papacy gradually became unfit to occupy the leading place it had in the middle ages. In this, of course, he is right, but it will be doubted by many that the spirituality of the Avignon popes has been formerly underestimated. The evidence for spirituality which he adduces—the interest in missions and education—should have been examined with a view to ascertaining whether it shows interest in the higher welfare of the church, or attention to routine duties. Alexander VI, the terrible Borgia, was also, as Mr. Bruce knows, a patron of missions.

The second of these volumes appears to have left the author's hands without thorough revision. Pages 14 and 15 retain what were evidently two draughts of the same paragraph; on page 32 the author falls into the common error of speaking of the Sorbonne as the "theological faculty of the University of Paris", which it never was (Herzog-Hauck, Vol. xviii, p. 533); and on page 26 he has allowed *doctor probabilis* to stand, for which we should read *doctor gravis et probus*.

This volume naturally shows the consequences of the editor's conception of the Church Universal more than does the former. The non-episcopalian protestant churches have no place in it. We look, therefore, in vain for any treatment of the Church of Scotland and other Presbyterian churches, of the Lutheran church, of the Huguenots, of the Protestant movement in Holland, Switzerland, Italy and elsewhere. The Cromwellian Protectorate is passed over in silence. Puritanism is hardly mentioned. It is rather disconcerting, on turning to the chapter on the church in Germany in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to find that the larger part is given to a sketch of Lothar Franz von Schönborn, Archbishop of Mainz, who affords an example, we are told, of the secularism of the church of that day, and who with others like him was responsible for the general laxity of belief, rejection of Catholic truth, and importance of church influence, which marked in Germany the last half of the eighteenth century. There is no word of Spener, Francke, the Pietistic movement or of the immense and immensely important theological literature of the time. Later two paragraphs are devoted to the philosophy of the eighteenth century.

Enough has been said to characterize the book. Mr. Hutton's interest is in the Episcopacy. Where Episcopal churches have engaged in missionary or other activity, he briefly records the fact; but the one thing that the reader will find discussed with any degree of fullness is the struggle of episcopacy to emancipate, maintain or aggrandize itself.

Mr. Hutton naturally feels himself most at home in dealing with the Church of England, and although we think that he has fallen below the standard set by his *History of the English Church from the Accession of Charles I to the Death of Anne*, he gives in outline a thoughtful presentation of the fortunes of the section of the church to which he belongs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

THEOLOGISCHER JAHRESBERICHT. Siebenundzwanziger Band, 1907. Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. G. KRÜGER und Prof. Dr. W. KOEHLER in Giessen. IV Abteilung: KIRCHENGESCHICHTE. Bearbeitet von Werner, Krüger, Vogt, Hermelink, Köhler, Herz. Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger; New York: G. E. Stechert & Co. 1908. 8vo., pp. 750.

This volume, although bearing the date of 1908, reached its readers only in the middle of 1909. Its closely packed 750 pages give a conspectus of the work done in Church History for the year 1907. The disposition of its contents is as follows: Johannes Werner reviews the general works on Church History (pp. 1-30); Gustav Krüger deals with the early period (pp. 31-90); Ernst Vogt and Heinrich Hermelink with the Middle Ages (pp. 91-190); Walter Köhler with the Reformation age up to 1648 (pp. 191-350); Richard Herz with the period from 1648 to 1789 (pp. 351-500); and Johannes Werner with that from 1789 to the present day. The comprehensiveness of the survey is remarkable and puts in the hands of students of theology an indispensable catalogue of the historical writings of the year. It is noteworthy that the historical section of the *Jahresbericht* continues to be larger than all other sections combined,—a striking indication of the direction in which theological interest has been turning of late.

It is impossible, of course, to give any detailed account of the contents of a book of this kind, and fortunately it is unnecessary in view of its well-known character. It has come to us in Calvin's year; and although it deals with the literature of two years earlier, it is natural to turn to the section which takes account of the Calvin literature. Some fifteen books and articles published in 1907 about Calvin are here catalogued. Only three of these are singled out, however, for special notice. These are N. Weiss' article in the *Bulletin* of the Society of French Protestant History, in which he publishes and discusses the portrait of Idelette de Burg discovered at Rouen; Bess' interesting sketch of Calvin's *Life*, published in the series called *Unsere religiösen Erzieher*; and Lord Acton's essay on *Calvin and Henry VIII*, printed in his *Lectures on Modern History*. We quote the last as a sample of the objective method of Köhler's work of characterization. "Lord Acton", he says, "sets the Calvinistic ideal of the Church over against the Lutheran. 'Lutheranism is governed not by the spiritual, but by the temporal power in agreement with the high conception of the State, which Luther derived from the long conflict of the Middle Ages. It is the most conservative form of religion, and less liable than any

other to collision with the civil authority on which it rests.' On the other hand, 'the secret of Calvin's later influence is that he claimed for the Church more independence than he obtained. The surging theory of State omnipotence did not affect his belief in the principle of self-government'. In opposition to both stands the Reformation of Henry VIII, as the outgrowth not of religious but of political motives." Köhler adds no single word of comment. Perhaps, we may rush in where he refuses to tread and say for ourselves that Lord Acton's characterizations as here cited seem to us eminently just.

It is perhaps an impertinence to recommend to the attention of scholars such a book as the *Jahresbericht*. Who does not already use its rich information every day of his life? But it is an open secret that it is sadly in need of support.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE AND SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. By AUGUSTUS SCHULTZE, D.D., L.H.D., President Moravian College and Theological Seminary; Author of *Theology of Peter and Paul*, *Books of the Bible Analysed*, *Essentials of the Christian Faith*, etc. Bethlehem, Pa.: Times Publishing Company. 1909. 8vo.; pp. x, 279.

This, the author tells in his brief preface, "is the first work of this kind written in the English language by a member of the oldest Protestant Church, founded by the followers of John Hus in 1457". A book coming to us so recommended commands at once our respectful attention. We welcome it as the vanguard, we trust, of an army yet to come.

Dr. Schultze writes genially and with a manifest desire to avoid all extreme views and statements. This desire becomes, indeed, a snare to him, and gives his expositions an appearance sometimes of vagueness, sometimes even of vacillation. His general theological standpoint is left, however, in no doubt. It derives from Schleiermacher rather than from Hus. Dr. Schultze, in one word, is distinctly of the "Mediating" school of theology, and reproduces all the main teachings of that school, including its characteristic *ordo salutis* and its advocacy of a probation in the next world for all those dying unsaved who have not made a decisive choice against Christ in this. Under the new covenant, he tells us, "there is but one sin which actually and definitely condemns the sinner, viz., a willful rejection of the offer of salvation in Christ Jesus" (p. 82), and everyone must have an opportunity to commit this decisive sin before his final destiny is fixed.

The foci about which Dr. Schultze's system revolves are his doctrine of the will and his doctrine of sin. He wishes to magnify the grace of God; but his exaggerated conception of the function of the will in salvation ever stands in his way. He wishes to recognize the lost estate of mankind in Adam; but again his exaggerated conception of the function of the will in the grounding of accountability deflects his

thought. The outcome is that he teaches a minified doctrine both of the sinful estate from which man is saved and of the action of the grace by which he is saved from it.

No soul, it seems, can be condemned to eternal punishment "because of the involuntary inheritance of a depraved nature" (p. 81). "*Personal guilt* and punishment for guilt can be attributed or imputed only where there is personal assent to the evil" (p. 81). "Inherited corruption" may, indeed, "unfit man for heaven"; but it "does not as such condemn him to punishment" (p. 81). It would seem, then, that man as fallen in Adam is not a sinner of very deep dye: he is not even punishably sinful. Nay, until and unless he wilfully rejects the offer of salvation in Christ (p. 82) he never deserves "actual and definite condemnation" (p. 82). Humanity, it would seem, indeed, except through that one sin, is incapable of becoming radically sinful. Devils may become "wholly identified with sin"; but (except by rejecting the offered Christ) not man. Human sin differs from devilish sin in that it originated in "partial ignorance and lack of evil intention" (p. 91), and is never "altogether a personal act of *conscious intention*" (p. 131). "It is a disease rather than a crime, involuntary slavery rather than rebellion" (p. 131). It is "not an absolutely deliberate act of malice" (p. 132). This seems to us very bad. But the use to which it is put seems to us worse. It is only because human sin is thus qualified sin, it is suggested, that Christ was able to redeem man. He could not, it seems, have redeemed devils. The efficacy of his blood is therefore limited, not by the purpose of God in His gift of it, but by an intrinsic incompetency in itself. Sin may be too great to be washed away by the blood of Christ. And the blood of Christ washes away human sin only because human sin is relatively not very bad. And this suggestion is made just after an excellent exposition of the substitutive atonement of Christ, in which an "infinite value" is ascribed to His sacrifice!

It is not, however, only the depth of sin which puts bounds to the efficacy of our Saviour's work in Dr. Schultze's scheme. The will of man does it also (p. 132). Dr. Schultze is unwilling to allow that even those that die in infancy can be saved, except as a result of their "personal decision". No: those that die in infancy have Christ offered to them in the next world; and we cannot say that all will accept Him. We can only be confident "that the love and wisdom of God will afford to every human being the best opportunity for attaining salvation, whether it be by living in the body and in this material world or out of the body and in the Spirit world" (p. 238). From which we may infer that God has enough foresight to know, in the case of each person who comes into the world (apparently apart from His wise, good and holy ordering), whether he will have the best "chance" of salvation here or yonder, and acts accordingly; but God has not enough foresight to know how any of them will use this, his "best opportunity", much less enough wisdom and power to secure, in any case, that he shall use it happily. All that God can do is to afford to each his "best opportunity" and sit helplessly by and await the result. The human will, in a

word, is greater than God's and will have its way rather than God's.

Of course, Dr. Schultze finds difficulty in adjusting the doctrine of "creative grace" which he earnestly wishes to teach, to this exaggerated doctrine of the will. We may observe his difficulty as well as elsewhere, perhaps, when he comes to speak of infant baptism (p. 214). Baptism, we are told, can convey nothing, except "so far as that can be done objectively, without taking away the right and duty of personal self-determination". Whatever it conveys, would seem therefore to be hung up until the capacity of self-determination grows in the infant, and to be contingent on its exercise. Dr. Schultze goes on, indeed, to tell us that it "marks the *beginning* of personal salvation", though he qualifies this by the words "objectively speaking"; he even goes so far as to discover in this "beginning of personal salvation" these two things: "an objective share in Christ's redemption" and "an infusion of the divine life" to which the child (just because he is a child) "can offer no resistance". We might well ask, What lacks such a child yet? But Dr. Schultze is ready with his answer: he lacks that "personal appropriation" without which there is no possibility of salvation. For, he announces, "baptismal grace is *conditional* in infants as well as in adults". As well as in adults. For to get Dr. Schultze's full meaning we must turn back to his exposition of the processes of "personal salvation" in adults (pp. 138 sq.). These processes are the work, of course, of God the Holy Spirit, and run through the stages of Vocation, Regeneration and Justification (for these two are with Dr. Schultze as with other Mediating theologians but the two aspects—ethical and judicial—of the same act), and Sanctification. But in no one of these processes is the operation of God the Holy Spirit decisive. Everything waits on man and man's determining action. God only provides "whatever is needful for godliness and happiness": what the Holy Spirit does in giving salvation is only to "bestow upon sinful man all that is needed". And all that the Spirit does "remains ineffectual unless it meets with the response of human willingness" (p. 138, *cf.* p. 142). There is no salvation except the salvation which man gives effect to by the act of his own will; and which after it is effected in him he retains by his own efforts—not, of course, without the aid of the Holy Spirit. The danger of falling away from the salvation into which we have entered may diminish as sanctification progresses, "but it does not disappear altogether until the last chain that binds the Christian to a sinful world is broken" (p. 180). The grace of God, in other words, is never—in this life at least—as strong as the sinful will of man; even though that will was never radically sinful (for a will radically sinful were devilish, not human, and imports absolute incapacity for salvation) and has under the tutelage of the Holy Spirit grown unto a high degree of sanctification.

We have thought it right to emphasize primarily the weaknesses of Dr. Schultze's theological scheme. They are the weaknesses of the Mediating theology to which he has, unfortunately, given his advocacy. But his presentation has its virtues, too. He makes, no doubt, the best

of the Mediating theology that can be made of it. He makes as much of the atonement of Christ (which he very purely conceives) and of the grace of the Spirit, as the schematization of the Mediating theology will permit, and his whole discussion is suffused with an atmosphere of devoutness. He believes in the Trinity and Angels; he believes even in miracles—and, indeed, even in modern miracles. He believes in a causal connection between Adam's transgression and the sins of his descendants. He believes in the Incarnation and the Two Natures, although he will not deny a Kenosis. He believes in a substitutive atonement. He believes in a really creative operation of the Spirit of God in the heart, even though he inconsistently hangs its efficacy on the action of the human will. He believes in a sane doctrine of the Church and of the ordained means of grace. He believes in a true second coming of Christ to consummate His kingdom. He believes in the resurrection of the just, though he explains away that of the wicked. He believes in eternal punishment. All these are great things to believe in these days of unbelief. And what Dr. Schultze believes he states with great winningness of manner.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

SIXTY YEARS WITH THE BIBLE. A Record of Experience. By WILLIAM NEWTON CLARKE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1909. 12mo., pp. 259.

Every simple and sincere record of vital processes makes an irresistible appeal to human sympathy. It matters not whether it be a record of growth or of decay. Both growth and decay are human experiences; and the human heart responds with quick and profound interest to the portrayal of either. The history of the years of declining vitality commands our concern as fully as that of the years of waxing vitality. We draw no Osler-line at forty, beyond which we will follow a life-drama with only waning attention. A book like Dr. Clarke's, which registers for us the course of a fading faith is sure, therefore, to claim a widespread and deep, if somewhat melancholy, interest. Such a record is unfortunately no novelty, but takes its place in an unhappily large literature. Fifty years ago the writings of F. W. Newman were possibly the most outstanding examples of the class. Of late examples have been rapidly multiplied. Only a few months ago we were all reading the sad account Mr. Gosse felt impelled to give us of how he drifted away from the somewhat narrow, indeed, but firm and lofty faith of his parents into a wider but less elevated freedom. Perhaps it is not wrong to conjecture that Mr. Gosse's volume may have been part of the impulse which has led Dr. Clarke to recount for us the mental processes through which he has passed in the gradual decay of his faith in the divine authority of the Christian Scriptures. At any rate, his winningly written book deserves a place by the side of Mr. Gosse's and arouses in the reader's mind much the same class of emotions.

It must not be supposed that Dr. Clarke thinks of his change of attitude towards the Bible as a process of decay. On the contrary, he

proclaims it a process of emancipation. In declining from the faith of his fathers, the faith in which he was bred, in the divine origin and authority of the Bible, it has seemed to him only that fetters have fallen from his limbs and he has stepped out into a large place. His hope is that in recording his experience of enlargement of spirit he may blaze out the path so that many will follow him. His purpose is not, then, purely one of recording. He is making of his experience a kind of propaganda. He wishes to present his drift as one "worthy of a child of God", and to commend it "to all his brothers in God's family" as a thing to be imitated. In losing the Bible he thinks he has found it.

This is no unusual contention. Mr. Gosse made it for his decline also. Indeed, it only represents the customary state of mind of those who have lightened the ship of their faith by throwing overboard all that they find difficult to apprehend or hard to conciliate with the habits of current thought. It is no doubt a great relief to feel no longer bound to believe what stands in the way of our comfortable satisfaction in the easy passage of our minds along the beaten road. "And let me tell you", writes Mr. R. A. Armstrong, who has rejected the divine Christ as Dr. Clarke has rejected the divine Bible (*The Place of Jesus in Modern Religion*, first essay)—"strange as it may appear—even paradoxical, perhaps—that just in proportion as the supernatural, the superhuman, has faded away out of my thought of Jesus, and he has become in my thought simple, natural, unmiraculous, largely subject to heredity and environment like all of us, human in his hopes and fears, human in his efforts and no doubt his errors, human in his faith and trust, human in his disappointments and final seeming failure—so much the more my heart has clung to him, the more he has drawn my love and veneration, the more I have longed to be like him, the more I have trusted what he has to tell me of the Father and his love, the more he has become a real and living influence in my life, a power capable of touching me to holier mood and braver effort." Similarly, Dr. Clarke protests that the more the supernatural and superhuman has faded away out of his thought of the Bible, the more frankly he has recognized its human shortcomings and errors and even immoralities, the more inspiring it has become to him, the more precious, the more trusted as a vehicle of the revelation of God. The change of view he has experienced, he vigorously asserts, was "necessary, was Christian, was beneficent". We fear that the illusion of elevation and enlargement expressed in such language is largely due to the greater comfort and freedom which is felt in the presence of Jesus or the Bible by those who are determined to go their own way, when they have persuaded themselves that Jesus or the Bible, as the case may be, has no right to exercise authority over their thought. The casting off of an authority may indeed bring a sense of release to those who chafe under its pressure: but if the authority cast off is rightful authority, it may be doubted whether it is real freedom which has been gained. The question of importance in any event is, not whether, when the obliga-

tions have been cast off, we feel blithe and free, but whether these are obligations which can rightly be cast off.

Dr. Clarke undertakes to set down the story of his change of attitude towards the Bible, from assured acceptance of it as a divinely authoritative book, trustworthy and final in all its deliverances, to free criticism of its contents with the result of rejection of large parts of them as untrue and even immoral and the utilization of the whole as scarcely more than an inspiration for our thought concerning divine things. The progress of this change of attitude he traces in considerable detail, and presents in a most readable and, we may add, affecting narrative. But the reader is impressed with the fact that no justification of it is given; or rather, to speak more precisely, that no justification is given of any of the stages of belief regarding the Scriptures which are described as succeeding one another. The progress of the change experienced is traced for us, the occasion of the emergence of its several stages is indicated, but no critical scrutiny of their propriety is attempted. So far as appears from the narrative, Dr. Clarke's original faith in the Scriptures as a divine book was purely traditional. He took it over from his parents and instructors and seems never to have made serious inquiry into the basis on which it rested. And his subsequent changes of attitude appear to have come to him similarly out of the atmosphere with which he was surrounded. There is at least no trace in the narrative of his having at any point of his changing views paused to subject the basis on which they rested to searching examination. It is quite possible that the narrative does him injustice here: undertaking merely to trace the processes of his mental development, his plan may have excluded the attempt to justify the successive changes of view through which he passed; and the illusion may be thus created that these several changes were one and all made without rational grounding. Such an illusion (if it be an illusion) is certainly created; and the impression is left very strongly fixed in the reader's mind that Dr. Clarke began with the "orthodox" belief in the Scriptures and has ended with the "liberal" view of them, alike, without having given to the question, What really are the Scriptures? any thorough investigation on its own merits. In other words, the story which he has narrated to us is on the face of it the story of a simple drift with the current of thought. In the mirror of his receptive mind he has apparently just reflected the dominating opinions of the times. When men in general were "orthodox", he too was "orthodox". When "liberal" ideas came to prevail, he too became "liberal" in his view.

This impression is somewhat strengthened by the occurrence of occasional turns of phrase which seem quite startlingly to suggest that Dr. Clarke has only desultorily looked into the main questions at issue. Thus, for example,—to adduce only a single instance—when he comes to speak of the Canon (p. 258), he remarks quite as if recounting a discovery: "Many years ago I became aware that if the Bible is to be recognized as absolutely authoritative, we must have a Canon that is settled by divine authority." That, however, one would have thought

a commonplace, which the slightest serious investigation would have made clear to any student of the subject from the beginning. Certainly the principle of the Canon has always been held "by the defenders of high inspiration" to be Divine gift through the Apostles, the authoritative founders of the Church, and its authentication as truly divine has been constantly found by them in the "testimony of the Holy Spirit in the heart". When Dr. Clarke expresses his wonder that "this point has been so persistently overlooked by the defenders of high inspiration", he only betrays that he has been very insufficiently informed as to the positions of the "defenders of high inspiration", and has persistently confused the subjectivism of the mediating theologians with their high supernaturalism.

One of the effects on the reader of the impression of mere drifting which Dr. Clarke's narrative conveys, is a feeling of the insecurity of his final position. This position is one of perfect freedom over against the Bible, but at the same time one which in some sense finds in the Bible the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. When defining his attitude as a theologian towards the Bible (p. 210), he says: "According to the principle that I accepted and acted upon, a system of Christian theology has God for its center, the spirit of Jesus for its organizing principle, and congenial truth from within the Bible and from without for its material." This is, of course, to make very little of the Bible in our theologizing. Not all its declarations are to be worked into our system and none of them have "the element of finality". Only such of them as are "congenial", that is, as are "congenial to the spirit of Jesus" as we conceive that spirit, are to be used by us; and these only along with any other notions which we may consider "congenial" to that spirit which we may think discernible outside the Bible. Thus the Bible is deprived of all uniqueness as a source of theology and as "authority" is set altogether aside. But, at least in Dr. Clarke's view, that "spirit of Jesus" which he makes the "organizing principle" of "Christian theology" is the gift of the Bible to us. He even declares (p. 253): "It is certain that the Bible gives us knowledge of Jesus, and that Jesus gives us knowledge of God, and that God as Jesus reveals him in [is?] the true light of life. Our sacred book is thus our guide to Jesus, to God, and to life divine." In so saying a certain uniqueness seems to be reserved to the Bible in its relation to our theologizing. We should be glad to think so; but we are constrained to add that we miss any solid grounding for even such a uniqueness. Dr. Clarke assures his readers, no doubt, that the faith that the Bible gives us the knowledge of Jesus "has been established in long human experience, and can be trusted". But he leaves them in grave uncertainty what amount of knowledge of Jesus the Bible gives us, and what kind of Jesus we may confidently derive from it. Dr. Clarke has committed himself far too deeply to the "new critical views" of the Bible to be able simply to take off of the face of Scripture as it stands the Jesus which lies open to view on it. And if he did, this Jesus by His whole attitude towards "the Scriptures" as truly as by His

express declarations regarding them would compel him to retrace his steps and to accord to the Scriptures that plenary authority as a witness to fact and doctrine alike which he has discarded. But if he is not to take off from the face of Scripture the Jesus that lies openly there, what Jesus does the Bible give true "knowledge of"? The "liberal theologians" of the last generation, discarding John in favor of the Synoptists and the other Synoptists in favor of Mark, and discriminating in Mark between the tradition of which he is the bearer and the theology which he superinduced upon it, managed to find "knowledge" in the Bible of a Jesus who fairly reflected in his teaching their own liberal thought. Our twentieth-century "eschatologists", working in their own way on the Biblical text, find "knowledge" in the Bible of an "ecstatic Jesus", the fair representative of first century Judaistic fanaticism. Which Jesus is it, or what Jesus is it, that Dr. Clarke finds that his eminently untrustworthy Bible gives him "knowledge" of,—who in turn is to give us our knowledge of God that is to stand as our test of truth—in the Bible and out of it? Obviously our conception of Jesus will depend on the view we take of the Scriptures from which we derive that conception; and if we are now to turn around and make our view of the contents of Scripture depend on the conception of Jesus which we derive from our reconstructed Scriptures, we seem to be in danger of falling into a circular movement of thought which promises us no very obvious issue. It would seem that we ought to find a starting point somewhere.

The fact appears to be that simple drifting scarcely offers us a safe guide for our theology or for our view of the Bible. We may follow Dr. Clarke's driftage with a profound interest and a deep sympathy. But the mere fact that he has drifted through these stages and feels comfortable and assured at the end of them, scarcely commends them to us as stages of opinion we should like ourselves to drift through or an issue at which we should ourselves like to arrive. We have an old-fashioned prejudice for reasoned views of truth; and we are in our hearts convinced that the Jesus which the Bible gives us is the Jesus of the orthodox faith and that the Bible which this Jesus has given us is the Bible of the orthodox faith. We are not unaware of the difficulties which attend both convictions. But we never expect to attain convictions on any matters of importance which are not attended with difficulties. And we prefer to rest our convictions on their own proper evidence and to leave the difficulties to be dealt with in detail as occasion offers and opportunity serves. If we could be convinced of nothing which offered difficulties to our faith, we could scarcely believe in God, or Man, or Salvation. The hardest thing to believe about the Bible, to our thinking, is that it can be a different kind of a book from what Jesus and His Apostles declare it to be. And the most difficult task we can conceive anyone setting himself is that of holding to the Jesus of the Bible and at the same time not holding to the Bible of Jesus. It is a task we may feel sure has never been accomplished. He who no longer holds to the Bible of Jesus—the word

of which cannot be broken—will be found on examination no longer to hold to the Jesus of the Bible. The new Bible he has constructed for himself gives him a new Jesus, and his whole system of truth, brought into harmony with what he considers the spirit of this new Jesus, is eccentric to the system of truth which is taught us by the real Bible which is placed in our hands by the real Jesus, to whom it bears consentient witness.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE. By DR. THEODOR VON HAERING, Professor of Dogmatics and Ethics in the University of Tübingen. Translated from the Second German Edition by James S. Hill, B.D., Rector of Stowey, Somerset. With an Introduction by Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D., Rector of Marylebone. 8vo; pp. xvi, 479. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. London: Williams and Norgate. 1909.

This is "distinctively a work on Christian practice. It assumes, as every Christian must, the existence of God, and the unique character of Christ and the Christian religion." Indeed, it is positively and avowedly supernaturalistic. It finds the deepest reason of the opposition to Christian ethics in this, that in the Christian faith 'these two things are taken in earnest; viz., the living personal God of holy love and other-worldliness.' As might be expected, it bases morality on religion. "History," it affirms, "has handed down no examples of whole nations firmly and permanently maintaining high moral ideals disconnected from religious belief." In like manner, it asserts the relation of Christian ethics to Christian dogmatics to be not only close but vital; and it insists, not merely on the present preëminence, but on the unsurpassibility of Christian ethics.

Nor is our author's plan less worthy of praise than are his presuppositions. It is both simple and comprehensive. His work is in two parts. Part I is apologetic. It states the "Fundamental Concepts of Ethics." It refutes the "Opponents of Christian Ethics;" such as, Nietzsche with his "devaluation of all values", the "Utilitarian", the "Evolutionist", the "Positivist", the "Pessimist", the adherents of "Mixed Systems." It finally vindicates "the truth of Christian Ethics" in the establishment of the authority of conscience, the reality of freedom, and the vital relation between religion and morality. Part II deals with "Christian Ethics as a Coherent System". After distinguishing between "Evangelical and Roman Catholic Ethics" and showing that it is the former which is in agreement with Scripture, it takes up "The Nature of the Christian Good". This it conceives to be the "Kingdom of God in Christ." The "Fundamental Notion" of this kingdom it finds to be "love" based on and regulated by law. "The Great Commandment" growing out of such love to God and our neighbor is then expounded after the example of Christ; and the "Love of God in Christ" is set forth as "the Deepest Spring of Action", "the Incentive and Motive Power" of the Christian life.

This leads to the exposition of "Individual Ethics"; and this is considered in relation to "the Commencement of the New Life", the "Development of the New Life", and "Virtue and Character". "Social Ethics" form the concluding and not least interesting section of the book. "Marriage and the Family", "Friendship", "the Industrial Life", the "Judgment of Christian Ethics on Economic Theories", "Science and Art", "the State", the "Church",—all are discussed from the moral standpoint, and the relation of the Christian to each of them is defined.

When an author moves continuously on so high a plane as does Dr. Haering, it is not easy and it may not be wise to particularize excellencies. Yet the reviewer is unwilling not to call attention to the emphasis laid on "legal right" as the necessary condition of evangelical love; to the clear denial "that there are such things as especial means of virtue rightly understood, ascetic exercises in the accurately defined sense;" to the illuminating discussion of the questions, How, and How far Christ may be an example to the Christian; to the whole section on Social Ethics, and particularly to its treatment of Socialism and of economic problems; and above all, to the author's constant insistence on an individual vocation from God as the basis of all ethical life.

On the other hand, there are defects which in fairness may not be passed over. The laws which should regulate Christian Liberty, if implied, are not discussed and defined; and that, too, though the writer must have had before his mind Calvin's great chapter on this subject. The obligation of the Sabbath and the grounds of divorce are not treated adequately or presented correctly. Though we are freed from the Moral Law as a condition of salvation, we are for that very reason bound by it as a rule of life; and if this be so, we can not see why all its commandments are not equally binding, and thus the Fourth as much as the Sixth or the Eighth: and as to divorce, it seems to us that I. Cor. VII: 10-15, even if it were rightly interpreted, should be treated much more in detail. The opinion that wilful and final desertion is a Scriptural and so true ground of divorce is sufficiently respectable to demand it. Beyond this, it is impossible not to see that Professor Haering, "like most of the younger school of German theologians, has felt the influence of Ritschl, and has adopted many of his theological methods, even when arriving at conclusions of his own." Thus, though making much of God's love for us in Christ as the great incentive to duty, he says nothing of God's gift of him to die for our sins as the supreme proof and illustration of the divine love for sinners. Yet to speak of God's love and not mention the cross is really to take the love out of the former. Again, while Christ is made the norm and the ground of the ethical life, and his kingdom its chief goal, there is a singular lack of emphasis on and even of reference to his true deity. Yet is it not the fact that he is this which gives to him his unique and his supreme place in relation to the ethical life? If he were only the perfect man, could he be the abstract ideal and the absolute authority? Ideals and authority presuppose law, and law presupposes an origin higher than that of those whom it binds. Once

more, while the Scriptures are constantly appealed to and are given peculiar honor, they are hardly taken as "the only and infallible rule of faith and practice." In his commendable zeal to maintain the rights of the individual conscience our author has exalted it above the Word. He would seem to give it the right, not only to interpret for itself the Word, but to judge it. In short, the final appeal would appear to be to the consciousness of the individual Christian and not "to the Law and to the Testimony."

Our limits permit us to add only that "the translator has done his best to present Professor Haering's work in as fair a form as a style occasionally difficult to follow admits," and that an "Index to Scripture Passages Quoted" and a "General Index" make this somewhat bulky volume easy to use.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

MISERY AND ITS CAUSES. By EDWARD T. DEVINE, Ph.D., LL.D., Schiff Professor of Social Economy, Columbia University, General Secretary of the Charity Organization Society of the City of New York, and Editor of "The Survey". 8vo; xi, 274. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1909. Price, \$1.25, net.

Both from his position and from his work it might have been expected that Professor Devine would give us an informing book on the important and difficult question which he discusses. He has done more and better. In spite of his melancholy theme, his essay is also interesting to the point of fascination. This is due not only to his clear and graceful style, but to his optimism. The problem which he considers is one which he believes can, to a large degree, be solved.

This problem is not that of all misery or of misery in itself. Our author does not take up the question of punishment. He rules out at the beginning all misery which is "the result of depravity", which, in a word, men bring on themselves. Neither does he deal with the deprivations and hardships connected with genuine poverty; that is, to poverty due to providential dispensations beyond human control. On the contrary, it is the surplus misery of our day that he considers, that which neither the individual has brought on himself nor God has "laid on him," but which comes, proximately from social maladjustment; and this misery he regards as embracing the majority of human ills.

As examples of these maladjustments he discusses "Out of Health", "Out of Work", "Out of Friends". Then in a carefully developed chapter, with the aid of numerous diagrams based on the reports of the agents of the Charity Organization Society, he presents the variety and the proportion of the "adverse conditions" which may be expected in any thousand of the families of the poor of New York. Finally, he indicates the lines along which maladjustments may be overcome and

universal justice and prosperity may, to the largest degree possible, be established.

On this fascinating and able essay the reviewer would remark:

1. The author's general attitude is highly to be commended. He is no socialist. Unlike many sociologists, too, he is alive to what the church has done. He understands that "no man comes to the Municipal Lodging House or to the Bowery bread-line through the route of regular attendance at church and Sunday-school"; and he is "very ready to believe that the church, for all those to whom it makes effective appeal, is the greatest of all safe-guards against such misery as comes from lack of friends". Nor does he underestimate the importance of religion in any scheme for social reformation. "Spiritual power directed towards the several causes of misery", he deems, "a very essential feature of the ideal community".

2. His conception of the lines along which social reform should proceed is sane. "Sound heredity; protected childhood; a prolonged working age; freedom from preventable disease and from professional crime; indemnity against the economic losses occasioned by death, accident, illness, and compulsory idleness; rational education; charity; normal standards of living and a social religion,—these surely" are, if not all the ends, yet chief ends, to be striven for, if we would bring in the brighter day. Nor is our author incorrect in emphasizing the importance of a vigorous and an incessant propaganda along these lines. Though there are many who know their duty but do not care to do it, there are also many who would do their duty, or would at least come nearer to doing it, if only they knew it. It is not sufficient to tell men to "follow Jesus"; they must be taught what it means to-day, amid the complex conditions of modern civilization, to follow him: and while it is true that no man or no society was ever made moral by act of legislature, it is also true that legislatures have a great deal to do with the correction of those maladjustments which, if not the causes, are the occasions of much of the misery of our age. Hence, we regard it as one of the hopeful signs of our time that books such as this of Professor Devine are being written and are being widely read. We need to know that there are social maladjustments; what they are, and how serious they are. In a profound sense it is true that "the people are perishing for lack of knowledge".

3. And yet, admirable though our author's discussion is, it is not well-balanced. He overestimates the significance of adverse physical or mental conditions. These are important; but we cannot admit that "defect of character sufficiently noticeable to be recorded is present, to our knowledge, in only a little over two-fifths of all cases, while over three-fourths of them are physically or mentally handicapped in some way or in numerous ways, at the time of application" (p. 226). That physical and mental handicaps are as numerous as this we do not question; but that defects of character are as relatively few and unimportant we cannot allow. Such an approach to moral perfection we do not find anywhere.

Moreover, physical and mental maladjustments are in their origin moral, and so demand moral treatment. Even if by social control society could be properly reorganized; it would not continue so, if there were only or chiefly social control. Causes must be eradicated, if any permanent good is to result from the removal of occasions. Were all the poor in New York to be provided to-morrow with work at a living wage, does any one suppose that even the next day the situation would be the same? Would not some employers be cutting wages? Would not some of the employed be losing interest in their jobs?

Besides this, indispensable though education is, it is not omnipotent. Socrates to the contrary, to know duty is not always or necessarily to do it. Ignorance is largely responsible for much wretchedness, but is it the fact that "ignorance is at the bottom of the greater part of the misery which we encounter"? (p. 260) To our minds the heart is more at fault than the head. At this point the Roman poet was nearer the truth than the Attic philosopher. "I know the better course, I follow the worse"—this dictum best describes the situation. Necessary, therefore, though education as to misery and its causes is, regeneration is needed first of all and above all; and regeneration, social as well as individual, social because it must begin as individual, can be effected only by the power of God.

4. This, however, is not to minimize the value of books such as that under review or of works such as that to which it refers. Even the spiritual regeneration of society would fail of its object, if it were not followed by social education and reformation. As has been intimated, it is in order to these. The child is born that he may be nurtured and trained, and men are regenerated that they may learn and teach the truth and confirm "the divine order of human society."

Moreover, this is an undertaking of such magnitude and complexity that, particularly in this age of specialization, it may well stand by itself. The social reformer ought to be profoundly religious, but he need not work, perhaps *he* would better not work, along lines distinctively religious. To point out the occasions of misery and to introduce the best methods for the removal of these and for the development of social righteousness—this is enough for any mere man to attempt. Were he to go further and to try also to discover and to eradicate the cause, he would undertake too much. The social reformer and the preacher of the Gospel should be in closest sympathy. The preacher must call out and in this sense create the reformer; the reformer must proceed on the doctrine of the preacher: but if the reformer adds the work of the preacher to his own, he is likely to fail as a reformer as signally as he is sure to fail as a preacher. In a word, so vast and so complex a science is sociology, that one must be a specialist in it if he is to do anything of value along its lines.

5. What, then, of the insistent demand that the preacher should also be a reformer, that the theologian should also be a sociologist? On its face it is absurd. It is the flat denial of the most pronounced and generally accepted educational tendency of our day, the tendency to special-

ization. If sociology be the most comprehensive and difficult of all the sciences except one, that one is theology, "the science of the sciences" because it is the science of Him "in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." Therefore, if the theologian and preacher does not need to be a specialist, no one needs to.

Of course, it may be urged that theology has been outgrown and that the preaching of religion is passing. This, however, our author is far from urging. This no Christian can tolerate for a moment: for Christ affirms nothing more clearly than the necessity of regeneration to reformation (St. John iii); and his Word teaches nothing more positively than that, infants and other mental incompetents aside, regeneration comes through the Gospel and never apart from the Gospel. This, moreover, would seem to be indicated even for the agnostic sociologist by the general inefficiency of merely social reform. If without such reform the Gospel falls short of its true result, without the Gospel such reform spends itself in changing environment merely. Hence, while it often modifies and even refines vices; as it leaves the evil itself in men unchanged, it must itself continually be modified. Its work is never done; it never can be done: after its most brilliant achievements, the stone has always to be rolled up again.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PUBLIC SPEAKING. By WALTER DILL SCOTT. 1907. Cloth, 12mo. Pp. 222.

Professor Scott, following the tendency of modern education to make all studies practical, shows in this book how the teachings of modern psychology can be made very helpful to the public speaker. The different forms of mental imagery and their effect on the emotions; the modern theories of the emotions and the principles of their expression; the fluctuation of attention and its connection with the rhythm of the sentence; the psychology of the crowd as it differs from that of the individual; and the various means by which an audience can be influenced, are clearly explained and illustrated, and practical suggestions given. The book is very readable, and will be especially helpful to those who are not familiar with the "New Psychology."

Princeton.

HENRY W. SMITH.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY. Chicago. October. Does the Historical Study of Religions Yield a Dogmatic Theology? Professor Hugh R. Mackintosh. The Hellenization of the Jews between 334 B. C. and 70 A. D. George Holley Gilbert, Ph.D., D.D. Non-Religious Persons. Professor Edward Scribner Ames, Ph.D. The Workings of Modernism. J. R. Slattery. Veridical Aspects of Mystical Experience.

Bernard C. Ewer, Ph.D. *Present-Day Religious Tendencies in India.* Hem Chandra Sarkar. *Notes on the Freer Gospels.* Professor Edgar J. Goodspeed, Ph.D. *John Mill on the Latin Gospels.* Professor Eb. Nestle, Theol. D.

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA. Oberlin. October. John Bunyan. Albert H. Currier. Ferris' "Formation of the New Testament." Parke P. Flournoy. *The Scientific Foundation of Belief in God.* D. Gath Whitley. *Epic and Lyric Poetry.* James Lindsay. *Parliamentary Law a World Institution.* Raymond L. Bridgman. *John Calvin's Calvinism.* Wolcott Calkins. *Calvinism and Darwinism.* *The First Three Chapters of Wellhausen's Prolegomena.* Harold M. Wiener.

CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW. London. October. *The Moravian Church and the Proposals of the Lambeth Conference.* Professor W. N. Schwarze. *The Problem of Morals in France.* *The History and Psychology of Religion.* F. B. Jevons, Litt. D. *Gnosticism and Early Christianity in Egypt.* P. D. Scott-Moncrief. *Eschatology and the Kingdom of Heaven.* George Tyrrell. Professor G. E. Newson. *George Howard Wilkinson, Primus of the Scottish Church.* George Body, D.D.

EXPOSITOR. London. November. *Did Christ Contemplate the Admission of the Gentiles into the Kingdom of Heaven?* Professor J. B. Mayor, Litt.D. *Historical Commentary on the First Epistle to Timothy.* Professor Sir W. M. Ramsay, D.C.L., LL.D., D.D. *The Body of Christ.* The Rev. Principal Alfred E. Garvie, D.D. *The Trial of Jesus.* Rev. E. H. Askwith, D.D. *The Christ of the Fourth Gospel.* Rev. R. H. Strachan. *The Passover and the Days of Unleavened Bread.* Rev. Professor B. D. Eerdmans, D.D. *The Dependence of Early Christianity upon non-Jewish Religions.* Rev. Professor Carl Clemen, D.D., Ph.D.

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW. Cambridge. October. *The Religion of the Future.* Charles W. Eliot. *What is Vital in Christianity?* Josiah Royce. *Modern Methods in New Testament Philology.* Samuel Angus. *Some Aspects of the Religious Philosophy of Rudolph Eucken.* Howard N. Brown. *Froude; or the Historian as a Preacher.* Paul Revere Frothingham. *The Standard Bible Dictionary.* George F. Moore.

HIBBERT JOURNAL. Boston and London. October. *Germany and England.* Professor Adolf Harnack. *The Christian Religion as a Healing Power.* Rev. Dr. Samuel McComb. *Luke the Physician and Ancient Medicine.* Rev. John Naylor. *Ptolemaic and Copernican Views of the Place of Mind in the Universe.* Professor S. Alexander, LL.D. *Modernism: a Retrospect and a Prospect.* Rev. Alfred Fawkes, M.A. *Jesus or Christ? A Rejoinder.* Rev. R. Roberts. *Calvin and Calvinism.* Professor E. Troeltsch. *Darwin and Darwinism.* Professor Borden P. Bowne. *A Paladin of Philanthropy.* Rev. F. G. Peabody, D.D. *Crime and Punishment.* Sir William Collins, M.P. *Historical Fact in Relation to Philosophy of Religion.* Rev. Dr. F. R. Tennant.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. Philadelphia. October. Meaning of Literature for Philosophy. Ernest Albee. The Unique Case of Socrates. Charles M. Bakewell. Knowledge and Practice. J. E. Creighton. Religion and the Psychical Life. Edward Scribner Ames. The Organization of Truth. John Wright Buckham. Ethics and Politics. R. M. MacIver. Religion and Morality. Henry W. Wright.

IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY. Dublin and New York. October. Truth and Toleration. Rev. Leslie J. Walker, S. J. The Mosaic Authorship of Deuteronomy. Rev. Francis E. Gigot. Repetition of Extreme Unction. Rev. T. Slater, S. J. "He Shall Be Saved, Yet So as by Fire." Rev. Hugh Pope, O. P. Scholasticism and Modern Thought. Rev. P. Coffey, Ph.D. The Biblical Commission and the First Three Chapters of Genesis.

JOURNAL OF THEOLOGICAL STUDIES. London. October. Historical Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament. IV. The Languages of the Early Church. C. H. Turner. Philo and the Catholic Judaism of the First Century. J. H. A. Hart. The *Vetus Itala* of the *Exultet*. Rev. H. M. Bannister. The Two Witnesses. Rev. T. A. Lacey. The oldest MS of St. Justin's Martyrdom. F. C. Burkitt. Liturgical Comments and Memoranda. III. Edmund Bishop. The Festivals of St. James and St. John in the Mozarabic Kalendar. Rev. W. C. Bishop. Deuteronomic Judgments of the Kings of Judah. Rev. E. Day, D.D. Old Testament. S. A. Cook. New Testament. Revs. J. F. Bethune-Baker, G. Milligan, A. E. Brooke, and P. C. T. Crick. Patrisca. A. Souter, Litt. D.

LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW. London. October. The Modern Challenge to Foreign Missions. Alfred E. Garvie, M.A., D.D. The Problem of the Unemployed. Edward Grubb, M.A. Lights and Shadows of Mystical Religion. W. T. Davison, M.A., D.D. Lucretius; the Precursor of Modern Science. Edward Walker, M.D. The Reconstruction of the World of the Hebrews. W. F. Lofthouse, M.A. Holiness, Symbolic and Real. J. Agar Beet, D.D. Frederic Chopin. Frederick Lawrence. The Ethical Emphasis in Modern Religious Teaching. Percy C. Ainsworth. The Larger Education. W. B. Fitzgerald.

LUTHERAN CHURCH REVIEW. Philadelphia. October. The Non-Religious Factors of the German Reformation. C. M. Jacobs, A.M. Martin Chemnitz. Prof. H. E. Jacobs, D.D., LL.D. The Church and our Civilization. J. C. Kunzman, D.D. Is the Teaching of the Second Article of the Form of Concord Concerning the Freedom of the Will Reactionary? II. C. B. Gohdes, A.M. The Lutheran Doctrine of Justification by Faith. H. Offermann, D.D. The Problem of the City and How the Church Can Meet It. F. K. Fretz, Ph.D. The Synoptic Problem. II. A. T. W. Steinhäuser, A. M. The Education Situation of To-Day and Its Relation to the Lutheran Church in America. Austin D. Crile, A.M. The Grace of the Inner Life. J. C. F. Rupp, A.M. The Emmanuel Movement. William Nelson, A.M.

LUTHERAN QUARTERLY. Gettysburg. October. James William Rich-

ard, D.D., LL.D. Professor S. G. Hefelbower. The Teaching Function of the Christian Ministry. Rev. E. D. Weigle, D.D. The Essentials of Pulpit Power. Professor J. A. Clutz, D.D. The Old and the New Theology Compared. Lewis J. Motscham. An Empirical Study of Evangelistic Meetings. Rev. A. Bunn Van Ormer. Is the Lutheran Church Productive of Piety? Professor L. H. Larimer. Are Denominational Colleges a Necessity? Rev. Hugh Johnston, D.D. John Calvin: His Place in History. Rev. D. W. Woods. Luther and Calvin. Professor J. A. Singmaster, D.D. The General Synod and the Book of Concord. Rev. John F. Crigler. An Exegetical Study of Romans 6: 1-6. Rev. J. C. Jacoby, D.D.

METHODIST REVIEW. New York. November-December. The Preacher as Evangelist. President Herbert Welch, D.D., LL.D. Modernism in the Roman Catholic Church. Professor H. C. Sheldon, D.D. Evolution and Sin. D. C. Knowles, D.D. The Eternal Life as Based on the Teachings of Jesus. F. M. Harvey, A.M. The Religious Training of the Young. C. W. McCormick, D.D. The Religion of Dr. Johnson. Ernest Richards, B.D. Frechette, Poet of Liberty and of Faith. Rev. E. C. E. Dorion, A.M.

METHODIST REVIEW QUARTERLY. Nashville. October. The Old Order Changing in Changeless Old China. A. P. Parker. John Calvin: the Man and His Work. B. B. Warfield. Robert Browning, the Subtle Poet of the Soul. J. O. Knott. The Darkening Shadow of the Negro Problem. J. P. Hollis. The Effects of Temperament and Life on Philosophy. J. J. Tigert. Fatigue: Its Scientific and Practical Aspects. D. S. Hill. Legitimate Speculation and Gambling. G. W. Dyer. Dwight L. Moody and His Schools. E. T. Curnick. God in Great World Movements. W. F. Lloyd. "The Cosmic Chill" and Its Cure. W. Harrison.

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. New York and Lancaster. November. French Works on the History of Philosophy during 1907-08. Professor Victor Delbos. Individuality and Freedom. Professor Ellen Bliss Talbot. The Postulates of a Self-critical Epistemology. Professor E. C. Spaulding.

REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW. Lancaster. October. The Religious Significance of Tennyson's "In Memoriam." W. Wilberforce Deatrick, Sc.D. The Rights and Limits of Biblical Criticism. Professor William C. Schaeffer, D.D. Christian Life and its Relation to Christian Cultus. Professor John I. Swander, Ph.D., D.D. The Ethics of the Gospels. Rev. E. E. Kresge. The Spiritual Self-culture of the Minister. C. B. Schneder, D.D. Authority in Religion. A. C. Shuman, D.D. A New Defense of Theism. S. S. Heberd. Contemporary Sociology. Professor A. V. Hiester.

REVIEW AND EXPOSITOR. Louisville. October. The Influence of the Sudan upon Jewish History. Professor A. H. Sayce. Calvin as a Civic and Social Influence. Professor George Boardman Eager, D.D., LL.D. The Calvinism of Calvin. Professor A. H. Newman, D.D., LL.D. Calvin as an Interpreter. Professor A. T. Robertson, D.D.

Dr. Daniel Featley and the First Calvinistic Baptist Confession. Professor W. J. McGlothlin, Ph.D., D.D. Tennyson's Religious Life. Miss A. G. Weld. Some Thoughts as to the Effects of the Death of Christ. Professor David Foster Estes, D.D. The Epistle to the Hebrews Studied through its Inductive Logical Forms. Mrs. John G. Roach.

THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY. St. Louis. October. The Murderous Pope. Diaphoroi Baptismoï. The Proof Texts of the Catechism with a Practical Commentary.

UNION SEMINARY MAGAZINE. Richmond. October-November. The Sin of a Strange Fire. James I. Vance. An Ideal Seminary Course in the English Bible. Theron H. Rice. The Conquering Kingdom. C. R. Vaughn. What is Pragmatism? Harris E. Kirk. The Temptation of Jesus. D. H. Rolston. Cuban Romanism. R. L. Wharton.

REVUE D'HISTOIRE ECCLESIASTIQUE. Louvain. Juillet. La sanctification d'après saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie (suite et fin). Joseph Mahé, S. J. Un recueil manuscrit de sermons prononcés aux conciles de Constance et de Bâle. J. M. Vidal. La réconciliation de l'Angleterre avec le Saint-Siège sous Marie Tudor. Légation du cardinal Polus en Angleterre (1553-1554) (a suivre). R. Ancel, O. S. B.

REVUE DE THÉOLOGIE ET DE PHILOSOPHIE. Lausanne. Juillet-Aout. Les relations de Calvin avec Lausanne. H. Vuilleumier. Quelques gloses des évangiles. H. Chavannes. Le parler en langues selon le livre des Actes. Emile Lombard.

REVUE DE THÉOLOGIE ET DES QUESTIONS RELIGIEUSES. Montauban. Septembre. Notre campagne contre le P. Tyrrell. Pierre Batiffol. Autour de l'Affaire Tyrrell. Raoul Gout. Les origines de l'idée de Dieu (suite). Henri Bois. L'affaire Tyrrell (suite). Raoul Gout. Seconde note supplémentaire sur Luc XVII, 21. A. Wabnitz. Une version nouvelle des livres apocryphes de l'Ancien Testament. Ch. Bruston. L'eschatologie évangélique. L'interprétation des Apocalypses. A. Causse.

NOTE.

The review of "The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, Vol. IV", pp. 110-114, was written by Willis J. Beecher of Auburn, N. Y. [Ed.]

